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19 Aug 22. Somalia: Hotel Attack.
EVENT
On 19 August, three gunmen infiltrated Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu, reportedly detonating at least two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) near the gates of the premises before opening fire on guests. According to Somali police and media reports, at least two senior security officials – including the head of the intelligence service in Mogadishu – were injured in the attack.
At the time of writing, reports say the attackers have barricaded themselves in the hotel with hostages. The Al-Qaeda-linked terror group Al-Shabab has allegedly claimed responsibility.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The Hayat is among the popular venues used by government officials for meetings, with Al-Shabab having previously targeted other hotels using similar tactics (e.g., Afrik Hotel attack, February 2021). The hotel is located close to key international facilities near the airport and a short distance from the Banadir Camp, which militants previously targeted in March this year.
- The attack is the most significant to occur in Mogadishu since the election on May, and comes a few days after a US airstrike reportedly killed 13 Al-Shabab militants in support of the Somali military.
- In recent months, the Somali government has increased engagement with international partners to combat terrorism in an effort to attract more investment in the country. Al-Shabab is likely retaliating against these measures with the latest attack.
FORECAST
In the immediate term, given the Hayat’s location on Wadada Garoonka road, the attack is likely to disrupt or delay access to the airport from the centre of town as security forces work to retake control of the hotel.
Although unverified claims of external funding (e.g. from Iran) suggest the group may be increasing its capabilities to conduct larger attacks, the group’s modus operandi in urban areas is likely to remain opportunistic, particularly towards strategically valuable targets near the airport and UN facilities.
The new government under President Mohamud will remain under pressure to enhance counter-insurgent capabilities over the coming weeks and months. In the meantime, it is highly likely that Al-Shabab will plan further attacks to disrupt Mohamud’s efforts to achieve post-election political reconciliation in the country.
(Source: Sibylline)
19 Aug 22. China pressure deepens Taiwan’s desire for big US weapon systems. Call for jets and ships widens gulf on procurement policy between Taipei and its main arms supplier Taiwanese soldiers at a military exercise in Hualien county on Thursday. Intensified military pressure from China has reinforced Taiwan’s desire to acquire large weapons platforms such as warships and fighter aircraft, deepening Taipei’s differences over arms procurement with the US. China’s People’s Liberation Army this month conducted unprecedented week-long exercises to punish Taipei for hosting US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and has since continued daily air and sea manoeuvres close to Taiwan. Taiwanese government and military officials see this campaign as evidence that Beijing’s preferred strategy is not to invade their country, but to force it to submit to Chinese control through military pressure below the threshold of war. Officials said this meant Washington should adjust its policy of pushing Taiwan to prioritise cheap, small and mobile weapons such as man-portable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that are deemed essential to resist a full invasion. The US is Taiwan’s main arms supplier. A senior Taiwanese government official briefed on national security issues said the PLA Navy had ships “pushing up” against the Taiwan Strait median line every day, as well as a vessel on the western and on the eastern side of the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines and a “regular presence” between Taiwan and the Japanese island of Yonaguni. “To push back against these 500-tonne ships, medium and large-size warships are really necessary,” the official said. “In this situation, it is very hard to simply argue we should replace our ageing large platforms with small and mobile boats and missiles,” the official added. “If you just focus on coastal defence, the only thing you can counter is when they’re really storming onshore.”
In the light of growing US concerns that China might attack Taiwan within the next five years, Washington is trying to force Taipei to prioritise “asymmetric” weapons — systems that exploit an adversary’s weakness instead of trying to match its strengths. This year, President Joe Biden’s administration began denying Taiwanese requests for large, expensive systems that it argued were not efficient in deterring an invasion. Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s government initially acquiesced to that course over resistance within its own defence establishment. But officials said the country’s most immediate defence needs must be reassessed in the light of what both Taipei and Washington have called a Chinese attempt to change the status quo around Taiwan. “The PLA’s latest operations show how different Taiwan’s situation is from the Ukraine war,” said Shu Hsiao-huang, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a think-tank backed by the defence ministry. “We need to strengthen both our asymmetric and our traditional defences.” The Chinese military has said its campaign has “destroyed” the median line, previously an unofficial buffer that its fighter aircraft now cross daily, and that it intended to conduct regular patrols closer to Taiwan. Taipei is concerned that this “new normal” will help Beijing underpin its claim of sovereignty over the island. “If we do not counter these attempts to constrain us, this could enable them to coerce us into unification at some point,” said one military official.(Source: FT.com)
19 Aug 22. Nigeria: Threats Of Attacks.
Key Takeaways
- The threat of Islamist attacks in and around the capital Abuja has increased significantly in recent months, with July marking a notable rise in militant activity in areas surrounding the city.
- Recent attacks underline the jihadists’ capacity to co-opt bandit groups and to extend their operational reach southwards. The re-emergence of the Ansaru terrorist group is likely to exacerbate the worsening security environment as the group consolidates its influence within rural areas around the capital.
- A lull in attacks since the start of August is partly due to the effectiveness of a recently increased security posture in and around Abuja. However, the security forces have neglected the root cause of the insecurity, failing to establish a consistent on-the-ground presence in states where jihadist-aligned bandits are present. A latent threat of attacks will therefore endure within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
- If militants launch significant offensives in the coming weeks, the authorities will likely temporarily disrupt internet and telecommunications services in affected regions, impacting businesses’ ability to communicate with staff on the ground. This will impact drivers moving goods in particular, resulting in a disproportionately negative effect on logistics firms and supply chains.(Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 22. South Africa needs an integrated national maritime security strategy. The South African Navy is unable to be responsible for the nation’s maritime security by itself, and an integrated maritime security strategy is required to bring together multiple roleplayers to meet existing and emerging threats and challenges.
This was the gist of a workshop organised by the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) of Stellenbosch University, the Institute for Security Studies Africa, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Stellenbosch last month. It was attended by academics, experts and officials from foreign countries who fleshed out the need for an integrated maritime security strategy and the next steps required to take it forward.
Elaborating on the need for an integrated maritime security strategy, Emeritus Professor Francois Vrey, Research Coordinator at SIGLA, in a research brief noted that “in the case of Africa, the naval dimension within an overall NMSS [National Maritime Security Strategy] is often too small, expensive, and weakly developed to be seen as the primary or lead actor.” As a result, an integrated NMSS is needed to draw together government departments and specialist agencies, as a multiplicity of actors are needed to ensure the ever-widening scope of maritime security.
“South Africa remains a pivotal player on the African continent but lacks a NMSS and thus projects a somewhat opaque maritime security commitment. As far as maritime affairs and Africa goes, South Africa as a lead African country appears to be strangely out of step or late in bringing its national maritime security house in order and so limits the optimal use of coercive, persuasive, and cooperative pathways to secure its maritime interests.
“South Africa must more fully cloak its maritime interests in an integrated NMSS to become a recognised maritime player by 2030, back Operation Phakisa with credible and smart security arrangements and so project the country as a credible maritime security partner and maritime player on the African continent and beyond,” Vrey stated in his brief.
Toral Vadgama, Programme Coordinator, Indian Ocean West, UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme, believes an integrated maritime security strategy for South Africa “is absolutely critical.” She said the UNODC will support this cause as best it can, and added that a growing number of states and regions have found great benefits in bringing experts together to develop maritime security strategies.
“This region is crisscrossed by countless trade routes but bad actors exploit these routes, undermine good governance, increase the likelihood of war and violence, perpetuate lawlessness and corruption. Vast transnational maritime security challenges include smuggling, exploitation of people, trafficking, and depletion of marine resources to name a few,” she said.
“Global reliance on the maritime domain necessitates increased attention to maritime security. The March 2021 closure of the Suez Canal is a classic example of a single incident with a single vessel that can have security and other consequences felt around the word.”
Africa’s population is expected to grow tremendously and the Indian Ocean will take over from the Atlantic and Pacific as the most important maritime trade route, especially as the Suez Canal may eventually run out of capacity. This will be “of exceptional importance for South Africa.” Growing populations will lead to a strain on maritime resources, and will require new approaches to sustainability and enforcement.
A maritime security strategy is needed, she said, for effective ocean governance and investment in the blue economy. An integrated maritime security strategy covers security, governance, and the maritime economy. All government agencies with a maritime connection need to be involved, but civil and private sector can get involved as well, with the wider the input the better.
At the workshop on 28 and 29 July, representatives from Ghana, India, and Kenya shared their countries’ experiences in developing maritime security strategies. Raghvendra Kumar, Associate Fellow, National Maritime Foundation (NMF) New Delhi, explained the development of the Indian Navy’s “Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015”. The process, evolution, drivers and challenges were discussed during this presentation. The speaker from the NMF stressed how the ‘maritime dependence’ of nations is an important marker for the need for devising strategies, to not only secure the maritime domain but also sustainably harness its economic potential. In this regard, Kumar said that maritime security strategy should focus on holistic maritime security that is, “freedom from threats arising in, or from or through the seas”.
Speaking about the need for stability, peace and prosperity in India’s maritime neighbourhood, Kumar said that a secure and stable neighbourhood is in India’s interests because money and investment go where there is stability. An unstable region sees the flight of investment, and a decline in growth and development. Kumar emphasised that where there is peace and security, peaceful coexistence cooperation will naturally occur.
Speaking about challenges, he said that states need to have a clear distinction between capacity and capability. Some states might have ample capacity (material resources) whereas some have ample capability (intangible resources like skills, training, knowledge etc.) but capacity without capability would render the former ineffective. Against this backdrop, he said, “We have resource constraints so we have to cooperate to dominate in the region.”
Developing Ghana’s maritime security strategy
Osei Bonsu Dickson from Ghana’s Ministry of National Security told workshop attendees that in response to rising concern about maritime insecurity, Ghana developed an integrated maritime strategy. The National Maritime Security Technical Working Group (NMSTWG) realised the need for a whole of government approach. Dickson said that when talking about maritime security and protecting the sea, the discussion has to include employment and other ways to make it relevant, such as its contribution to GDP.
The NMSTWG comprised representatives from Ghana’s ministries of national security, transport, fisheries, defence, energy, finance, foreign affairs and other entities within the government. Consultations with key maritime players included the energy community, fishing community, enforcement, intelligence and naval communities, industry players, the legislative community, business community, shipping community, researchers, engineers, universities, economic planners etc.
The end goal was to identify and respond to maritime threats and ensure economic sustainability and development in Ghana’s waters. The integrated maritime strategy deals with issues like piracy, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, robbery, illegal bunkering, ship to ship transfers, maritime boundary disputes, drug trafficking, people smuggling, critical infrastructure disruption, ecological and environmental issues.
Dickson said lessons learnt were that political will is crucial; the public needs to be educated to ensure buy-in; realistic timeframes need to be developed, and the strategy should be kept open to further developments and updates.
The Kenyan experience
Ambassador Nancy Karigithu, Kenya’s Principal Secretary, State Department for Shipping & Maritime, shared Kenya’s experience in developing a national maritime security strategy. She explained that Kenya’s blue economy contributes $1.5bn annually to the country’s GDP with the potential to generate more than double that. However, a diverse array of maritime security threats include piracy, terrorism, wildlife, drug and weapon smuggling, and IUU fishing. Between 2008 and 2021, Kenyan waters were classified as a high risk area by the international shipping industry due to piracy and terrorism, meaning higher freight rates and insurance, and fewer vessels transiting. The establishment of the Kenya Coast Guard Service in 2018 helped return the confidence of the international shipping industry and resulted in the reduction of the high risk area in mid-2021.
Karigithu explained that securing Kenya’s maritime domain needed a whole of government approach, with some 20 departments involved in the maritime sector to some degree or another. To address bureaucracy, actors had to be linked together and sea blindness addressed with education programmes targeting the public and policy makers.
Critical support and institutional accountability from the topmost leadership of the state is necessary, she said, as is a whole of government approach, awareness across society and establishing enforcement institutions. Politicians need to be shown the economic importance of maritime security, as maritime security alone does not get support.
Kobus Marais, Democratic Alliance shadow defence minister, echoed that defence is not a vote-winning priority. He said government needs to be convinced that Operation Phakisa’s blue economy initiative can make an enormous contribution to South Africa’s GDP. As South Africa’s economy is in poor shape, the reduced defence budget means technology needs to be used as a force multiplier, such as satellites and maritime surveillance aircraft as well as cyber technology, and South Africa needs to work together with other countries on maritime security. Other roleplayers need to be brought in as well, from the Navy to the Border Management Authority and private sector.
South Africa’s Maritime Road Map
South Africa has developed a Maritime Road Map that includes a maritime security component. One of its authors, senior researcher Nikki Funke from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), emphasised that South Africa has 3 924 kms of coastline and a “sea-land” area that is three times bigger than its land size. The country is positioned on a major shipping route and 58% of South Africa’s gross domestic product is based on trade and 98% of South Africa’s trade volume moves by ships. However, in spite of these impressive numbers, South Africans generally do not recognise their country as a maritime nation.
Consequently, the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA), in collaboration with the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the South African International Maritime Institute (SAIMI), appointed the CSIR to develop the Maritime Road Map, for South Africa to be globally recognised as a maritime nation by 2030. One of the eight key objectives is prioritising the safety and security and military protection within and beyond South Africa’s exclusive economic zone.
At present, a problem is that of foreign fishing which is currently impacting on the EEZ. Attention also needs to be paid to increased protection against pirates in order to secure the Southern African trade routes and facilitate activities such as oil and gas exploration. “In this regard, it can be argued that maritime security is a prerequisite for sustainable development and that securing the maritime domain is very important to protecting South Africa’s national interest,” the Road Map states.
Interventions in this regard include enhancing existing technologies and conducting research to promote safety and security in the maritime sector. South Africa, the Road Map notes, has already developed technologies (e.g. a satellite system and stratospheric communications platform) that can be used to avoid the capturing of ships by pirates. The Road Map suggests unmanned aircraft could be deployed to monitor the maritime environment, and existing sensor networks (space, radar, optics, an automatic identification system etc.) could be harnessed and combined for the management and protection of the maritime EEZ, assets and resources.
“The possibility of having an entity such as a coast guard by means of building on existing capabilities (e.g. those of the SA Navy) should also be investigated. South Africa is in the process of establishing a border management agency, which is envisaged to also support some of these functions. SAN should also be seen as a key player in the sector, with a focus on innovations that are technically at the cutting edge in terms of its requirements and which could potentially also support the maritime industry.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
18 Aug 22. Project Thusano to cost SA close to R3bn. When the Cuban/South African defence and military co-operation agreement and its Project Thusano contracts end in three years, the South African taxpayer will have paid over R2.9bn to the Caribbean Island state.
Justifying the expenditure to Cuba, which started in 2015, Defence and Military Veterans Minister Thandi Modise is on record as saying “South Africa has historical relations with Cuba and nothing will change that”.
Her comment forms part of a written reply to Project Thusano questions posed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) shadow minster for Modise’s portfolio, Kobus Marais.
He wanted to know what the remaining terms of the “two main contracts” entered into under Project Thusano are as well as their monetary value and maturity dates.
“The monetary value spent from the inception of the contract in 2015 until the 2021 financial year was R1 377 122 820.00. The contracts end in January 2025”, Modise’s written response reads in part with the rider, “when the Cuban members go for their vacation in December 2024, they will not return to South Africa”.
Project Thusano and its associated contracts will see a further R1 288 455 688,24 spent in the remaining three years they are in force.
The total spend on Project Thusano for its duration is estimated to be R2 665 578 508,24.
Marais was given short shrift by Modise in response to his asking what the status of the Cuban contracts is in view of the Auditor General having declared the “main contracts and all sub-contracts irregular and wasteful expenditure”.
The Ministerial response reads: “First and foremost the Auditor-General made its finding based on one supplement relating to the acquisition of Heberon and they based themselves on the procurement policies and regulations of the PFMA, it has nothing to do with the entire contract”.
She continues: “This issue is subject to investigation as the matter has been reported and a case lodged in Worcester. To say the contracts are irregular and wasteful expenditure will be deemed sub judice because only one aspect of the supplement is under scrutiny”.
Modise maintains there is no reason to terminate or suspend the contract ending in January 2025 adding the Auditor General’s recommendations need to be debated in Parliament.
Marais responded: “The arrogant and nonchalant brushing away of legislative and regulatory responsibility and accountability is embarrassing and worrying, very worrying”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
17 Aug 22. RoK prioritises offsets on KF-21 programme. South Korea has added its domestically developed KF-21 (Boramae) fighter aircraft to its list of priority defence offset projects during the coming few years.
The aircraft’s inclusion on the offset list underscores the high level of foreign involvement in the KF-21 development programme and also Seoul’s determination to locally source replacements.
South Korea’s list of priority defence offset projects is administered by the Defense Administration Program Administration (DAPA). The list identifies the technologies that DAPA wants local industry to gain access to through the defence offset programme.
A new priority offset list was issued by DAPA in mid-August, with the KF-21 included for the first time. The list covers priorities during 2022–24 and beyond, although offset requirements linked to the KF-21 programme are scheduled to be discharged during 2024–32. (Source: Janes)
18 Aug 22. Further diplomatic rapprochement with Taiwan will exacerbate tensions with China. The US Trade Representative (USTR) announced on 17 August that it has agreed to start formal negotiations with Taiwan over a bilateral trade agreement this autumn. Separately, Canadian federal legislators said they are planning to visit Taiwan in October to discuss bilateral trade relations. The announcements will exacerbate tensions between China and the US and Canada, which were heightened after US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan on 2 August. Beijing regards foreign diplomatic engagement with the breakaway Taiwanese government as provocative meddling in its internal affairs. Following Pelosi’s visit, China conducted retaliatory military drills around Taiwan and banned certain Taiwanese imports, actions which were criticised by the US and Canadian governments. The moves by Washington DC and Ottawa will likely elicit a response from Beijing, elevating policy risks for US and Canadian firms in China. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 22. Iraq-Syria: Business council will boost trade relations; sustained sanctions risks will deter Western-oriented firms. Iraq and Syria announced on 16 August the formation of a joint business council. This will aim to develop their bilateral economic and private sector relations across fields including trade and tourism, as well as increasing Syrian exports to Iraq. Prior to the conflict in Syria, Iraq purchased approximately 46 percent of Syria’s exports. The move comes amid efforts by the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, to rebuild and consolidate economic ties with regional partners to support the country’s post-war recovery. This follows the decision to establish Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese-owned companies in Syria. The council will support the resolution of existing issues (including matters related to shipping and certificates of origin) in bilateral trade in the coming months. However, ongoing US sanctions against Assad’s government are likely to deter Iraqi-based businesses, particularly those with close ties to Western markets, from making significant investments and engaging closely with the Syrian government due to compliance risks. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 22. Russia: Central Bank subsidises strategic energy industries to insulate economy from Sanctions. The Russian Central Bank announced a series of proposals on 18 August to subsidise its energy industry so as to mitigate the economic impact of Western sanctions. The proposals seek to improve the economic outlook for the long-term financing of ongoing gas and oil projects. They involve lending to companies in foreign currencies and/or heavily subsidising the interest rate on ruble loans. Data from the Centre for Energy Development (CRE) suggests that a successful pivot towards Asian markets will allow Russia to maintain its coal exports. However, this subsidisation of investment is unlikely to improve Russia’s economic performance significantly in the short term; a major constraint on developing its gas and oil industry is Russia’s limited access to advanced technology due to Western sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 22. Ethiopia: Progress towards ceasefire agreement unlikely despite peace committee statement. A peace committee established by the federal government stated on 17 August that it has drawn up a peace proposal and is pushing for the rapid resumption of basic services in Tigray. However, it stated that a formal ceasefire agreement must be reached before these services can resume. Progress towards a peace agreement has been extremely limited since the informal truce in March. However, imminent progress remains unlikely. Spokespersons for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) stated that the resumption of services is a precondition for any agreement. They claimed the statement was made in bad faith, alleging that federal forces attacked TPLF positions in western Tigray in recent days. Without an agreement, sustained disruption to services in Tigray will exacerbate humanitarian conditions, increasing the threat of further TPLF offensives aiming to break the siege and secure resources. This will elevate the threat of armed conflict in the surrounding Amhara and Afar regions. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 22. Niger: Anti-French sentiment sustains pressure on Operation Barkhane, raising prospect of future protests. The authorities banned a demonstration against France’s military presence by the M62 movement (a civil society coalition) scheduled to take place in the capital Niamey on 17 August. The movement has subsequently launched an online petition demanding the departure of French forces. Niger remains a key regional ally for France, which recently relocated Operation Barkhane from Mali to Niger. However, Niger is also vulnerable to mounting anti-French sentiment across the Sahel, which has in part been exacerbated by Russian social media campaigns. The M62 group stated that they will respect the protest ban, mitigating threats of anti-French protests in Niamey in the short term. However, it is likely that unless Operation Barkhane succeeds in securing Niger’s western border from jihadist incursions, anti-French sentiment will continue to build, elevating the likelihood of future anti-French protests. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 22. U.S., Taiwan to start formal trade talks under new initiative. The United States and Taiwan have agreed to start trade talks under a new initiative to reach agreements with “economically meaningful outcomes”, with a Taiwan official saying China’s “economic coercion” would be also be discussed.
Washington and Taipei unveiled the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade in June, just days after the Biden administration excluded the Chinese-claimed island from its Asia-focused economic plan designed to counter China’s growing influence.
The office of the U.S. Trade Representative said the two sides had “reached consensus on the negotiating mandate” and it was expected that the first round of talks will take place early this autumn.
“We plan to pursue an ambitious schedule for achieving high-standard commitments and meaningful outcomes covering the eleven trade areas in the negotiating mandate that will help build a fairer, more prosperous and resilient 21st-century economy,” Deputy United States Trade Representative Sarah Bianchi said in a statement.
Taiwan’s top trade negotiator John Deng told reporters in Taipei on Thursday he hoped talks could start next month, and that this could one day lead to a free trade deal the island has long sought with the United States.
The negotiating mandate released along with the announcement said the United States and Taiwan have set a robust agenda for talks on issues like trade facilitation, good regulatory practices, and removing discriminatory barriers to trade.
It said the start of the formal talks would be for the purpose of reaching agreements with “high standard commitments and economically meaningful outcomes”.
Deng said one topic would be China’s economic coercion, a reference to actions Beijing takes to block trade with countries it is in dispute with, such as when Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a de facto embassy in its capital.
“Its economic coercion targets are not just the United States or Taiwan, it’s done to a lot of countries. Its harm to the global economic and trade order is great,” he added.
Despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, Washington has been keen to bolster support for Taiwan, especially as it faces stepped up political pressure from China to accept its sovereignty claims.
China has said it “firmly” opposes the new Taiwan-U.S. trade initiative. (Source: Reuters)
17 Aug 22. Sri Lanka: Colombo will not extend state of emergency as threat of mass unrest reduces. On 16 August, President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s media office announced that the ongoing state of emergency would not be extended beyond this week. The emergency provision granted the army with sweeping powers that enabled them to arbitrarily detain people and search private property, and was staunchly criticised by human rights groups. Protests have tailed off in recent weeks, likely in part due to the army’s crackdown as well as a slight improvement in the availability of fuel. However, sections of society, such as student unions, continue to oppose Wickremesinghe sustaining the threat of future outbreaks of unrest in the coming months, albeit on a smaller scale. Subsequently, the crackdown on those considered to be a threat to the state by security forces will likely continue, sustaining human rights concerns.(Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. Thailand: Attacks in restive south highlight shortcomings of ongoing peace negotiations. A series of attacks in the Deep South region (Yala, Narithiwat, and Pattani provinces) of Thailand occurred after midnight on 17 August, targeting convenience stores and petrol stations, and injuring at least seven people (although the injuries are not reported to be serious). The attacks were characterised by arson and the use of explosives, with Thai authorities claiming they were aimed at disrupting the local economy. The attacks occurred despite the resumption of peace talks between the main regional insurgent group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Thai government earlier this year. However, the talks have not stopped attacks, driven by the splintering of insurgents. The Patani United Liberation Organisation (Pulo) recently carried out bombings due to unhappiness from being excluded from talks, although it has denied responsibility for these latest attacks. Overall, the region is likely to continue to experience low level insurgency given the prevalence of splinter groups, and slow-moving peace negotiations. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. North Korea-South Korea-US: Cruise missile launches primarily a symbolic protest but underscore growing complexity of regional security threats. On 17 August, North Korea launched two cruise missiles from Onchon, South Pyongan province, into the Yellow Sea for the first time since January, marking the latest missile activity since June. The missiles caused no casualties nor damage, and most likely were designed to protest South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s 100th day in office press conference, in which he reiterated his economic aid plan for North Korea in exchange for its denuclearisation. The launches also likely reflected Pyongyang’s commitment to conduct a nuclear test this year and condemnation of the upcoming US-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise on 22 August – 1 September. Similar shows of force from the North are expected at least until 1 September and possibly longer as a result of growing joint military exercises between US, South Korean, and Japanese forces. While such activities will reduce the success of diplomatic de-escalation efforts, threats to nearby commercial aircraft or vessels will remain low. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. Tunisia: Approval of referendum results will sustain the threat of civil unrest and dampen investor confidence. On 16 August, Tunisia’s Independent High Electoral Commission (ISIE) accepted amendments to the constitution following disputes over results of the 25 July referendum. The ISIE confirmed that 94.6 percent of voters approved the draft constitution, despite a low turnout of approximately 30.5 percent. Opposition groups including the Tunisian General Labour Union and the Islamist Ennahda party denounce the constitutional amendments, noting that the reforms will consolidate President Kais Saied’s authoritarian “power grab”. Notably, President Saied’s dismissal of judges who disapproved of the constitutional amendments on 10 August (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 11 August 2022) further underpins President Saied’s expansion of executive authority. Elevated levels of civil unrest will endure in urban centres such as Tunis and Sfax, as well as an increased probability of prolonged industrial action in the coming days. Tunisia’s democratic backsliding will pose reputational and regulatory threats for companies, particularly those with government-backed contracts. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. Mexico: Attack and kidnap of security forces in San Luis Potosí underscores CJNG’s use of high-profile attacks for tactical gains. On 16 August, gunmen from the CJNG drug trafficking organization attacked the Moctezuma police station in San Luis Potosí state, reportedly kidnapping at least four officers and causing significant public property destruction. The incident coincided with the release of a separate video showing four members of the municipal police in Concepción de Buenos Aires, Jalisco state, also being kidnapped by the CJNG, although the video is reportedly a month old. Both incidents point to a growing trend of high-profile attacks in central Mexico ostensibly aimed at obtaining tactical victories as the CJNG expands to Michoacán, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí. This trend will likely persist as security forces crackdown on the CJNG and the organisation competes with other local groups for territorial control, with road blockades, private property destruction, and armed clashes with security forces likely. Strategic smuggling routes and ports remain likely to register very high levels of violent crime, elevating physical threats to assets and staff. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. Turkey-Syria: Conflict escalation likely to sustain existing physical security threats for businesses in bordering areas. On 16 August, at least 17 individuals were killed in overnight Turkish air strikes on a Syrian border post west of Kobane. The development follows ground clashes with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Defence Forces. Since Iran and Russia refused to green-light President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s new military offensive announced in May during recent joint and, airstrikes and skirmishes in Kurdish-controlled areas of northern Syria have increased. President Erdogan will continue to utilise Russian distraction by Ukraine to bolster his position Syria. Additionally, as campaigning in Turkey intensifies ahead of the 2023 election, he is unlikely to reduce operations in northern Syria. While there is a low likelihood of a ground intervention in the short term, instability will be sustained by cross-borders exchanges, further undermining the security environment outlook. Businesses reliant on staff travel or presence in bordering areas of Syria and Turkey will continue to face heightened bystander and physical security threats. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. Turkey-Russia: Arms deal will attract international criticism, but Turkey will continue to balance geopolitical pressures. On 16 August, Russian state-owned media outlets confirmed the signing of a contract for the sale of a second collection of Russian S-400 ground-to-air missile defence systems to Turkey. Recent developments underline efforts by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to maintain Turkey’s perceived neutrality between Ukraine and Russia amid the conflict, preserving its strategic bilateral economic ties. However, Turkey’s expansion of military and economic ties with Russia in recent weeks, underpinned by President Erdogan’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 5 August, threatens to attract criticism from international partners including the US. Notably, Turkey’s purchasing of Russian S-400 systems in previous years prompted the US to suspend Turkey from its F-35 fighter jet program in 2019. Nevertheless, Turkey will continue to use its geopolitical leverage to retain its role as a mediator, seeking to reap benefits from bilateral trade and economic opportunities. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. Joint Press Statement for the 21st Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) held the 21st Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) August 16-17, 2022 in Seoul, Republic of Korea. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Dr. Siddharth Mohandas, led the U.S. delegation. Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy (DEPMIN), Dr. Heo Tae-keun led the ROK delegation. Key senior U.S. and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials also participated. In addition, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Dr. Vipin Narang and Dr. Mohandas together co-chaired the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) session of the KIDD with DEPMIN Heo.
U.S. and ROK officials reaffirmed a shared goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and pledged that U.S. and ROK combined forces would remain ready and postured to defend the ROK.
The leaders discussed the DPRK threat, particularly the increased volume and scale of DPRK missile tests over the course of the last year. With this in mind, and considering the evolving threat posed by the DPRK, both leaders committed to expanding the scope and scale of combined military exercises and training on and around the Korean Peninsula—starting with Ulchi Freedom Shield next week—to bolster combined readiness. They also affirmed the importance of full implementation of relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions by the international community.
Both sides shared their assessments of activities at the DPRK’s Punggye-ri nuclear testing site. The two sides affirmed that, should the DPRK conduct a nuclear test, the ROK and the U.S. will engage in a strong and firm bilateral response, to include options to deploy U.S. strategic assets to the region.
DASD Mohandas and DEPMIN Heo co-chaired the KIDD Executive Session. In this session, the two leaders acknowledged an increasingly complex regional and global security environment.
The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of adherence to a rules-based international order based on international laws and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight, and pledged close cooperation to meet regional challenges. They discussed recent unlawful and unsafe actions that complicated the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions concerning the DPRK. The two leaders affirmed their commitment to maintaining peace and stability, lawful unimpeded commerce, and international laws including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful use of the seas, including in the South China Sea and beyond, as reflected in the ROK-U.S. Leaders’ Joint Statement in May 2022. The two leaders also reinforced the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. They pledged to continue promoting defense and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. To that end, the two leaders committed to continue to closely collaborate so that the ROK Indo-Pacific strategy framework and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy contribute to peace and stability in the region.
Both sides affirmed the critical role that the ROK-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) continues to play in enabling bilateral cooperation between the ROK and Japan, as well as trilateral security cooperation among the ROK, United States, and Japan. Both leaders noted that trilateral cooperation among the three countries is critical for advancing shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and committed to further strengthening cooperation. They acknowledged the progress made during the recent Trilateral Ministerial Meeting in Singapore and pledged to deepen cooperation through mechanisms such as the annual Defense Trilateral Talks. They also positively assessed the recently conducted Pacific Dragon multilateral missile tracking exercise, which in addition to the United States, ROK, and Japan, also included Australia and Canada.
Finally, both sides applauded recent progress made to improve access to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) site and acknowledged the importance of the Alliance’s missile defense architecture in defending the ROK people—as well as U.S. and ROK deployed forces—particularly considering recent DPRK missile tests.
During the DSC, the two sides acknowledged progress toward revising the ROK-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS), as discussed at the 53rd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).They also affirmed that the TDS is being revised into a flexible, robust document that is aligned with the US National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. The DS will enable effective deterrence of the DPRK’s nuclear, other WMD and non-nuclear capabilities with strategic effects amidst a dynamic security environment of the region.
U.S. officials reaffirmed the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK, leveraging the full range of U.S. military capabilities—to include nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and other advanced non-nuclear capabilities. ROK officials emphasized that the Korean 3K(Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR) Defense System will be strengthened to deter and counter advancing DPRK nuclear and missile threats.
In addition, the leaders committed to hold the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in September 2022, and conduct a DSC tabletop exercise (TTX)in the near future.
Both sides also committed to engage in closer policy coordination and communication to strengthen Alliance counter-missile capability and posture, and pledged to launch a Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) within the DSC to this end.
At the Security Policy Initiative (SPI), both sides reaffirmed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains the linchpin of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asia region.
DASD Mohandas and DEPMIN Heo noted combined training and exercises as well as stable, unfettered access to training facilities and bases are critical to maintaining a combined defense posture that is ready to “fight tonight.”
The leaders pledged to continue to implement the Yongsan Relocation Plan and acknowledged progress made over the past year.
Additionally, they pledged to deepen and expand Alliance cooperation in the space and cyber domains to effectively prepare for emerging threats. In particular, they applauded the ROK-U.S. Space Policy Joint Study, which was agreed upon at the 18th Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG).
To continue to improve interoperability into the future, both sides committed to continue to enhance cooperation in the defense industrial space, as well as research and development. In particular, they committed to explore ROK-U.S. science and technology cooperation in various high-tech domains such as space, quantum, cyber defense, artificial intelligence, automation as well as cooperative measures in the area of 5G and next-generation mobile communications (6G).
During the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Working Group (COTWG), DASD Mohandas and DEPMIN Heo acknowledged the progress made towards the transition of wartime OPCON to the Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC) and reaffirmed a mutual commitment to meeting the three conditions under the bilaterally approved Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP).
In particular, they applauded the completion of the Joint Study on COTP capabilities and all accompanying annexes.
U.S. and ROK leaders assessed that the 21st KIDD reaffirmed close Alliance bonds, bolstered Alliance coordination, and strengthened the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture.
Based on these outcomes, the two sides pledged to continue progress leading up to the 54th Security Consultative Meeting, scheduled for November 2022. (Source: US DoD)
16 Aug 22. France completes Mali withdrawal. The French military announced on 15 August that it has completed its withdrawal from Mali, saying the last unit from its main base at Gao had crossed into Niger earlier that day. It said that the “major logistical challenge” was completed in less than six months after it was ordered by President Emmanuel Macron on 17 February and stressed that it remained committed to fighting terrorism in the Sahel in close co-ordination with its African partners. The decision to withdraw from Mali was prompted by successive coups in Bamako in 2020 and 2021 and the resulting military-led transitional government’s decision to turn to Russia for support. Meanwhile, there has been growing popular resentment of the French military presence and the perceived lack of progress it had made against the various militant groups operating in Mali since the intervention to stabilise the country in 2013. (Source: Janes)
16 Aug 22. Georgia: Georgia’s EU candidacy membership status uncertain amid reports highlighting democratic backsliding. The European External Action Service released a new report on Georgia, stating that reforms in the country have been largely driven by the EU association agreement. Nevertheless, the report highlighted several shortcomings, such as electoral discrepancies and tolerance of anti-LGBTQ violence and general homophobia throughout society, all of which continue to undermine the nation’s democratic progress. The report has also highlighted deep political polarisation, with opposition politicians blaming the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party for failing to make sufficient progress on reforms. These tensions are likely to intensify in the short term, following GD’s decision to press ahead with a controversial new surveillance bill in April, which was vetoed by the country’s president and is awaiting a review by the Venice Commission. With GD already planning to override the veto, there is a high risk that Georgia’s democratic progress will be jeopardised further, diminishing the prospects of an EU candidate status in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 22. Moldova: New bomb threats heighten risk of destabilisation in Moldova. Moldova’s police force is investigating several bomb threats targeting Chisinau airport and the nation’s Supreme Court. The country’s pro-EU President, Maia Sandu, announced publicly that a number of these threats were traced back to IP addresses in Belarus and Russia. Tensions between Moldova and Moscow have been high since April, when a series of explosions in Transnistria, a Russian-backed separatist region, ignited fears of spill-over in the region, though an armed escalation remains unlikely at present. These new developments suggest that Russia and Belarus may be deliberately targeting and destabilising Moldova, particularly as the growing cost-of-living crisis and prospect of gas shortages adds pressure on the pro-West government. Bomb scares are likely to continue in the coming weeks, and while they are likely to predominately be hoaxes, regional tensions will moderately elevate the risk of real bomb incidents targeting Chisinau airport. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Aug 22. N. Korea fires two cruise missiles from west coast town of Onchon. North Korea fired two cruise missiles from the west coast town of Onchon early on Wednesday, a South Korean military source said.
The source added the South Korean and the United States military authorities are analysing details of the missiles’ flight, including the range.
The launches come a day after Seoul and Washington kicked four days of preliminary joint drills in preparation for the long-suspended live field training Ulchi Freedom Shield, which takes place from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1.
The two allies have scaled back combined military drills in recent years because of COVID-19 and to lower tensions with the North, which has accused the exercises of being a rehearsal for invasion.
Meanwhile, Pentagon on Tuesday said the U.S., South Korea and Japan participated in a ballistic missile defence exercise off Hawaii’s coast last week – the first such drills since 2017 as relations between Seoul and Tokyo hit their lowest in years.
While Pyongyang has not conducted a missile test for two months, it had battled against a COVID-19 outbreak for months before declaring victory over the virus last week. The North, however, has been observed preparing for a possible nuclear test, which would be its first since 2017.
In a separate news release made by the North on Thursday, the sister of its leader Kim Jong Un blamed propaganda leaflets from South Korea found near the border for causing the coronavirus outbreak and vowed a “deadly retaliation” against the South. Despite such warnings, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol on Wednesday reiterated that he is willing to provide phased economic aid to North Korea if it ended nuclear weapons development and began denuclearisation, as he took questions during a news conference to mark his first 100 days in office. (Source: Reuters)
16 Aug 22. Kenya: Electoral committee members’ rejection of presidential results will support Odinga’s electoral fraud allegations. On 15 August, four of the seven members of the national electoral commission rejected the Kenyan presidential results naming William Ruto as president-elect, claiming that the body was under pressure to announce the results. The Vice President of the independent body announced on national television that they could not take responsibility for the results because of the opaque nature of the process. Raila Odinga’s Azimio la Umoja One Kenya coalition has alleged that there is evidence of election rigging, discrediting the election results. It is highly likely that the electoral commission’s rejection of presidential results will bolster Odinga’s claims of electoral fraud, increasing support for protests when he issues his anticipated electoral challenge. Such protests will likely be concentrated in Nairobi and western and coastal towns and cities, such as Kisumu and Mombasa. Targets will likely be government buildings in central districts, driving incidental transit disruption and threats to bystanders due to likely clashes with police. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 22. Yemen: Ceasefire violations will undermine ceasefire and threaten energy exports. On 15 August, United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, proposed a “four-point” plan to extend the ongoing two-month ceasefire, due to expire on 2 October. Grundberg’s six-month proposal reaffirms the significance of continuing the flow of fuel from Hodeidah port, with the volume of domestic oil production having increased significantly since January 2022. However, inflammatory disputes between Houthi leaders, Yemen’s Armed Forces and the Saudi-led coalition continue to undermine the stability of the current ceasefire. For instance, the Houthi chairman of the Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, vowed to retaliate against renewed joint Saudi and US naval exercises in the Red Sea with missiles and drones, with al-Mashat specifically addressing the “Saudi and Emirati regimes”. Whilst the truce continues to prevent major cross-border strikes, recent escalations threaten to exacerbate maritime insecurity in the Red Sea with clashes in Shabwah threatening energy exports from Belhaf port in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 22. U.S., South Korea, Japan hold missile defense exercise with eye on North Korea, China. The United States, South Korea and Japan participated in a ballistic missile defense exercise off Hawaii’s coast last week, the Pentagon said on Tuesday, reviving combined drills with an eye on North Korea as well as China.
It was the first time the three countries have held such drills since 2017, after relations between Seoul and Tokyo hit their lowest in years in 2019 amid renewed historical disputes dating to Japan’s 1910-1945 occupation of the Korean peninsula.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who took office in May, has vowed to improve relations with Japan and deepen the U.S. alliance to better deter North Korea, including by expanding or resuming joint drills.
The missile warning and ballistic missile search and tracking exercise took place Aug. 8-14 during the multinational Pacific Dragon drills, and demonstrated the three countries’ commitment to respond to challenges posed by North Korea, protect shared security and bolster the rules-based international order, the Pentagon said in a statement.
The participants shared tactical data link information in accordance with a trilateral information sharing agreement, the statement said.
U.S.-led joint missile defence measures have been a sore point with China, which retaliated economically against South Korea’s 2016 decision to host a U.S. military Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery.
Beijing says the THAAD radar can penetrate its territory and has called on Yoon to honour assurances made by his predecessor to not to increase THAAD deployments, participate in a U.S.-led global missile shield or create a trilateral military alliance involving Japan.
Yoon has said those do not represent formal agreements and that Seoul is not bound by them.
South Korea’s ministry of defense also confirmed on Tuesday that its troops would resume long-suspended live field training during their joint military drills with the United States to be held from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1. The two sides have scaled back combined military drills in recent years due to COVID-19 and efforts to lower tensions with the North, which has accused the exercises of being a rehearsal for invasion. (Source: Reuters)
15 Aug 22. Ecuador: State of emergency declared in Guayaquil following explosive attack, highlights rising threat of gang violence in city. On 14 August, Ecuador’s President Guillermo Lasso declared a state of emergency in the city of Guayaquil, Guayas province, following an attack with a suspected improvised explosive device (IED) in the Cristo del Consuelo neighbourhood. The authorities say the attack targeted a known gang member, alias ‘Cucaracha’, which left him hospitalized, killed five people and wounded at least 17 others. Authorities in Guayaquil stated that fighting between organised criminal groups are the cause for the sharp increase in violence, which is elevating serious physical threats to bystanders in the city. Whilst details of the state of emergency have not yet been formalised, it is expected to last until at least 13 September. Authorities have deployed a security task force to the city to address the increasing violence. Armed clashes between police forces and criminal groups are possible, further increasing threats to bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 22. Afghanistan: Crackdown on protesters highlight continued operational risks for NGOs and media personnel after one year of Taliban rule. On 13 August, Taliban fighters beat female protesters demanding their right to work and education ahead of 15 August (today), marking one year of Taliban rule. Protesters were met with heavy resistance, with fighters not only beating women but also firing shots into the air to disperse crowds. Several journalists covering the protests were also beaten by Taliban fighters. In fact, Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Reporters Without Borders have stated that since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has lost 39.59 percent of its media outlets and 59.86 percent of its journalists, indicating high levels of operational threat for media personnel. Further, several diaspora communities in the West will likely hold small protests to mark one year since the Taliban takeover today- with protests already underway in Vienna. However, these are unlikely to cause significant disruptions to supply chains and will likely be held outside embassy buildings. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 22. Mali: Deteriorating relations will impede MINUSMA operations, despite resumption of rotations. On 15 August, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) resumed rotations following discussions between Malian authorities and mission representatives. Authorities temporarily suspended the rotation of all MINUSMA’s military and police units on 14 July, after they arrested 49 Ivorian soldiers working with the mission, forcing the mission to extend the deployment of active units. The suspension highlighted the deterioration of relations between Mali and its international partners, which is likely due to the influence of Russia as it consolidates relations with Malian authorities. On 12 August, Germany, a contributor to MINUSMA, announced the suspension of its military reconnaissance mission in Mali after authorities withheld clearance for German flights over the country. Despite Malian authorities accepting the mission’s request to resume rotations, deteriorating relations between Mali and troop-contributing countries will impede MINUSMA operations, hampering efforts to contain jihadist expansion in the country. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 22. China-Taiwan-US: Surprise bipartisan US delegation visit to Taiwan will sustain Beijing-Washington animosity and military activities in the Taiwan Strait. A bipartisan five-member US official delegation arrived in Taipei on 15 August for a two-day visit, two weeks after Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. Beijing condemned the visit and announced military activities near Taiwan, albeit without specifying their duration. Nonetheless, the exercises are expected to last until the delegation leaves Taiwan. The surprise visit will compound Beijing-Washington and cross-Strait animosity and sustain Chinese military activities near Taiwan (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 August 2022), and possibly maintain a new normal of increased US official support for Taiwan and enhanced Chinese military activities near the island. Diplomatic and military miscalculation risks will remain elevated, while additional Chinese economic coercion towards Taiwan remains possible. Snap closures of maritime and airspace near Taiwan remain possible, but will likely not heavily impact the air and maritime transport sectors. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 22. Australia: Airport shooting likely an isolated incident; highlights low latent threat of gun violence. On 14 August, a 63-year-old-man fired multiple shots in the check-in area at Canberra Airport, before being detained by police. No one was injured, and reports suggest that the suspect did not aim at anyone, instead shooting at the window. Planes were grounded for three hours, and the airport was evacuated as police swept the area to confirm that there was no further threat. No motive has been reported and the gunman was believed to have acted alone, with the suspect to undergo a mental health assessment. The incident happened in the landside area of the terminal before security and border control. However, while Canberra Airport officials stated that a review of the incident will be undertaken, they do not believe a significant change in security procedures will be necessary. Overall, while gun crime remains a threat in Australia, it typically happens at lower rates (0.18 firearm homicides per 100,000, compared to 4.12 in the US), partly due to strict gun control laws. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Aug 22. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Heightened security posture in Jerusalem will mitigate increased threat of copycat attacks. Late on 13 August, a Palestinian gunman opened fire near the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City, targeting a bus carrying Jewish worshippers and people in a car park. The attack injured at least eight individuals, five of whom are US citizens, leaving two in critical condition. Identified by Israeli media as Amir Sidawi, an East Jerusalem resident, the gunman fled the scene before turning himself in to Israeli police. Israeli police believe that the incident was a sole perpetrator attack, reporting that the individual has no known affiliations with Palestinian militant groups. Nevertheless, representatives of groups including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have praised the assault, labelling it a “heroic operation”. Amid heightened tensions following Israel’s launch of Operation Breaking Dawn targeting PIJ militants in Gaza on 5 August, Israeli security forces will maintain a strengthened presence in Jerusalem to mitigate the increased likelihood of copycat attacks in the coming days and weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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