NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 08.

* IDF continues expanding ground operations into southern Gaza while conducting clearing operations in numerous locations in northern Gaza. On 8 December, the IDF claimed to have conducted strikes on over 450 targets in Gaza in the preceding 24-hour period, including drone strikes in the Khan Yunis area. During this time, the IDF continued advancing on Khan Yunis from the north and east and collapsed numerous tunnel shafts. In northern Gaza, the IDF has continued clearing operations in Gaza City and Jabalia, taking control of a Hamas outpost and weapons warehouse in al Bisan. Also, in Jabalia, the IDF detained dozens of individuals suspected of terrorism, the large volume of detainees highlights the likelihood that they surrendered. Throughout Gaza, IDF ground units have engaged in clashes with Hamas, PIJ and PFLP militants, who continue to employ small arms, mortars, anti-tank grenades, tandem shells and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

* Over the past 24 hours, the frequency of rocket fire from Gaza-based militants towards Israel has continued to fall. Launches primarily targeted locations in the Gaza envelope and southern Israel. However, on 8 December at 1431hrs local time, there was one barrage of rockets targeting central Israel, triggering sirens in Givatayim, Ramat Gan and Tel Aviv. This highlights the continued risk of sporadic upticks in the intensity of rocket barrages across Israel.

* On 8 December, the US embassy in Baghdad’s green zone was targeted by rockets, no damage was reported, and no group claimed responsibility. Following the incident Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani released a statement ordering Iraqi security agencies to investigate the incident and pursue the perpetrator. The incident will elevate the likelihood of the US increasing operations against Iranian militant proxies in Syria and Iraq and highlights the substantial bystander risks around US assets in the two countries.

* Following rocket launches from Syria towards Israel on 7 December, the IDF launched retaliatory strikes on 8 December. Rockets from Syria fell in open areas in the Golan Heights and triggered sirens in Buqata (northern district). In response, the IDF struck targets in Rif Dimashq and Quneitra governorates, with unconfirmed reports claiming these included Syrian army positions. While unconfirmed, Israel does perceive the Syrian army as ultimately responsible for cross-border strikes and IDF retaliation against Syrian military positions is not uncommon. Additionally, unconfirmed reports on 8 December claim the IDF killed four individuals in a strike on a car in Madinat al-Baath (Quneitra governorate). If a high-ranking officer or senior figure related to Iran Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was among the dead in the car, there is a realistic possibility that there will be further, though likely limited, rocket launches from Syria into Israel in the coming week.

* IDF operations in the West Bank continue with increased intensity, particularly around hotspot locations in northern West Bank. On 8 December, six Palestinians were killed, during clashes with the IDF resulting from a raid in al-Farah camp (Tubas governorate). Additionally, Palestinian militants clashed with the IDF in Tulkarm and Nablus, using improvised explosive devices against the troops. Further armed clashes were reported during IDF raids in Ramallah and Arraba (Jenin governorate).

* Over the past 24 hours, cross-border clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border have increased in frequency and intensity following the death of an Israeli civilian in the Northern District. On 7 December a Hizballah-launched anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) killed a civilian on farmland near Matat (Northern district), while another ATGM injured two IDF personnel in Shtula (Northern district). Subsequently, the IDF increased the frequency and intensity of air and artillery strikes conducted on locations associated with Hizballah and allied militants in Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South governorates on 7 December. Hizballah claimed it had incurred three casualties among its members while the Lebanon faction of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad announced two casualties. Strikes continued at an elevated intensity on 8 December, with a hostile aircraft, likely launched by Hizballah, detected in the vicinity of Kiryat Shmona (Northern district).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* Despite police dispersal of the far-right Israeli activity march in Jerusalem, there is a realistic possibility of further demonstrations over the coming days, sustaining unrest risks. On 7 December, Israeli police dispersed the ‘Maccabees March’ of far-right Israeli religious activists before their planned march through Old Jerusalem’s Muslim Quarter and gathering at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound. Despite localised clashes between demonstrators and police, no instances of broader domestic unrest or clashes with counter-demonstrators were reported. Despite this dispersal, over the Hannukah period (7-15 December) there is a realistic possibility of further attempts to mobilise far-right religious organisations in the Jerusalem area, sustaining risks of further protests and clashes with security forces and/or counter-demonstrators. Such demonstrations will also further exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, sustaining elevated risks of domestic unrest and sole perpetrator attacks over the coming days.

* On 8 December, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will vote on a ceasefire resolution calling for the immediate cessation of IDF operations in Gaza, which is unlikely to be adopted. The resolution, which has been proposed by the UAE after the UN Secretary-General António Guterres invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter and called for a UNSC sitting. Given the terms of the resolution and the UAE’s, the US will likely veto the proposal. Although the resolution is unlikely to pass, as IDF operations expand southwards into Khan Yunis and Rafah, Israel will almost certainly face increasing international pressure to moderate operations in Gaza and to re-engage in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas. While there is a realistic possibility of indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas proceeding over the coming days, the negotiating parties are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement during this timeframe.

* The draft of the US Department of Defense budget for 2024 highlights continued US support for Israel and efforts to improve the operational environment in the Red Sea. On 7 December, the US Senate and House of Representatives Armed Services Committee released the first draft of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), authorising USD 886bn in defence spending. The draft budget provides funding for joint US-Israeli security research and development projects, particularly anti-drone projects while earmarking funding for including Israeli pilots in Euro-NATO pilot training, among other measures. The bill also outlines ongoing efforts to expand the US’s joint naval manoeuvres in the Middle East that aim to counter threats posed by Iran and its numerous regional proxies, particularly to commercial shipping lanes in the Red Sea. As a whole, the proposed budget highlights continued US commitment to supporting Israel, while underscoring ongoing efforts to improve the stability of the operational environment in the Red Sea, particularly for commercial vessels.

* The drop in Starbucks’ market value by approximately USD 12bn in November following its worker union social media post supporting Palestine, highlights the reputational and brand image risks of the war. The post triggered a consumer boycott of the company, slowing sales and triggering negative investor confidence, causing the company’s stock to fall weekly, despite growth in sales in the last quarter of the year. The incident highlights the spillover risks of the war, particularly to retail chains due to weak supervision of customer relations and labour unions. These are likely to continue growing as the war continues, with risks applying to the apparent support of either side or party in the conflict.

FORECAST

Rockets targeting the US embassy in Iraq reflect a likely escalation in targeting US forces and assets in the region, elevating bystander risks. Following the incident, US forces in the region are likely to increase their operations and strikes against Iranian proxies, particularly in Syria and Iraq. However, increasing strikes in Iraq will elevate domestic unrest risks and public pressure on the Iraqi government to act against US strikes in Iraqi territory. This domestic pressure is also likely to be used by opposition forces trying to destabilise the current administration by elevating anti-governmental and anti-western sentiments.

US final defence budget draft for next year, published on 8 December, signals plans to enhance Israel’s long-range military capabilities. The draft includes among others plans for joint IDF-US navy training in the Red Sea and additional fuel planes for Israel. These highlight long-term plans to boost Israel’s regional power projection and capabilities to face far threats, including Iran and its proxies in the region. Together with the budget for a representative to push normalisation with Israel in the region, these symbolise further integration of Israel into US military efforts to provide and maintain security in the region.

The increasing intensity of IDF strikes in southern Lebanon will likely trigger a moderate escalation in cross-border clashes over the coming days, increasing physical security and bystander risks. Following an Israeli civilian casualty in Matat and at least five militant deaths in southern Lebanon, an increase in the frequency and intensity of cross-border, tit-for-tat clashes is highly likely over the coming days, driving elevated risks for individuals and assets in proximity to the Israel-Lebanon border. Strikes resulting in IDF or Hizballah casualties will likely drive further escalations in cross-border hostilities, increasing risks of target misidentification resulting in civilian casualties. While Hizballah will likely continue primarily targeting IDF bases and positions in northern Israel, an uptick in Lebanon-based PIJ militant casualties will increase the risk of rocket fire targeting population centres in northern Israel. Additionally, amid an uptick in hostilities, there is a realistic possibility of Lebanon-based militants employing higher-capability rockets, increasing the exposure of population centres further from the Israel-Lebanon border, including Haifa, to possible rocket fire. Despite the likelihood of an escalation in cross-border clashes over the coming days, a full-scale mobilisation of Hizballah forces remains unlikely.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

* A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel

* High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants

* Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities

* Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate

* An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants

* US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level

* Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon

* The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

Dec 07.

* The IDF continues operations in Gaza, expanding the ground offensive further into Khan Yunis while continuing clearing operations in northern Gaza. IDF ground units have continued expanding operations into Khan Yunis and claimed to have encircled key Hamas command and control centres in the city by 7 December. IDF personnel clashed with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Gaza-based militants, who deployed small arms, anti-tank munitions, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and rocket-propelled grenades. Concurrently, the IDF has continued clearing operations in Beit Lahia, Jabalia and Shujaiya, while the Israeli navy has continued conducting strikes on locations along Gaza’s coastline. Over the past 24 hours, the Israeli Air Force conducted at least 250 airstrikes in Gaza.

* Rocket fire from Gaza towards Israel over the past 24 hours returned to pre-ceasefire levels. However, southern Israeli cities such as Beersheba remain likely to experience a higher frequency of rocket barrages than before the ceasefire. On 6 December, Hamas militants fired a multi-rocket barrage at Beersheva, with at least one rocket landing in a parking lot and damaging several vehicles, though no injuries have been reported. Subsequently, the IDF claimed that the rockets were fired from a Hamas position adjacent to southern Gaza’s humanitarian zone and near UN facilities. Further rocket launches towards Israel, including towards the central district remain likely over the coming days.

* The IDF increased operations in the West Bank, uncovering two underground tunnel shafts and three explosive labs in Jenin. On 6 December, the IDF continued conducting large-scale raids in Jenin, with Hamas-aligned militants employing small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Over the past 24 hours, clashes also occurred in Nablus and Ramallah, resulting in numerous injuries, while the IDF conducted raids, arrests and asset seizures in Bethlehem, Hebron and Tulkarm. Ahead of Jewish activists’ planned demonstration at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound at 1930hrs (local time) on 7 December, Israeli security forces will likely increase their posture in the Jerusalem area, particularly along the activists’ planned route through the Old City.

* Cross-border clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border have continued at the increased frequency observed in recent days, sustaining elevated physical security and bystander risks. Over the past 24 hours, Lebanese Hizballah militants fired a multi-rocket salvo at Matat (Northern district) which injured at least one civilian and damaged a vehicle, while two instances of mortar fire triggered alerts in Margaliot (Northern district). The IDF has shelled numerous locations along the Israel-Lebanon border while conducting airstrikes on locations linked to Hizballah militants in the Nabatieh and South governorates. Tit-for-tat clashes between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah have returned to pre-ceasefire levels and will likely continue moderately escalating in intensity and frequency over the coming days.

* Throughout the Middle East, elevated activity from Iranian-aligned proxy groups continues to drive regional tensions, sustaining operational risks therein. On 6 December, the Iranian-aligned Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) attempted to conduct two drone attacks on US military installations in Iraq. While neither attack resulted in material damage or injuries, following the termination of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, elevated IRI activity underscores elevated collateral risks to assets in proximity to US military installations in Iraq and Syria. Also on 6 December, the US Navy shot down a drone in the southern Red Sea, attributed to Yemen-based Houthis. Elevated Houthi activity and increasing reports of drone loitering in the Red Sea highlight elevated risks of harassment for commercial vessels along major shipping routes, particularly those associated with Israel and the US.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* Amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza, limited humanitarian aid deliveries continue via the Rafah border crossing, with fuel deliveries likely increasing over the coming days. IDF ground and air operations in Gaza continue to significantly limit the delivery and distribution of aid by humanitarian organisations, which face significantly elevated operational risks throughout the enclave. On 6 December, the Israeli cabinet voted to incrementally increase the volume of fuel allowed to pass into Gaza over the coming days, amid critical energy insecurity which continues to undermine the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid therein. While no official statement regarding the volume of fuel has been released, over the coming weeks, the Israeli government will likely authorise the delivery of between 120,000-180,000 litres of fuel to humanitarian organisations per day, moderately stabilising critical energy insecurity. Subsequently, on 7 October, unnamed Israeli officials reportedly informed the Times of Israel that the Kerem Shalom Crossing, Gaza’s primary goods crossing from Israel into Gaza, will be opened over the coming days to facilitate increased aid and fuel deliveries. Even so, this crossing remains highly vulnerable to collateral damage from airstrikes and/or rocket fire as hostilities in Gaza continue, sustaining the likelihood of disruption to the cross-border movement of goods.

* On 6 December, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter allowing him to call for a UN Security Council (UNSC) sitting. Guterres likely activated the article to push the Security Council to formally call for a ceasefire, predicating an attempt by the UAE, a non-permanent UNSC member, to propose a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in the coming days. Despite generating substantial international media coverage, this move is highly unlikely to significantly impact IDF operations in Gaza over the coming days. However, while there is a realistic possibility of the US vetoing a ceasefire resolution depending on its terms, there is an equally realistic possibility of the US abstaining from voting and allowing the resolution to pass. Consequently, over the coming days, Israel will likely face increasing international pressure to moderate operations in Gaza, particularly as the ground offensive expands southwards towards Khan Yunis and Rafah and to re-engage in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas.

FORECAST

Over the coming 24 hours, IDF ground units will almost certainly continue advancing into Khan Yunis with Hamas and allied militants conducting complex ambushes on IDF personnel. Over the coming days, as the IDF attempts to locate Hamas command nodes and leadership figures in Khan Yunis, militant groups will almost certainly continue conducting co-ordinated drone, mortar, IED and small arms attacks on IDF formations. The increasing intensity of clashes in southern Gaza will almost certainly result in increasing IDF casualties. In response, the IDF will likely increase airstrikes on structures in southern Gaza to reduce IDF soldiers’ exposure to prepared positions such as booby-trapped buildings, during clearing operations. Rocket launches from Gaza-based militants will almost certainly continue, with a realistic possibility of an uptick during the Hannukah holiday period (7 December – 13 December) to increase psychological pressure on the Israeli population.

Rocket launches from locations near UN facilities in southern Gaza elevate the risk of the IDF launching precision strikes in the vicinity of the southern Gaza humanitarian zone. Pictures from the IDF of the alleged launch site of the Beersheva barrage indicate that the rockets were likely launched remotely, underscoring persistent challenges to advanced launchpad detection. As the rocket barrage consisted of 12 projectiles and caused material damage to an industrial park in Beersheva, the IDF will likely escalate efforts to locate launch pads across southern Gaza, including in proximity to the humanitarian zone. There is also a realistic possibility of the IDF conducting strikes in the vicinity of the humanitarian zone. Given the sensitivity of the area, should such a strike occur, the IDF is highly likely to use precise, low-yield munition with a limited blast radius. Even so, physical security and bystander risks will be particularly elevated in the vicinity of this area over the coming days, compounded by risks of misidentification, particularly for groups and individuals transiting along the zone’s perimeter.

Over the coming days, clashes involving Israeli security personnel in the West Bank will likely increase in frequency and intensity, driving elevated physical security and bystander risks. At 1930hrs (local time), approximately 200 far-right Israeli activists will march towards the Al Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions. These will further increase risks of Palestinian domestic unrest in the broader Jerusalem area and the West Bank, particularly following Friday prayers. Given the contested and provocative nature of the march, there is a realistic possibility of clashes with counter-protesters, particularly Palestinians. Over the Hannukah period, there is a realistic possibility of further far-right demonstrations in Old Jerusalem, particularly in the vicinity of the Al Aqsa Mosque compound, sustaining risks of further counter-demonstrations. Rising ethno-religious tensions will also increase the likelihood of sole-perpetrator attacks in the Jerusalem area, including stabbings, shootings and car-ramming attacks. While attacks have so far prioritised IDF personnel and positions, including checkpoints and border crossings, the increased tensions over the holiday period will further elevate the risk of attacks targeting civilians. This risk will be particularly elevated around religious sites, crowded public spaces and transport hubs in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

* A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel

* High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants

* Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities

* Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate

* An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants

* US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level

* Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon

* The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*France: Sabotage of defence sites will elevate the risk of further incidents in coming weeks. On 6 December, anonymous anti-war activists claimed responsibility for a sabotage attack on two production sites of defence company Aubert and Duvall overnight on 19-20 November. The activists claimed to have partially felled a power line supplying a site in Firminy (Loire department) and set fire to a high-voltage cable supplying a site in Les Ancizes Comps (Puy-de-Dôme department). The activists were critical of the bombing of Gaza in their letter of responsibility, indicating they were possibly motivated by this. However, they also mentioned other conflicts, suggesting a general anti-war position. They also criticised the alleged record sales made by eight major defence companies; these will likely be possible targets of sabotage action in the future. Amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, there is a realistic possibility that this sabotage will inspire further similar action in the coming weeks, particularly in France, Germany and Italy, and to a lesser extent in the UK.

*Saudi Arabia-Yemen-US: Saudi remains committed to ceasefire, but sustained attacks drive escalation risks. On 6 December, reports emerged that Saudi Arabia had asked the US to show restraint in responding to the prior hijacking and missile attacks by Yemen’s Houthis against allegedly Israeli-linked vessels in waters proximate to Yemen. The US response has so far focused on intercepting missiles and providing naval support to targeted vessels, but the US has alluded to the possibility of a direct response, threatening to escalate the conflict. Saudi Arabia’s call for restraint underlines its commitment to its own peace agreement with the Houthis despite an escalation of militant activity on their border. This is largely driven by concerns that regional instability will endanger efforts to bolster Saudi Arabia’s non-oil economy, particularly its growing tourism industry. However, while an escalation in the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is currently unlikely, the Israel-Hamas conflict will sustain the risk of Houthi attacks and the risk of US escalation, further destabilising Yemen and threatening Saudi regional economic objectives.

Dec 06.

* IDF ground operations continue in Shujaiya and Jabalia in northern Gaza and have advanced into Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. During an IDF operation in northern Gaza, forces uncovered a large weapon silo containing hundreds of anti-tank missiles, long-range rockets, RPGs and UAVs. Sections of the Salah al-Din road to the east and north of Kahn Yunis have been closed to civilians, with the IDF currently using this area for military purposes. As IDF operations continue to expand southwards, Hamas, PIJ and Gaza-based militants continue to use complex tactics and increasingly advanced weaponry during clashes. On 5 December, Hamas militants rigged a house with IEDs while IDF personnel were operating in the area.

* The frequency of rocket launches from Gaza targeting Israel has continued at levels slightly above the pre-ceasefire period. Barrages of rockets towards central Israel resulted in shrapnel falling across Israeli cities in central Israel including several locations in Tel Aviv, and a rocket hit a building in Ashkelon, south district. These highlight the sustained security and bystander risks across Israel regardless of IDF advancements in southern Gaza.

* The IDF increased operations in the West Bank, uncovering two underground tunnel shafts and three explosive labs in Jenin. Armed clashes involving the deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against IDF soldiers were recorded in Jenin (Jenin governorate) and Tammun (Tubas governorate). Increased operations and raids by the IDF reflect elevated activity of militants in the West Bank are likely to further elevate tensions in the West Bank.

* On 5 December, IDF mistakenly struck a Lebanese army position, killing a soldier and injuring three. The IDF issued an apology and said the accident is being investigated. The accident reflects the elevated risks of misidentification, particularly in proximity to the Israel-Lebanon border. Over the past 24 hours, IDF clashes with Hizballah and/or affiliated militants on the Israel-Lebanon border have continued to gradually increase, returning to pre-ceasefire levels.

* On 6 December, the IDF intercepted a surface-to-surface missile launched from Yemen targeting Eilat. According to the IDF, despite siren triggering in Eilat, the missile did not cross into Israeli territory and was intercepted by the Arrow air defence system. This is the first missile targeting Eilat since the end of the ceasefire on 1 December, reflecting continued threats by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* An additional tactical pause in IDF operations in Rafah has facilitated humanitarian aid deliveries, though cross-border movement disruption continues to significantly undermine socio-economic conditions in Gaza. On 6 December, the IDF announced a temporary ceasefire in Rafah from 1000hrs to 1400hrs (local time) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, though the intensification of clashes in Khan Yunis and central Gaza continues to significantly restrict broader aid distribution. On 5 December, the World Health Organisation warned of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation throughout Gaza, with critical food, water and energy insecurity presenting immediate and significant threats to public health. Continued combat operations will almost certainly sustain disruption to the delivery of humanitarian aid while exacerbating operational risks for humanitarian organisations throughout Gaza.

* On 5 December, Israeli police authorised a demonstration by Jewish activists at the Al Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem, significantly increasing the likelihood of counter-demonstrations and clashes over the coming days. The march will take place on 7 December and has been organised by nine right-wing Jewish religious groups which oppose the control of the compound by the Jordanian-appointed Jerusalem Waqf, and coincide with the first night of Hannukah. Although the march will be limited to a maximum of 200 participants, counter-demonstrations are highly likely, presenting elevated risks of localised clashes in proximity to the Al Aqsa compound. There is a realistic possibility of further demonstrations throughout the Hannukah period, driving ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas while sustaining elevated diplomatic tensions with Jordan.

* Persistent tensions within the Israeli unity government will sustain moderate risks of budget policy stasis, though are unlikely to undermine government stability. On 5 December, at a joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, National Unity Party leader and cabinet member Benny Gantz reiterated his opposition to the government’s plans to release coalition funds as part of budget amendments proposed on 27 November. The press conference comes after opposition leader Yair Lapid called on government coalition members to vote against the amendments which increased military and defence spending while also releasing funds for religious schools and Israeli settlements in the West Bank. While the amendments will likely pass the first reading in the Knesset on 6 November, there is a realistic possibility of rising tensions within the unity government delaying the passage of the amendments over the coming weeks. Even so, risks to government stability remain low.

FORECAST

Over the coming 24 hours, the IDF is highly likely to continue advancing towards Khan Yunis in southern Gaza, sustaining elevated risks of rocket barrages targeting central and southern Israel. In response to the IDF’s southwards expansion, Hamas and Gaza-based militants active in the Khan Yunis and Rafah areas will likely escalate efforts to use ammunition caches in southern Gaza before IDF ground forces reach weapons stores. Consequently, Gaza-based militants will likely continue employing increasingly advanced weaponry during clashes with the IDF over the coming days, while sustaining frequent rocket launches towards IDF positions in the Gaza envelope and civilian population centres in central and southern Israel. Intense clashes will almost certainly persist in Khan Yunis, sustaining extreme physical security and bystander risks.

Clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants along the Israel-Lebanon border are likely to intensify in the coming days. The gradual uptick in hostilities is likely to continue, particularly in response to the accident resulting in a dead Lebanese army soldier. There is a realistic possibility that the accident will be leveraged by Hizballah as an opportunity to increase support among the Lebanese army by retaliating on the army’s behalf. As such there is an elevated risk of large rocket barrages including higher capability equipment targeting Israel’s North and Haifa districts in the coming days. While Hizballah is likely to target IDF bases and positions there is still a realistic possibility of rockets targeting population centres. The use of higher capability rockets will also increase the risks to population centres that are out of the range of rockets most commonly used during barrages, such as Afula, Caesarea, Haifa and Nazareth.

Israeli demonstrations around the Al Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem are highly likely to escalate ethno-religious tensions, increasing the likelihood of clashes and attacks over the coming days. Over the Hannukah period, there is a realistic possibility of further demonstrations in the vicinity of the Al Aqsa Mosque compound and counter-demonstrations, particularly in Jerusalem’s proximate Muslim Quarter. Broader instances of domestic unrest are likely over the coming days, and the IDF are highly likely to adopt an elevated security presence in Jerusalem. As such, there is a realistic possibility of violent clashes between demonstrators and/or with security forces, with further demonstrations likely acting as a flashpoint for upticks in violent altercations. Rising ethno-religious tensions will also increase the likelihood of sole-perpetrator attacks in the Jerusalem area, including stabbings, shootings and car-ramming attacks. While attacks will likely primarily target IDF personnel and positions, including checkpoints and border crossings, there is also a realistic possibility of attacks targeting civilians, particularly at religious sites, crowded public spaces and transport hubs. In the broader West Bank, clashes will almost certainly continue in Jenin, with elevated militant activity almost certainly triggering further arrests, raids and clashes over the coming days. Retaliatory demonstrations and clashes are highly likely in unrest hotspots, including Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm. Additionally, elevated ethno-religious tensions will likely sustain increasingly frequent instances of clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian civilians, elevating physical security and bystander risks for individuals therein.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

* A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel

* High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants

* Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities

* Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate

* An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants

* US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level

* Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon

* The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

*Israel: Efforts to contain civilian violence will likely create compliance challenges; restrictions on military aid unlikely. On 5 December, the US imposed visa bans on people involved in violent clashes in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and stated that further designations will be announced in the coming days. The move follows repeated warnings by the US to Israeli officials to do more to prevent violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank. However, with offensives into southern Gaza likely to escalate over the coming days, tensions in the West Bank will continue to build, likely necessitating an increased IDF presence which in turn will likely embolden Israeli settlers and increase retaliatory violence. As such, the US will likely feel pressured to expand visa restrictions and such sanctions on Israelis, possibly presenting a compliance risk for US businesses. However, US efforts to contain violence are highly unlikely to escalate to restrictions on military aid, likely having minimal impact on Israeli security policy.

*UK: Nationwide strikes against defence sector will largely remain peaceful; isolated incidents possible. On 7 December, the Palestine Youth Movement will hold a nationwide ‘Shut it Down for Palestine’ strike targeting the defence sector. The group has singled out BAE and Elbit Systems. Trade union members and Palestine activists plan to hold peaceful picket lines outside Israeli-linked defence sites. The group previously orchestrated strikes outside the entrances to a BAE Systems factory in Kent on 10 November. In this instance, protests remained broadly peaceful, causing limited disruption to operations. While the majority of protests on 7 December will likely remain peaceful, there remains a realistic possibility that more extreme actors take part in strikes, elevating security risks for the defence sector. In particular, the possibility of activists affiliated with the protest group Palestine Action joining the protests will drive criminal damage, vandalism and staff harassment risks. BAE and Elbit Systems sites will remain the most likely targets of protests, though affiliated defence sites will also face elevated direct action risks.

Dec 05.

IDF ground operations continue in Gaza, with reports of units advancing southwards reflecting the likely expansion of operations over the coming days. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF announced its encirclement of Jabalia and clashed with militants during clearing operations in Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya. IDF forces also continued advancing through central Gaza, with clashes reported in Deir al Balah and along the Salah al-Din Road, which is now closed to civilians. Unconfirmed reports indicate that IDF ground forces have also advanced from eastern Gaza into northeastern Khan Yunis, reaching Bani Suheila, with numerous overnight air strikes reported in the surrounding governorate. As the IDF continues to expand ground operations southwards, extreme physical security and bystander risks will almost certainly persist, particularly in central Gaza.
Over the past 24 hours, there was an increase in the frequency of rocket launches from Gaza towards southern Israel, including Beersheba. The uptick in rocket fire targeting southern Israel is likely due to the IDF’s continued advances towards southern Gaza, particularly Khan Yunis. Gaza-based militants will likely continue targeting proximate locations in southern Israel with elevated levels of rocket fire over the coming days, likely in an attempt to make use of weapons caches before IDF ground forces expand operations into southern Gaza.
Tit-for-tat clashes and strikes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants are gradually intensifying. Over the past 24 hours, Hizballah has continued to prioritise targeting IDF positions on the Israel-Lebanon border, primarily using anti-tank-guided missiles (ATGMs) to target locations IDF positions in the vicinity of Kiryat Shmona (Northern district) and the Shebaa Farms area. On 5 December, the IDF also intercepted a Hizballah-launched drone near Margaliot (Northern district). Cross-border fire from Lebanon continues to pose elevated security risks to civilian populations in northern Israel, particularly those close to the border and/or IDF positions. Similarly, IDF strikes on locations including warehouses and infrastructure associated with Hizballah warehouses and military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, sustain bystander security and misidentification risks in southern Lebanon.
Over the past 24 hours, the frequency and intensity of armed clashes between the IDF and Palestinian militants in the West Bank continued to gradually increase, particularly in Jenin. Unrest and clashes remain concentrated in the northern West Bank, mainly Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm, though spillover clashes have also been observed in the central West Bank, in Bethlehem and Qalandia Camp. The gradual intensification of Palestinian militant activity is likely driven by continued IDF raids in the West Bank and the advancements into southern Gaza. Amid elevated clashes and tensions, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will deploy additional troops into the West Bank over the coming days and adopt an elevated security posture in unrest hotspots.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The IDF has resumed temporary humanitarian pauses in southern Gaza. On 5 December, the IDF announced a temporary pause in operations in Al-Geneina neighbourhood, Rafah. In the past few days, the resumption of hostilities in Gaza has significantly increased the risks of disruption to aid deliveries via the Rafah border crossing and the distribution throughout Gaza. These risks are likely to continue despite the implementation of temporary humanitarian pauses. Additionally, on 4 December, Gaza-based communications firm Paltel announced that damage to its infrastructure had triggered a communication blackout throughout Gaza, though services were partially restored by 5 December. Elevated operational risks to humanitarian organisations, as well as restricted access to communication services, will likely further disrupt access to aid, sustaining significant humanitarian concerns over persistently elevated food, water and energy insecurity throughout Gaza.
On 4 December, Hamas called on Palestinian youth in Lebanon to join ‘the Youth of al-Aqsa Flood unit’, though this is unlikely to trigger significant mobilisation. The call, which was issued by Hamas militants based in Lebanon, has been rejected by Gebran Bassil, leader of Lebanon’s Free Patriotic Movement, which forms part of the caretaker government. Bassil’s rejection of the mobilisation call highlights significant domestic opposition to the expansion of hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border. Cross-border clashes, which have been primarily concentrated between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah, as well as Lebanon-based Hamas militants, have significantly elevated physical security and bystander risks in Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South governorates and have displaced approximately 55,000 civilians. Given substantial opposition to escalating clashes, the mobilisation of civilians or the expansion of hostilities beyond southern Lebanon remains unlikely.
On 4 December, Israel’s National Security Council increased travel warning levels for over 80 countries, underscoring elevated risks of targeted violence. The council increased warnings for most of Europe, indicating a ‘potential threat’ to individuals associated with Israel and/or Judaism in locations including Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and the UK, with similar warnings issued for Australia, Brazil, China and Russia. Warnings also indicate that travellers in Eurasia should reconsider travel plans, while Israelis in Bahrain, Tunisia and Qatar should immediately depart. The travel recommendations underscore elevated threats of harassment and violence targeting Israeli and/or Jewish travellers amid elevated ethno-religious tensions driven by the Israel-Hamas war and the resumption of IDF operations in Gaza.

FORECAST

The IDF is likely to continue advancing towards Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. The IDF is likely to conduct fewer airstrikes in southern Gaza than it launched in northern Gaza before it launched its ground offensive, due to international pressure to reduce civilian casualties. However, intense airstrikes remain likely and security risks in Khan Yunis remain severe. Furthermore, increased IDF operations and activity in southern Gaza will continue and hinder the transfer and dissemination of aid throughout the strip, further elevating food and water security risks.

There is a realistic possibility of the IDF augmenting its security posture in the West Bank over the coming days, increasing the likelihood of violent clashes and demonstrations, particularly in unrest hotspots. The deployment of additional IDF personnel will likely increase already-elevated risks of unrest and clashes over the coming days, presenting elevated physical security and bystander risks. Furthermore, developments in the IDF’s ground operations in Gaza will likely act as flashpoints for demonstrations and elevated militant activity, particularly Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya and Tulkarm. There also is a realistic possibility of clashes triggering temporary closures of checkpoints and/or border crossings, disrupting overland movement over the coming days. Concurrently, Israeli settlers’ increasingly violent clashes with Palestinian communities throughout the West Bank are highly likely to further exacerbate ethno-religious, tensions, sustaining risks of sole-perpetrator attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Cross-border clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border will likely continue on trend over the coming 24 hours, though there is a realistic possibility of further, moderate escalations over the coming days. Although Hizballah militant activity will likely continue predominantly targeting IDF positions in northern Israel, an uptick in tit-for-tat cross-border clashes will elevate risks of target misidentification, elevating bystander security risks in southern Lebanon and the threat of further escalation. Although unlikely to trigger mass-mobilisation, Hamas’ call for Palestinians in Lebanon to contribute to militant activity underscores the group’s continued presence on the Israel-Lebanon border. As such, there is a persistent risk of non-Hizballah groups based in Lebanon conducting uncoordinated attacks targeting civilian population centres, presenting continued and elevated risks to physical security and bystanders in Israel’s Northern and Haifa districts. Attacks targeting civilian population centres and/or infrastructure are highly likely to trigger an uptick in retaliatory IDF strikes in southern Lebanon, increasing the likelihood of further conflict escalation therein.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave

Executive summary

Israel-Hamas ceasefire offered a route of de-escalation, with further agreements addressing security and hostages likely to elevate de-escalation prospects.
As fighting resumes in Gaza, concerns regarding an escalation of the current conflict risk driving an escalation in the involvement of Lebanese Hizballah and/or Iranian proxies, including Iranian-backed Houthis, likely resulting in substantial knock-on effects for Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
Regional countries, including Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are more likely to escalate via diplomatic means rather than through military action, though a heightened deterrence posture vis-à-vis heightened stability risks cannot be ruled out.
Direct Iranian forces involvement remains an unlikely scenario at present, though Iranian-affiliated assets, including in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, are likely to increase rhetoric and actions against US and Israeli targets as the Israeli operations against Hamas develop.

Context

On 1 December, the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas ended after the two sides could not agree on the number of live hostages to be released by Hamas. However, during the ceasefire, hostilities in Gaza and along Israel-Lebanon border were kept to a minimum, with Iranian proxies also reducing their attacks on Israel and US forces during that period. These successful developments raised prospects of de-escalation facilitated by further agreements. However, as the current ceasefire ends and hostilities resume, the risk of escalation in Israel and the wider region remains elevated despite ongoing negotiation efforts. The conflict remains dynamic and dependent on the level of engagement by key actors, which will in turn be key in affecting triggers/indicators and scenarios. These are likely to continue sustaining regional tensions, security risks and policy risks in the coming weeks.