Sponsored by Exensor
www.exensor.com
————————————————————————-
08 Jul 22. Japan – Ruling LDP To Win Vote.
Key Takeaways
- The House of Councillors – while less powerful than the House of Representatives – still plays an important role during times when the lower house is dissolved, or the National Diet (Japan’s bicameral parliament) cannot be convened. Main issues that will be determining factors in the 10 July upper house election will be issues surrounding Japan’s post-pandemic recovery, defence spending, and the country’s rising inflation.
- Despite the general public’s dissatisfaction over the ruling coalition’s handling of these key issues, the ruling parties are expected to maintain a majority in the House of Councillors. Moreover, the shock assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will likely further galvanise support for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), ensuring a relatively stable policy agenda and business operating environment for the next 3-4 years.
- While these plans intend to reduce regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict with Russia through effective deterrence, they are also hugely ambitious. Increasing economic pressures in Europe are highly likely to hinder their implementation. Additionally, rising socio-economic pressures will discourage European governments from boosting defence and military investments in the coming years. This eventuality could reignite debates to do with ‘burden-sharing’. If NATO fails to implement its proposed reforms, the alliance will highly likely lose credibility internationally, undermining the effectiveness of its deterrence capabilities.
Context
On 10 July, Japanese citizens will cast their ballots for the House of Councillors – the upper house of Japan’s National Diet. This poll will determine which of the 545 total candidates registered for both the prefectural and proportional representation districts will be elected to one of the 125 seats available in the 245-seat chamber.
The House of Councillors yields less legislative power than the lower house, the House of Representatives, in that a disagreement from the upper house over issues such as budgets, treaties, or the selection of a prime minister can be overruled by the lower house. Similarly, the House of Representatives has the power – with a two-thirds majority – to override votes that take place in the House of Councillors. Nevertheless, the House of Councillors plays an important role in issues related to constitutional amendment proposals, which are required to have approval by both houses. The upper house also acts as the primary legislative chamber during periods when the National Diet is unable to convene or when the lower house is dissolved.
Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during an election campaign speech on 8 July (see Sibylline Alert – 8 July 2022), Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has vowed to hold the vote as planned, in a show of defiance to safeguard the democratic process. We assess Abe’s death and the potential impact on the election outcome in Scenario 3 below.
Post-pandemic recovery, defence spending, and inflation constitute key issues in this year’s poll
This upper house election is largely being viewed as a litmus test for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito coalition and Prime Minister Kishida’s government. Indeed, debates that the heads of the nine ruling and opposition parties staged in the previous week have largely focused on a few key issues, including the rising cost of living in Japan. A recent survey conducted by Japanese news outlet Asahi TV found that the four most important issues for the Japanese voters ahead of the upper house election were economic and fiscal policies (60 percent), pension/social security system (51 percent), education/child-rearing support (42 percent), and security concerns (40 percent).
Japan’s opposition bloc has attempted to capitalise on these concerns by stating that the LDP’s handling of these issues has been insufficient. For example, Kenta Izumi, head of the oppositional Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) claimed during a public debate that Kishida’s government has failed to “rein in” the price increase on basic goods, such as wheat, due to his weak approach towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the LDP has passed a supplementary budget to address this issue, inflation has continued to rise in recent weeks, impacting public sentiment toward Kishida and the ruling coalition. A survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun in late May found that 66 percent of participants disapproved of the Kishida government’s handling of price hikes, with many particularly focusing on how the LDP’s supplementary budget only takes measures against inflation of around 10,000 basic items.
Despite spending a notable amount of time discussing economic concerns, neither the ruling coalition nor Japan’s opposition parties discussed Covid-related policies. A senior LDP official claimed that “Covid-19 is not a suitable topic for candidates giving stump speeches as the pandemic is no longer a pressing concern for voters”. However, Japan is currently experiencing a notable increase in Covid-19 cases, which has raised concerns that the recovery of the country’s critical tourism sector could be delayed into 2023. Indeed, Kishida is expected to make a formal decision on whether he will launch a new tourism campaign, which will give travellers up to USD 81 per day for travel and other expenses, after the upper house election and depending on the country’s infection situation. While the government has allowed foreign tour groups to return to Japan, the ruling coalition has been particularly cautious about lifting Covid-19 countermeasures too quickly, fearing it would lead to a new infection wave. With this cautious approach expected to remain at the front of Kishida’s policy plan for the foreseeable future, the ruling coalition and oppositional bloc’s reluctance to discuss Covid-19 and the country’s resurgence of Covid-19 infections could translate into delays in the post-pandemic recovery of Japan’s critical sectors, such as hospitality and tourism.
Despite these concerns, Kishida has maintained that the unspecified policies he plans to implement following the election will help resolve many of Japan’s economic issues. However, the prime minister did agree with the opposition that the war in Ukraine was having a severe impact on Japan’s socio-economic stability and has proposed amending Japan’s post-war pacifist constitution to allow Japan to better handle this security concern. While Japan has historically been opposed to revising Article 9 of the constitution, recent surveys have indicated that this opinion may be changing amongst Japan’s politicians. A poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in June found that 61 percent of the 545 candidates running in the upper house election were in favour of a constitutional reform due to concerns stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 66 percent of these candidates claimed that they want this amendment to formalise the legal existence of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (JSDF), which would open the door for Japan to develop “pre-emptive strike” capabilities and move away from its current defence-first framework. This move would further fuel tensions with neighbouring countries such as China, South Korea, and North Korea (see Scenario 1 for further analysis).
Ruling LDP remains the favourite despite dissatisfaction over government’s handling of key issues
Scenario 1 (65-70 precent): LDP maintains its majority in the upper house, prolonging policy stability and Japan’s current business operating environment for Kishida’s tenure
This upcoming contest will be the ruling coalition’s second major test since it retained its majority in the House of Representatives, by defeating the CDPJ in the general election in November 2021 (see Sibylline Alert – 1 November 2021). Despite the aforementioned opinion polls indicating rising negative sentiment towards the LDP’s handling of key issues, the ruling party is still expected to win a majority in Sunday’s vote. Indeed, a survey conducted by Asahi TV found that the LDP’s approval rating is at 43.4 percent and the Komeito’s rating is at 4.5 percent. Similarly, a national survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun on 4-5 July found that the ruling parties are in the position to win 56-65 of the 125 contested seats. In comparison, the CDPJ, Japan’s main oppositional party, is only expected to win around 12-20 seats (see Table 1 below).
With the ruling coalition highly likely to maintain the majority within both the upper and lower houses of the Diet, there is a high probability of LDP and Komeito utilising this legislative advantage to push forward their policy agenda. Key amongst these will be stabilising the Japanese yen and improving Japan’s socio-economic stability. The yen has been on a sharp decline over the past few weeks, which has raised concerns amongst the leading companies in Japan about the potential impact on the country’s economy. For example, Suzuki Motor Corp’s Executive Vice President Naomi Ishii said the depreciated yen has “had a negative effect on proceeds” due to the rising cost of imported materials. While the Kishida administration has not fully explained how it plans to address these concerns, the Bank of Japan is expected to maintain the LDP’s trademark ultra-loose monetary policy to bring the inflation rate back to the preferred 1-2 percent range. While this inflation policy will likely impact export-related industries, such as electronics and consumer goods, Japan’s overall economy will benefit from a slightly stronger yen as it will make it more affordable for industries, such as manufacturing, to import critical materials and components. These policies are expected to keep Japan’s favourable business environment for both domestic and foreign organisations across critical sectors, such as manufacturing, technology, and tourism.
Elsewhere, the ruling coalitions’ majority within both houses of the Diet will also likely see renewed calls for a constitutional amendment to Japan’s pacificist Article 9 clause and the legalisation of the JSDF. Although the aforementioned upper house candidates’ survey indicates that the LDP will likely be able to acquire the two-thirds majority required in both chambers to pass such an amendment, the proposed constitutional reform is unlikely to gain a simple majority in the legally required popular referendum due to the Japanese public’s aversion to remilitarisation.
While the Japanese public will likely reject the constitutional revision, the ruling coalition’s push for such an amendment will highly likely further heighten regional tensions between Japan and its neighbouring countries China, South Korea, and North Korea. However, Seoul is unlikely to implement any overtly harsh measures against Japan given South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s recent push to increase military cooperation between the two countries to counter North Korea’s ballistic missile activity and a possible new nuclear test (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 May 2022). However, there is a realistic possibility of China and North Korea responding more strongly to Japan’s potential moves towards remilitarisation. Pyongyang is likely to engage in ballistic missile or nuclear tests before or during Japan’s constitutional amendment procedures. Such provocative activities are unlikely to have any significant impact on business relations in Japan or lead to an armed conflict. With regards to China, there is a heightened risk of any attempts to revise Article 9 being met with diplomatic and/or physical protests in major Chinese cities, due to Japan’s historical aggression during the Second World War. Although such protest is unlikely to result in significant operational delays given Beijing’s stringent security forces, it will sustain anti-Japanese sentiment in China and exacerbate regional tensions.
Scenario 2 (<1 percent): the oppositional bloc prevents the ruling collation from winning a majority in the House of Councillors, forcing the LDP to enact the lower house’s legislative powers to settle disputes
In the highly unlikely scenario that Japan’s oppositional bloc, comprises parties such as the CDPJ, the JCP, Nippon Ishin, Reiwa Shinsengumi, and DPP, is able to garner enough votes to prevent the LDP-Komeito coalition from securing a majority in the upper house, the government’s policy agenda is still expected to proceed as planned but with more contention. The LDP and Komeito still hold a majority in the more powerful lower house, which means that any dissidence from the upper house over important issues such as budget allocation can be overruled by the lower house. Similarly, any disagreements from the upper house over constitutional amendments could also be voted and pushed forward by the House of Representatives with a two-thirds majority. However, such action is largely considered a “last resort option” and would likely raise serious concerns over potential abuse of the lower house’s legislative powers. To this end, even in this low likelihood scenario, the LDP and Komeito will still manage to push their policy agenda through both chambers of the Diet, but with contested issues – such as defence spending, constitutional reforms, or budgetary concerns – potentially requiring the lower house’s vetoing power to be fully implemented. In light of the assassination of Shinzo Abe, there is a realistic possibility that his death will galvanise support for the LDP from the voters, potentially increasing the number of seats the ruling party wins above the currently projected 56-65. Moreover, the LDP’s senior leadership is highly likely to capitalise on this increased popularity to push through Abe’s key policies that he was unable to complete himself, chief amongst them being the constitutional revision of Article 9. While the parliamentary approval process for the Article 9 amendment would likely play out much as it does in scenario 1, there is uncertainty over how the general public would vote in the referendum. Indeed, Japanese citizens have historically been against any revisions to Japan’s constitution and Article 9 in particular. However, there is a higher possibility that popular support for the changes will rise, as a way to honour Japan’s longest-serving prime minister and one of the most influential politicians in the modern era. This is even more likely if a referendum is held in the next 3-6 months while the shocking assassination is still fresh in the public’s consciousness. Regardless, a successful constitutional vision remains a low likelihood outcome of 5-10 percent. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jul 22. Israel-Turkey: Diplomatic thaw will expand market access, but threatens to inflame tensions with Iran. On 7 July, Israel and Turkey signed their first civil aviation agreement in 70 years as part of efforts to improve bilateral relations. Commercial flights will resume from Israel to Turkey for the first time in 15 years, with Israeli airlines, including Arkia and El Al, expected to fly to multiple Turkish tourist destinations. These include Antalya, Dalaman and Istanbul. Elsewhere, Israel’s caretaker economy and trade minister, Orna Barbivai, intends to re-open the Israeli trade office in Istanbul. The move will facilitate the resumption of the import and export of base metals, chemicals and agricultural supplies. However, while recent developments will expand market access and security assurances, the rapprochement threatens to disturb Turkey’s balancing act with Iran amid Tehran’s deteriorating relations with Israel. Therefore, while businesses will likely benefit from greater regional investment opportunities, the overtures increase the likelihood of retaliatory low-level cyber-attacks or assaults against Turkish military elements by regional proxies in Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jul 22. US: China’s warning sustains bilateral tensions, threat of hostility. The Chief of China’s Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department, General Li Zoucheng, demanded on 7 July that the US cease its military “collusion” with Taiwan. He warned that there would be a firm reaction from China to any “arbitrary provocations”. Li’s remarks came during a meeting with the US Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley. The comments demonstrate that tensions between the two powers remain elevated, sustaining the risk of a major confrontation and hostile Chinese action against the US. Following Li and Milley’s meeting, Chinese military officials claimed they had conducted joint combat readiness exercises in the sea and airspace around Taiwan on 8 July in response to “collusion and provocations” by the US. The exercises come amid the visit to Taiwan by a US government delegation led by Senator Rick Scott. Bilateral tensions look set to remain elevated, with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken due to meet his Chinese counterpart on 9 July. These tensions will increase the risk of China launching cyber attacks on US critical infrastructure. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jul 22. South Africa: Further protests, supply chain disruption likely amid ending of fuel levy relief. Protesters demonstrating against rising fuel prices blocked several key roads with their trucks in Mpumalanga province, including the road between Mbombela and White River. They also blocked the N4 highway which connects South Africa to the port of Maputo in Mozambique. The delays will incur a daily cost of around USD 14 million for operators exporting chrome and coal from South Africa to Maputo. The protests follow the government’s announcement that it will end the temporary reduction of a fuel levy next month, despite fuel prices having already increased by over 10 percent. Further protests and roadblocks are likely after the ending of the reduction comes into effect from August. This will cause nationwide disruption to road movement, impacting supply chains and elevating costs for truck operators. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jul 22. Japan: Shinzo Abe Assassination. Around 1130 local time on 8 July, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was shot during an election campaign speech in Nara city, western Japan. Japanese public broadcaster NHK reported at 0850 GMT that Abe had succumbed to his injuries and died. The medical team treating Abe later confirmed his death.
SIGNIFICANCE
- Abe was speaking on a platform at a road intersection in central Nara, campaigning for a local Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidate for the upcoming upper house election, which is officially set to take place on 10 July. According to witness accounts, Abe collapsed after two shots were fired from behind him. It is unclear whether both shots hit the former prime minister, though injuries to his neck caused serious internal bleeding.
- The police quickly arrested a 41-year-old man, named Tetsuya Yamagami, at the scene and seized what officials have described as a homemade firearm. The suspect did not make attempts to escape and admitted to trying to kill Abe, citing his dissatisfaction with the ex-prime minister. Local media quoted sources from the Japanese military that the suspect had worked for the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force until 2005. While Yamagami declared his motive and intention for the assassination, information about his mental health status is currently unknown.
- Gun crime and political violence are extremely rare in Japan, largely owing to the country’s strict firearm control laws. Japan only recorded 10 shooting incidents in 2021; most cases of gun crime are typically linked to fighting among organised crime syndicates, known as the Yakuza. Indeed, the last known public shooting of a politician occurred in 2007 when a Yakuza member shot and killed Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Ito. Ownership of pistols is outlawed, with a complicated and comprehensive background check and licensing process in place for air rifles and shotguns, the only guns permitted for sale in Japan. Even if the suspect manufactured the weapon himself, it remains unclear how he managed to acquire the ammunition, with firearm owners legally required to register where and how ammunition is stored.
- The assassination will send shock waves through Japanese society, given the rarity of such a high-profile violent incident. The government and security forces will highly likely review and strengthen protection for politicians at public events, including physical screenings for weapons and background checks on participants. The police will likely strongly discourage “pop-up” street speeches by high-profile politicians, in favour of more organised events.
FORECAST
As Japan’s longest-serving prime minister and one of the most influential political figures, Shinzo Abe’s death will likely have a significant and immediate impact on Japan’s ruling LDP. Abe was the leader of the LDP’s largest faction, the Hosoda faction. However, Abe’s influence did not only come from his position as the Hosoda faction leader. He was one of Japan’s many legacy politicians, with his father, Shintaro Abe, being a former minister of foreign affairs and his brother, Nobuo Kishi, the current defence minister. The Abe/Kishi families’ deep political roots in Japan gave Abe a significant amount of influence over policy decisions being made at all levels of government within Japan.
Given his immense influence, there is currently no clear successor to Abe as the head of the Hosoda faction, which heightens the risk of a power vacuum emerging within both the faction itself, and the LDP as a whole. While unlikely to occur immediately, there is an increased probability of other key factions – including current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s – aiming to fill this void and siphon off members of Abe’s faction to strengthen their numbers and further their policy agenda. For example, Kishida has quibbled with Abe and the LDP’s right-wing hard-line senior leadership since taking power over several key issues, including economic and security policies. As such, if Kishida is able to gain enough members of the Hosoda faction and strengthen his faction’s position internally within the LDP, he will be less adherent to the party senior leadership’s influence and could implement more of his policies. It is a possibility that such a scenario will prompt the reversal of Abe’s trademark ultra-loose monetary policy, and the implementation of Kishida’s “new capitalism”, which calls for the digitalisation of the economy and more investment in human capital. Despite such changes, Japan’s current business-friendly operating environment is unlikely to be impacted in any significant fashion.
Outside of internal LDP politics, Shinzo Abe’s assassination will also likely have an impact on the upcoming upper house election. Kishida claimed that he has yet to decide on whether the poll will still take place on Sunday (10 July). Regardless of when the vote is held, there is a realistic probability that Abe’s death will galvanise support for the LDP across Japan, potentially increasing the total number of seats the ruling party wins above the currently projected 56-65 total. Such a scenario would provide the ruling coalition of the LDP and Komeito with a majority within the upper house and set the stage for the two parties to propose a constitutional revision of Japan’s pacifist Article 9 clause.
Indeed, Abe had long sought to revise Article 9 to legally codify Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) and allow Japan to rebuild a strong military. While Abe’s previous attempts to do so were stymied, a June 2022 survey from Japanese news outlet Asahi Shimbun found that 61 percent of the candidates running in the upper house poll were either in favour or somewhat in favour of a constitutional revision. Given this trend, senior LDP members are highly likely to push for a constitutional referendum to be held to complete Abe’s legacy.
While the referendum proposal will potentially garner enough support in Japan’s National Diet, it remains unclear how Japanese citizens would vote during the public referendum stage of the constitutional reform process. Japanese citizens have been largely against remilitarisation, with previous surveys indicating that 60 percent of the population disapproved of any alteration to Article 9. However, there is a heightened risk of sentiment shifting in light of Abe’s death and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, especially if a referendum is held in the next six months. While the successful passing of such a proposal is currently assessed to be a low likelihood scenario (5-10 percent), attempts to initiate this process will likely heighten regional tensions with Japan’s neighbouring countries, particularly China, South Korea, and North Korea.
(Source: Sibylline)
08 Jul 22. Unrest in Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan: UK statement to the OSCE. Saffienne Vincent-Neal (UK delegation) voices UK’s concern about recent events in Karakalpakstan, where people have tragically lost their lives.
Thank you Mr Chair,
The UK has a strong bilateral relationship with Uzbekistan – our recent MOU on economic cooperation and commitment to support the Government of Uzbekistan demonstrates this. As close friends, we are deeply concerned about recent events in Karakalpakstan and we were saddened to hear that people have tragically lost their lives.
We understand that mass unrest erupted in Karakalpakstan after plans to change its autonomous status within Uzbekistan were announced and that initially peaceful demonstrations turned violent, with casualties among civilians and law enforcement.
We are glad to hear that the situation appears to be returning to normal and call for calm and dialogue. We ask that the Government of Uzbekistan adhere to their OSCE commitments on human rights and due process as authorities seek to understand what happened.
We call on the Uzbek authorities to conduct an open and fully transparent investigation into these tragic events and we will continue to monitor developments closely. We remain concerned that a local journalist, who called for the independence of Karakalpakstan, was arrested, and whose whereabouts remains unknown.
We support efforts to involve citizens and civil society in political decision-making and respect the right to peaceful assembly and media freedom. Media plays an important role in ensuring reliable information is communicated and helps combat disinformation. Respect for all human rights is critical to peace and stability.
Thank you. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
07 Jul 22. UK reveals Royal Navy seizure of smuggled Iranian missiles. HMS Montrose seized dozens of packages containing advanced weaponry, including surface-to-air-missiles and engines for land attack cruise missiles. In early 2022, whilst on routine maritime security operations, Royal Navy ship HMS Montrose seized Iranian weapons from speedboats being operated by smugglers in international waters south of Iran. The weapons seized included surface-to-air-missiles and engines for land attack cruise missiles, in contravention of UN Security Council resolution 2216 (2015).
This is the first time a British Naval warship has interdicted a vessel carrying such sophisticated weapons from Iran.
The seizures, which occurred on 28th January and 25th February 2022, took place in the early hours of the morning. HMS Montrose’s Wildcat helicopter, equipped with state of the art radar systems, was scanning for vessels smuggling illicit goods. The helicopter crew spotted small vessels moving at speed away from the Iranian coast.
During the February interdiction, United States Navy destroyer USS Gridley supported efforts by deploying a Seahawk helicopter to provide critical overwatch during the operation. On both occasions, the Wildcat helicopter pursued the vessels and reported back to HMS Montrose that they could see suspicious cargo on deck.
A team of Royal Marines approached the vessels on two Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats before securing and searching the vessel. Dozens of packages containing advanced weaponry were discovered, confiscated and brought back to HMS Montrose.
Minister for the Armed Forces James Heappey said: “The UK is committed to upholding international law, from standing up to aggression in Europe to interdicting illegal shipments of weaponry that perpetuates instability in the Middle East. The UK will continue to work in support of an enduring peace in Yemen and is committed to international maritime security so that commercial shipping can transit safely without threat of disruption.”
The seized packages were returned to the UK for technical analysis which revealed that the shipment contained multiple rocket engines for the Iranian produced 351 land attack cruise missile and a batch of 358 surface-to-air missiles.
The 351 is a cruise missile with a range of 1,000km. It is regularly used by the Houthis to strike targets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and was also the type of weapon used to attack Abu Dhabi on 17th January 2022, which killed three civilians.
On Friday 24 June, the Ministry of Defence hosted the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), which concerns the conflict in Yemen. The panel inspected the seized weapons and received a technical brief by the UK’s Defence Intelligence analysts.
Commanding Officer of HMS Montrose, Commander Claire Thompson, said: “These interdictions demonstrate the professionalism and commitment of the Royal Navy to promoting stability in this region. I am extremely proud of my crew – the Royal Navy sailors, aircrew and Royal Marines involved in these endeavours and the significant positive impact they are having in maintaining the international rules-based order at sea.”
The UK retains a permanent presence in the Middle East, with HMS Montrose having been deployed to the region since early 2019, actively supporting multi-national maritime security operations and protecting the interests of the United Kingdom and its allies. The ship operates under the control and direction of the UK Maritime Component Command (UKMCC), based in Bahrain.
In the wider Gulf, HMS Montrose regularly works alongside international partners as part of the 38-nation coalition Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF is the world’s largest multinational maritime partnership, which exists to counter illicit non-state actors. HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate, has taken part in numerous successful operations to seize illicit drugs in the Gulf of Oman, most recently in January when £15 m worth of heroin, methamphetamine, hashish and marijuana were seized. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
06 Jul 22. SA Defence budget will continue shrinking. National Treasury allocations to the Department of Defence (DoD) for the national defence force, military veterans, Armscor and the Castle of Good Hope among others, have and will continue to decrease, according to the latest SA Yearbook. According to the government authorised publication, Minister Thandi Modise’s department was allocated R52.4 bn for the 2021/20 financial year.
“As the DoD’s core activities are labour intensive, compensation of employees (CoE) is its largest cost driver, accounting for 61.4% (R88.4 bn) of total expenditure of R140.2 bn over the MTEF (medium term expenditure framework) period”.
“Following Cabinet’s decision to stabilise government debt over the medium term, the department’s budget for CoE is reduced by R3.9 bn in 2021/22, R5.3 bn in 2022/23 and R3 bn in 2023/24.”
This will see, the yearbook has it, CoE spending decrease at an average annual rate of 1.5%, from R31 bn in 2020/21 to R29.6 bn in 2023/24. The reductions will “mainly be effected by freezing salary increases for all employees”. Additionally, to remain in line with government’s ceiling for CoE spending, personnel numbers in the DoD are expected to decrease by 342, from 73 500 in 2020/21 to 73 158 in 2023/24 ascribed mostly to “natural attrition”.
“The DoD expects to fill only critical posts as they become vacant. Cabinet approved an overall reduction of 4.5% (R15.4 bn) on the DoD budget over the medium term.”
This will see expenditure decrease at an average annual rate of 4.5%, from R54.2bn in 2020/21 to R47.2bn in 2023/24. This includes reductions of R119.9m in 2021/22, R145.2m in 2022/23 and R140m in 2023/24 on transfers to Armscor. Other reductions, the Yearbook has it, will be effected proportionately across all programmes. These are given as CoE mainly; goods and services items, such as computer services, contractors, fuel, oil and gas as well as travel and subsistence and food and food supplies. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
05 Jul 22. Sudan: Unrest Continues.
EVENT
On 4 July, the head of Sudan’s ruling military government announced the withdrawal of the army from ongoing talks, supposedly to allow political and revolutionary groups to form a civilian transitional government. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan stated that the military-dominated sovereign council will be dissolved under the new government. However, he also revealed that a Higher Military Council of the Armed Forces will be established to oversee security, defence and “related responsibilities”.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The announcement comes after the military killed nine protesters and seriously injured over 600 others during demonstrations on 30 June. The violence prompted civilian groups to organise mass sit-ins throughout urban centres across Sudan. A general strike will also be organised within two weeks. Additionally, Khartoum resistance committees signed a charter in May to establish a unified political platform for the resistance groups in charge of the anti-coup protests, which will consolidate the protest movement. Amid the mounting unrest, it is possible the military felt pressurised to accept the protesters’ demands, namely the exclusion of the armed forces from a new transitional government.
- There remains a high degree of scepticism over the military’s stated intention to withdraw from politics, especially after it removed civilian members from the transitional government in October. Yasir Arman, a leading member of the Forces for Freedom and Change opposition group, claims that Burhan’s announcement is consistent with a leaked confidential note sent by the military to mediators and the international community last week. The note details the functions of the Higher Military Council, including its influence over foreign policy and its control of the Bank of Sudan, sustaining concerns about the military’s continued involvement.
- The FFC and the resistance committees, the primary pro-democracy factions leading the protest movement, have rejected the proposal of the Higher Military Council. They claim that the proposed council will simply seek to solidify the military’s power. By contrast, the groups which are seemingly most supportive of the move are the “National Consensus” groups, including Islamist supporters of the deposed former president, Omar al-Bashir.
FORECAST
The rejection of the proposal by the FFC and resistance committees will ensure that mass protest action continues. The FFC has already stated that the military’s latest offer means the protests are working. It has called on supporters to escalate protest action through sit-ins, processions and the impending general strike. Such action will likely take place in key cities across Sudan, targeting primary roads and transit nodes. This will cause significant disruption to supply chains between Khartoum and industrial centres like Atbara and the Port of Sudan. Such action will continue to be met with excessive military force; the use of tear gas and live ammunition will elevate the threats to bystanders, particularly in Khartoum and Omdurman.
Negotiations which take place on the military’s terms will lack legitimacy among huge swathes of the Sudanese public. In any case, eduring questions about the role of the Higher Military Council and al-Bashir era Islamists in the next government will likely act as flashpoints for further protests. It is highly likely that as the role and responsibilities of the Higher Military Council are more clearly outlined, civilian groups will seek to escalate protest action to coerce the military into reducing its political influence.
Negotiations to form a new government will be highly contentious. The talks currently include pro-al-Bashir and Islamist groups such as the Islamist National Congress Party (NCP), which the military government formally allowed to re-enter politics in April 2022. Pro-democracy factions widely perceive such groups as vessels for sustaining military influence within the government. Questions over these groups’ ties to the military and their role within the transition will likely disrupt negotiations, driving a repeated resurgence of protest activity in the coming months. In particular, a continued escalation of protest action in Khartoum will exacerbate the risk of fracturing within the military, threatening government stability. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jul 22. China-Japan: Chinese naval, coast guard intrusions near disputed territories sustain maritime operational risks. On 5 July, two China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels entered waters near the disputed but Japan-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, an action deemed by Tokyo as a violation of international law. Chinese vessels had been spotted near the islands for 81 consecutive days, marking the 15th intrusion this year. It also occurred a day after two Chinese and Russian military vessels entered Japan’s contiguous zone near the islands, the fourth time a Chinese naval vessel was spotted there since June 2018. The frequency of Chinese intrusions near disputed territories will increase for the foreseeable future, especially to defend territorial sovereignty (see Sibylline Monthly Forecast – July 2022). More joint Chinese-Russian patrols are also expected. Maritime and military tensions will increase throughout the long-term, raising the risk of retaliatory sanctions, and of escalation caused by maritime collisions. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Jul 22. Vladimir Putin’s non-Russian macho sporting interests.
“Putin’s concern with releasing highly stylised images of him engaged in macho pursuits including horse riding, carrying a hunting rifle, and going fishing is something that one would expect from a fashion model, or actor, rather than a serious politician or political leader.”
- John R. Bryson, Professor of Enterprise and Economic Geography, Birmingham Business School
At the G7 summit in June 2022, Western leaders mocked President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to project a macho image based around the periodic release of highly posed photographs. This included the 2009 photograph of Putin riding a horse topless. This criticism hit home as Putin responded by stating that it would be ‘disgusting’ to see Western leaders strip off and that they needed to cut out alcohol and engage in more sport.
There are many interesting aspects to this political exchange between Putin and Western leaders. Putin’s concern with releasing highly stylised images of him engaged in macho pursuits including horse riding, carrying a hunting rifle, and going fishing is something that one would expect from a fashion model, or actor, rather than a serious politician or political leader. It is noticeable that the construction of Putin’s macho image does not include visiting Russian troops on the frontline in Ukraine. This is a macho image that is constructed away from any real danger and should be compared unfavourably with Boris Johnson walking through Kyiv with President Zelensky, and with Zelensky’s visit to Ukrainian troops on the frontline.
I have a major problem with the way in which Putin constructs his macho image around sport. Putin is passionate about sports and using sport to project Russia’s importance on the world stage and to provide the Russian people with a sense of pride. However, Russia’s involvement in international sports is strongly associated with systematic doping based on the use of performance-enhancing drugs. This is not the image that Putin wants to project.
Putin projects an image of being passionate about many different sports including ice-hockey, judo and karate, horse riding, swimming, fishing, shooting and mountain skiing. To Putin, there is something special about Russian identity that he equates with the Russian language, heritage, and history. However, there is a tension between his sporting interests and his concern with everything Russian. Thus, ice-hockey is one of his sports, but this sport was developed in Canada rather than Russia. One could argue that Putin needs to focus his attention on Bandy, but then this sport’s first published set of organised rules were produced in England in 1882. The origins of mountain skiing are debatable, but the oldest ski was found in a peat bog in Sweden and not in Russia. Judo was developed in Japan whilst Karate’s origins lie in the Ryukyu Kingdom that was annexed by the Empire of Japan in 1879.
Putin recently told President Emmanuel Macron that he would much rather play ice-hockey than hold peace talks. The problem with this statement is that this means that Putin is more concerned with playing a game developed in Canada than with discussing the long-term interests of the Russian people.
There is an important tension in the ways in which Putin constructs his macho identity. On the one hand, he has compared himself to Peter the Great by emphasizing the importance of recovering Russian lands that have been lost. On the other hand, Putin’s macho identity is based around interests in non-Russian sports. Thus, his sporting interests are based around celebrating innovations in sports that were made in countries like Canada, England, and Japan. Why has Putin turned his back on Russian sports and failed to enhance the associations between Russian identity and sports developed in Russia. One problem is that very few sports were developed in Russia that have become of international importance.
Putin likes to consider Russia to be a sporting superpower, but the reality is that Russians tend to play sports invented elsewhere. All this means that Putin’s strong Russian macho leader image is based around involvement in sports that do not reflect a celebration of Russian identity, but an appreciation of non-Russian sporting innovations and cultures. It is time for Putin to enhance his interests in all things Russian and this includes developing an interest in Russian sports.
04 Jul 22. Argentina: Finance minister resigns over political pressures, heightening threat of unrest. On 2 July, Argentina’s Finance Minister Martín Guzmán resigned amid elevated political infighting between the two main factions of the ruling coalition, further raising economic policy and socio-economic health concerns. A close ally of President Alberto Fernández, Guzmán likely resigned due to political pressure from the Frente de Todos (FdT) hard-line wing of the ruling coalition led by the Vice President, Cristina Fernández. This group is pushing for more government spending to address the economic crisis and opposes the financial assistance deal reached with the IMF. President Fernández has named FdT-aligned Silviana Batakis as Guzmán’s replacement, signalling less political willingness to comply with the IMF and reduce Argentina’s fiscal deficit. Although radical economic policy changes remain unlikely, Batakis’ relation with Cristina will likely lead to shift in subsidy and taxes policies. Guzmán’s departure will spark a significant peso devaluation, increasing domestic economic uncertainty. The adoption of a looser fiscal policy could lead to a severe inflationary spiral which would significantly increase the threat of unrest. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Jul 22. Papua New Guinea: Threat of violence and unrest escalated during election period. On 4 July, polling began in Papua New Guinea’s general election. Security has been heightened in preparation, with more than 10,000 police and military personnel deployed, while Australia has sent 130 members of the Australian Defence Force to provide support. Violence surrounding elections is common in Papua New Guinea, driven by a lack of confidence in electoral processes and inadequate administrative capacity, with more than 200 people being killed during the 2017 election. Since May, there have been an estimated 28 election-related deaths, while clashes have also been reported between groups of supporters. The polling period is scheduled to last until 22 July, with the results to be confirmed in August. Tensions over this time will likely intensify incidents of violence and domestic unrest, particularly in the Highlands region of the country. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Jul 22. Ghana: IMF loan provides route to containing inflation and reducing domestic unrest. On 1 July, government officials confirmed that President Nana Akufo Addo had authorised the Finance Ministry to launch talks with the International Monetary fund on a new support package. With Ghana currently locked out of the Eurobond market, the decision allows Ghana to cancel plans for high interest loans and secure cheaper forms of credit at a time when debt has risen to 78 percent of GDP and Ghana faces a balance of payments crisis. Additionally, increased access to credit will likely enable the government to stem a fall in the value Ghana’s cedi, reducing price pressures that pushed inflation to an 18-year high in May of 27.6 percent and have created a cost of living crisis that prompted rare demonstrations in Accra last week. However, its capacity to cut domestic unrest may be undermined if loan terms include unpopular policies. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Jul 22. Mali: ECOWAS lifting of sanctions will alleviate economic pressure, mitigating threats of protests in cities. On 3 July, leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) lifted financial sanctions imposed on Mali, after the country’s ruling junta proposed a 24-month transition to civilian rule and published a new electoral law. The lifting of sanctions will take immediate effect, with borders opening with the country and regional diplomats returning to Bamako. Sanctions, imposed in January, cut the country off from the regional financial market and central bank, exacerbating economic challenges and causing the country to default on USD 300 m of its debt. The decision underlines ECOWAS’ acknowledgement of the sanctions failure in turning public opinion against the junta. Instead ECOWAS is now prioritizing resecuring working relations with Mali ahead of maintaining a deterrence against coups among other member states. The lifting of sanctions is likely to alleviate economic pressure for its population, particularly amid rising inflation rates and food insecurity, mitigating threats of protests in cities. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Jul 22. Sri Lanka: Mass protests planned for 9 July will likely cause supply chain disruptions. Mass protests calling for the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaska and his government over fuel shortages have been scheduled for the 9 July. Organisers, which largely consist of student activists, have generated significant interest on social media and in chat rooms, calling people from across the country to descend upon Colombo. While industry groups for bankers and doctors have held recent demonstrations, the 9 July protest aims to revive the GottaGoHome movement at Galle en Face in the capital. However, with the fuel crisis severally impacting public transport and mobility of individuals, it is unclear how individuals from across the country will travel to Colombo. Security authorities however will likely be on alert in the capital and install additional check points and roadblocks in anticipation of large crowds, disrupting the movement of personnel and goods. If large numbers of protesters do descend on Galle en Face the likelihood of clashes remains high, elevating threats to bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Jul 22. Update: air strikes against Daesh. The RAF are continuing to take the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria.
Summary
- Tuesday 14 June – an RAF Reaper struck a group of Daesh terrorists north of Tikrit in Iraq.
Detail
Iraqi security forces identified a number of Daesh terrorists attempting to re-establish a presence in an area to the north of Tikrit. A Royal Air Force Reaper remotely piloted aircraft joined coalition aircraft in supporting the Iraqi operation by tracking the group on Tuesday 14 June, and at an appropriate opportunity, when the terrorists were exposed in the open away from any civilians, conducted a successful attack alongside the other coalition aircraft; the RAF Reaper employed Hellfire missiles. The group was reported to be destroyed as a result of this Iraqi-led operation, and the terrorists eliminated before they could mount an active threat to the Iraqi people.
Previous update
Royal Air Force aircraft have continued to fly missions over Iraq and Syria in support of the global coalition against the Daesh terrorist movement. On Tuesday 14 December 2021, hostile drone activity was detected around the At Tanf coalition base in Syria. A pair of Typhoon FGR4s from Royal Air Force Akrotiri were conducting one of their regular patrols over Syria and Iraq as part of the global coalition against Daesh, and were tasked to investigate. On arrival in the At Tanf area, the pilots were able to identify a small hostile drone, and despite the diminutive size of the target, succeeded in conducting an air to air engagement with an ASRAAM (Advanced Short Range Air to Air Missile) which eliminated the threat it posed to coalition forces.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
01 Jul 22. US Army will no longer rotate tank units to Korea — but the tanks are staying. The Army will no longer rotate tank brigades to South Korea beginning this fall, the service acknowledged in a press release Thursday afternoon. Instead, the Army will now rotate a Stryker brigade combat team to Korea every nine months. It will also maintain the existing armored brigade combat team’s worth of tanks and equipment on the peninsula in a similar manner to the pre-positioned tank stocks in Europe that allowed a tank brigade to rapidly deploy out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, in response to Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine.
Removing the rotational armored brigade is the latest step in a gradual drawdown of American ground firepower on the peninsula, too, although a permanent air cavalry squadron was activated there in May.
Before it was deactivated in 2015, the 2nd Infantry Division’s 1st ABCT “Iron Brigade” was permanently stationed there. In the years since, the Army has maintained a rotational tank brigade commitment — until now.
Reduced OPTEMPO for ABCTs?
The change to Strykers is also a tacit acknowledgement that the service’s armored brigades may be overcommitted after the Ukraine crisis led the Army to increase its European armor commitment from one brigade combat team to three.
At a March town hall with family members of the 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st ABCT, which had just deployed to Europe less than six months after returning from a Korea rotation, Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Grinston acknowledged “how this math is going.”
An Army official told Army Times that with the departure of 1st Infantry Division’s 1st ABCT the service currently has two armored brigades in Europe. And the Army’s long-term rotational commitments now include an ABCT and a new additional rotational brigade in Romania.
A Defense Department fact sheet on the changes indicated that an infantry brigade could fill the Romania commitment in the future, though.
Force structure expert Mark Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank told Army Times in March that unless the service reduced its commitments, “the [operational tempo] would be very severe.”
Removing the Korea ABCT rotation will likely ease some of that pressure on the service’s tank force, buying time for units to modernize their equipment in between rotations.
The Army’s 11 ABCTs would have faced a significant challenge attempting to continue manning the Korea rotation in addition to three brigades in Europe, though it’s still unclear whether the service will be required to maintain its current posture in Europe.
An Army spokesperson did not immediately respond to a query seeking clarification on the service’s commitments after President Joe Biden announced changes to Europe force posture on Wednesday.
(Source: Army Times)
01 Jul 22. Chile: Uncertainty.
Key Takeaways
- Chile’s President Gabriel Boric has seen his approval ratings plummet since taking office on 11 March. The Boric administration’s attempt to assuage both the moderate and more radical left-wing factions of the ruling coalition have resulted in a weak political situation, increasing government instability and social tensions.
- The high levels of uncertainty surrounding the 4 September referendum on a new constitutional text will continue to hamper socio-economic growth in Chile and negatively impact investor confidence. Whilst the draft text does not include radical reform changes, uncertainty remains, particularly over policy and regulatory risks for the extractive sector. Current opinion polls show that the constitution will likely be rejected in the referendum.
- The weak socio-economic situation will sustain domestic unrest risks in the next one to two years, with the risk of strikes and protests by various sectors, including students, mine workers, bus and taxi drivers, and health care workers demanding better economic, environmental, and public security conditions.
Context
On 11 March, Gabriel Boric assumed presidency of Chile with promises to bring significant changes to the country’s economic model. However, the initial 100 days of the administration have been marked by a weakening economy, high inflation, and persistent social unrest in the south.
For decades, Chile has been one of Latin America’s fastest growing economies, enabling millions to be lifted out of poverty. Between 2000 and 2015, the poverty rate fell from 26 percent to 7.9 percent. However, vulnerability to external economic shocks and limited government social assistance has resulted in over 30 percent of Chile’s population now being at risk of falling back into poverty, putting them in the so-called “vulnerable middle class”. The Chilean public endured the lack of government assistance until the 2019 social protests exposed the deep inequalities and underlying frustrations felt by the vulnerable middle class. The protests destabilised Chile’s traditionally predictable politics as an angry middle class took to the streets and demanded increased social benefits and individual rights.
The domestic economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, which has driven up international energy prices and crated more global supply chain disruptions. Annual inflation in Chile reached 10.5 percent at the beginning of June 2022, the highest inflation rate since 1994. Meanwhile, the price of the average Chilean food basket increased by 17.3 percent in the last 12 months. Amid the ceasing of emergency government economic support rolled out at the height of the pandemic and weak macroeconomic conditions, poverty is projected to increase again by 4.7 percent in 2022. These underlying weak socio-economic conditions continue to sustain elevated unrest risks in the country.
Moreover, whilst Chile remains one of the safest countries in the region, concerns of criminality are growing. In the last six months, homicides have increased by 70 percent and the perception of harm caused by violent robbery has increased by 37 percent in the last decade. A rising homicide rate can be attributed to increases in gang violence and drug trafficking.
The sense of frustration expressed during the 2019 protests extended to the country’s traditional political parties, fuelling anti-establishment sentiment, and prompting the rise of new political leaders not previously involved in politics, as well new and more radical political parties. The general dissatisfaction with the political system led protesters to demand radical political reform and the rewriting of the constitution by a popularly elected Constitutional Convention (constituent assembly). The elections for the Constituent Convention in May 2021 demonstrated the extent of the Chilean electorate’s distrust of the political establishment, as 64 percent of the elected representatives are independents not affiliated to any political party, and many are members of Chile’s often ignored Indigenous communities.
Constitutional Convention
On 28 June, Chile’s Constitutional Convention approved the final draft of the new constitutional text, unveiling the potential new pillars of the country’s regulatory framework. The draft constitutional text will be put up to a national referendum vote on 4 September. While the proposed draft significantly increases the role of the state in key areas such as healthcare, basic and higher education, and labour supervision, the convention rejected major overhauls to regulation on mining and other extractive sectors, which will reduce policy risks for the sector. The draft text also mandates gender equality quotas in government institutions
However, recent polls show that voters will likely vote against the new constitution on 4 September. According to a Cadem poll, 51 percent of respondents now say they are planning to vote against the new constitution. Such an outcome would be a major political setback for the Boric administration, which is supportive of adopting a new constitution. It will likely hinder the administration’s policy agenda and will ultimately weaken democratic institutions as are likely Chileans will lose confidence in the political system’s ability to address their demands. Indeed, the strength and stability of Boric’s administration is dependent on the outcome of the 4 September referendum. Potential scenarios are outlined towards the end of the report. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Jul 22. Sudan: Use of excessive force likely to drive further violent protests in Khartoum and Omdurman. On 30 June, the security forces killed seven protesters during anti-coup demonstrations in Khartoum and Omdurman. In the capital, thousands of demonstrators were marching towards the Republican Palace. The security forces’ use of live ammunition and tear gas against protesters comes despite the lifting of the state of emergency and the termination of judicial immunity. It is likely that the incident will undermine efforts to secure Western funding. The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) condemned the violence and called for protesters to continue demonstrating by initiating ‘sit-in’ protests. It is highly likely that future demonstrations will be met with excessive force by the security forces, elevating the threat to staff and assets in Khartoum and Omdurman. The government’s implementation of sporadic internet outages will almost certainly impact communication in these cities. It is highly likely that protests will prompt road and bridge closures, disrupting citywide movement. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Jul 22. Nigeria: Recent attack is consistent with elevated threat of kidnap in rural areas of central, northern regions. On 30 June, Nigerian officials confirmed that armed gunmen attacked a mining site near Ajata Aboki village in the Shiroro area of Niger state. They kidnapped four Chinese nationals and an unconfirmed number of locals. The attack was perpetrated by an armed group made up of individuals known locally as ‘bandits’. The group and others like it have reportedly been active in recent years throughout northern and central Nigeria. While they often seek to represent the interests of pastoral communities by attacking sedentary farmers and isolated villages, these groups’ tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are known to include kidnap for ransom (KFR) and illicit goods trafficking. The recent attack is consistent with such activity and demonstrates the elevated threats to assets and staff located in rural areas of central and northern Nigeria. These threats are particularly acute for businesses operating in sectors which involve goods that can be more easily resold after being stolen, such as extractives. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Jul 22. Brazil: Senate approves pre-election aid package, ignoring constitutional spending cap and elevating socio-economic health risks. On 30 June, Brazil’s Senate approved a significant pre-election aid package, which will now be sent to the lower house. The package is the latest populist measure pushed by President Jair Bolsonaro, who has used the fuel price crisis exacerbated by the war in Ukraine as a legal justification for overriding the constitutional spending cap. The package includes USD 192 in aid for self-employed truck drivers, a key Bolsonaro support base. It also increases the amount paid out by the Auxílio Brasil social welfare programme by 50 percent. Government-aligned senators also managed to grant increased funding to an existing food security programme, as well as additional aid for taxi drivers. These two additional benefits will cost a further USD 475 m. Bolsonaro continues to trail behind former president Lula da Silva in voting intention polls ahead of the October presidential election. These populist measures follow a series of others implemented ahead of the elections and will maintain policy and macroeconomic instability in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Jul 22. Peru: President Castillo resigns from Perú Libre, elevating government instability risks. On 30 June, President Pedro Castillo announced his “irrevocable” resignation from the ruling Perú Libre party. The decision follows the call by Vladimir Cerrón, Perú Libre’s main leader, for Castillo to leave the party for betraying its principles (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update- 30 June 2022). The move further weakens Castillo’s position, increasing governability risks amid dwindling congressional support for Castillo. Separately, the Supervisory Commission of Peru’s Congress approved a report on 30 June that accuses Castillo of leading an alleged corruption ring. The report will now be sent to the plenary of Congress and could result in the launching of a new impeachment motion against Castillo. While previous congressional attempts to impeach Castillo have failed, the risk of impeachment is likely to escalate significantly after the election of new Congress leaders next month. These developments will increase government stability risks in the coming weeks and months. (Source: Sibylline)
————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————-