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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 30.

On 30 November, the Syrian opposition forces led by Haya’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued to consolidate control over the city of Aleppo (Aleppo governorate) and advanced towards rural areas east of the city. This involved limited clashes with the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) after much of the SAF fled overnight. Opposition forces also captured further towns in Idlib governorate, including Maarat al-Numan, and are now advancing in the Hama governorate with reports of ongoing clashes in the city of Hama’s northern outskirts.

SIGNIFICANCE

* Simultaneously, the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a separate offensive initially targeting Tadef south of Al-Bab, aiming for Tel Rifaat (all Aleppo governorate), which is controlled by the government and the Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces (SDF).

* This is the largest attack by HTS and its allies in years, targeting Aleppo and strategic governorates such as Hama. HTS initially announced that the operation’s main goal was to establish deterrence and prevent the SAF and Iran-backed groups from attacking its strongholds in Idlib.

* The rapid advances of the opposition forces in government-held territories, capturing significant areas of Aleppo, Idlib and Hama governorates, indicate a major strategic and logistic failure within the SAF. The collapse of the government’s defensive lines also underscores Damascus’ inability to hold strategic regions in north and central Syria without major Russian and Iranian support.

* Despite the SDF’s sustained control over the Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo, no major clashes with HTS have been reported. This possibly signals an arrangement to avoid hostilities between both groups in other locations of Aleppo and areas east of the city.

FORECAST

The opposition offensive will likely continue advancing on multiple fronts, triggering significant risks of a wider conflict in western Syria in the coming 48 hours. HTS and its allies will likely use the current momentum to expand the scope of the operations. In the coming 48 hours, the opposition will likely advance towards the eastern areas of Aleppo governorate and attempt to control more districts in Hama and surrounding towns. Furthermore, a mass withdrawal of SAF troops and defections within its ranks remains a realistic possibility, augmenting the rate of the opposition advancements in the coming hours, particularly in Hama. The offensive will possibly prompt local opposition groups in Daraa (Daraa governorate) and Homs (Homs governorate) to attack governmental and SAF posts, increasing bystander risks near these facilities.

A moderate uptick in Russian airstrikes on Aleppo, Idlib and Hama governorates in the coming hours is likely. Despite limited Russian airstrikes targeting the newly captured areas by HTS in the last 72 hours, Russian jets will likely target further HTS positions in Aleppo (including the city centre) and other captured areas, including the strategic towns of Saraqib and Maarat al-Numan (all Idlib) and possibly the captured towns in the Hama governorate. These strikes will almost certainly elevate bystander risks to residents, prompting thousands of families to relocate to safer regions in the east towards the Raqqa governorate and possibly towards the south, heading to Homs governorate and the capital Damascus. Major displacements will possibly create bottlenecks on the provincial highways, adding to the existing mobility disruption in northwestern and central Syria triggered by HTS cutting off the M5 highway connecting Aleppo to Damascus.

A counter-offensive by the SAF and Iran-backed groups against the opposition in the coming days is a realistic possibility. The SAF had announced that it conducted a strategic withdrawal from Aleppo to prepare for a counter-offensive to regain lost areas in the north-west. However, given the incapability of the SAF, any such operation is unlikely to be effective without major support from Iran-backed groups and Russia (via airstrikes). There is also a realistic possibility that Iran-baked groups in Iraq (including those operating within the Popular Mobilisation Forces) will support the Syrian government’s attempts to regain control. Any counter-offensive operation by the SAF will likely initially focus on the Hama and Aleppo fronts and restoring mobility on provincial thoroughfares connecting captured regions with Damasus.

Clashes between Turkey-backed militias and Kurdish forces are likely, exacerbating security risks in the north. Given the mass withdrawals of the SAF and pro-government militias in Aleppo and the surrounding areas, it is likely that the Turkey-backed SNA and the Kurdish groups in the SDF will exploit the security vacuum to try and gain more ground in the north. This will likely trigger clashes along the borders of control. These risks will be particularly high near Al-Bab (Aleppo governorate). Any major clashes will possibly elevate the risk of direct Turkish airstrikes targeting SDF strongholds in northern Syria (Source: Sibylline)

 

30 Nov 24. Syrian rebels sweep into Aleppo after lightning assault Militants’ offensive underscores Bashar al-Assad’s weakness after years of civil war Rebel fighters pose for a picture in Aleppo © AFP via Getty Images Syrian rebels sweep into Aleppo after lightning assault on x (opens in a new window) Syrian rebels sweep into Aleppo after lightning assault on facebook (opens in a new window) Syrian rebels sweep into Aleppo after lightning assault on linkedin (opens in a new window) Share Save current progress 49% Malaika Kanaaneh Tapper in Beirut and Andrew England in London AN HOUR AGO 24 Print this page Rebel forces have swept into Syria’s second city Aleppo after mounting a lightning offensive that poses the biggest threat to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in the simmering years-long civil conflict.  Images circulated on Friday night on opposition-linked social media showed rebel forces posing in front of Aleppo’s citadel, which lies in the heart of the city. The militants, led by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, said on Friday night that they were “expanding their control inside the city of Aleppo” after launching the offensive on Wednesday. The assault comes as Assad faces growing domestic and external pressures in a country shattered by years of civil war that erupted after a 2011 popular uprising. He was able to put down the original rebellion with military backing from Russia, Iran and Iranian-backed militant groups, including Hizbollah, the Lebanese militant movement. But over the past year, Israel has stepped up its air strikes on Iranian-affiliated targets in Syria as it has launched an offensive against Hizbollah in Lebanon, weakening the groups that have played a crucial role in supporting the Assad regime. HTS’s ability to fight inside Aleppo, which endured some of the worst fighting of the civil war, is a devastating blow to Assad and underscores the regime’s weakness. Government forces took control of Aleppo in 2016 after laying siege to the city and, supported by Russian air strikes driving out rebels based in the city’s eastern areas, turned the war in Assad’s favour. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, said that HTS had taken control of more than half of the city of Aleppo in the just a few hours “without any resistance from regime forces”. (Source: FT.com)

Nov 29.

KEY POINTS

  • A ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) entered into force, reducing security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon; however, these risks remain elevated near Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions.
  • The foiling of Iranian weapon smuggling operations into the West Bank highlights increased efforts to destabilise the West Bank’s security environment.
  • Gaza Strip: The IDF continues to clash daily with various Palestinian militants in Gaza, highlighting sustained cross-faction armed resistance. In the past week, Palestinian militants from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) conducted attacks targeting IDF troops in Rafah (Rafah governorate, Gaza). Meanwhile, militants of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade targeted IDF troops in the Netzarim Corridor (central Gaza). The clashes highlight sustained armed resistance by militant groups other than Hamas, some of which are known to hold hostages. While these groups are likely to follow Hamas in its negotiations with Israel, their continued armed resistance is likely encouraging Hamas to maintain its staunch negotiating position, stalling prospects of a ceasefire.
  • West Bank: Israel’s Shin Bet thwarted a large weapon delivery from Iran that included ‘balance breaking weapons’. On 27 November, Israel’s internal security agency, the Shin Bet, confirmed they foiled an Iranian attempt to smuggle weapons to Jenin (Jenin governorate) in the West Bank. Among these weapons, were Claymore mines, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars, advanced weapons that are uncommon in the West Bank and, as such, are considered as ‘balance breaking’ by Israeli security forces. Attempts by Iran to smuggle advanced weapons into the West Bank have gradually increased in the past year but remain largely uncommon. The latest attempt reflects growing attempts by Iran to further destabilise the security environment in the West Bank, increasing risks of intensified armed clashes and rocket launches instigated by Palestinian militants in the West Bank over the coming year.
  • Israel-Lebanon: A ceasefire between Israel and LH entered into force, significantly reducing security risks. On 26 November, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved the US-France mediated ceasefire proposal by a majority of ten in favour and one against (National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir). On 27 November at 0400hrs (local time) the ceasefire entered into force. The ceasefire stipulates a 60-day transition period where the IDF will withdraw from its positions in southern Lebanon and LH will withdraw its forces north of the Litani River. However, the withdrawal of troops will likely be spread over the period and will not all take place immediately, sustaining risks of misidentification and armed clashes in southern Lebanon. This will likely be exacerbated by the return of displaced Lebanese populations to their homes and the likely return of LH operatives concealed among them during the 60-day period, sustaining elevated bystander security risks. In the hours before the ceasefire, the IDF intensified its air strikes in Lebanon, striking over 20 LH headquarters in the capital Beirut as well as LH’s largest production facility for precision missiles, found in the Beqaa Valley area. Following the ceasefire, cross-border rocket fire from LH into Israel has stopped, however sporadic launches by splinter groups remain a possibility, sustaining moderated elevated security risks in northern Israel.
  • Israel-Lebanon: The risk of misidentification of Lebanese civilians as militants will sustain substantial bystander risks around IDF positions over the coming days. On 27 November, IDF troops fired warning shots at Lebanese civilians approaching their positions in southern Lebanon, injuring several individuals. Subsequently on 28 November, the IDF Spokesperson to Arab Media, Colonel Avichay Adraee, posted a warning for Lebanese citizens, prohibiting them from returning south of the following line of villages: Al-Hebbariyah, Al-Qantara, Arnoun, Baraashit, Marjayoun, Shaqra, Shebaa, Yatar, Yohmor (all Nabatieh governorate) and Al-Mansouri (South governorate). Also on 28 November, the IDF conducted a warning strike using a drone near a vehicle in the Markaba area (Nabatieh governorate). Later that day, the IDF conducted its first air strike since the start of the ceasefire, targeting an LH rocket facility near Tebna (Nabatieh governorate) after identifying activity there. The strikes and the warning highlight sustained bystander security risks near IDF positions in southern Lebanon as well as the fragility of the ceasefire agreement. However, we assess that the ceasefire is likely to hold in the coming days.
  • Israel-US: US President Joe Biden provisionally approved a USD 680 million weapon sale to Israel following the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. On 27 November, US officials confirmed plans to sell Israel thousands of joint direct attack munition kits (Jdams); these facilitate the converting unguided bombs into guided precision munitions. The sale also includes hundreds of small-diameter bombs. US officials denied an explicit link between the approval of the sale and the ceasefire deal with LH. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on 26 November, hours before the approval of the ceasefire, that replenishing weapons stocks is one of the main reasons for the ceasefire. This signals the importance of the weapon economy to Israel and the ability of US administrations to use said economy to exert pressure on Israel. It is possible that, in the coming weeks, there will be more weapon sales and military aid approved to Israel.
  • Israel-Yemen: Earlier on 28 November, the leader of the Iran-backed Houthis, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, announced that his group would continue targeting Israel despite the ceasefire with LH. The announcement highlights persistent security risks in the Red Sea and Israel, disrupting maritime shipping and related operations in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb areas. Furthermore, continued Houthi targeting of maritime vessels in the area (as well as military assets) will elevate risks of US-led coalition retaliation on Houthi locations, driving security and bystander risks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • The establishment of an Israel-Hizballah ceasefire has increased pressure on the Israeli government to secure hostage releases from Gaza, driving protest risks. On 27 November, several relatives of hostages held by Hamas in Gaza temporarily blocked the entrance to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Knesset office in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district); demonstrators criticised the government’s failure to reach a ceasefire with Hamas, despite reaching an agreement with LH. On 27 November, a Hamas spokesperson stated that LH was ready to engage in ceasefire and hostage release negotiations with Israel. Although this statement does not substantially differ from previous Hamas statements regarding ceasefire negotiations, given the establishment of the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire on 27 November, it will likely further exacerbate anti-government sentiment within Israel. The scale of anti-government protests will likely increase in the coming week, with large-scale demonstrations likely emerging in major cities on 30 November. These demonstrations will likely disrupt overland movement, particularly in Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district); that said, these will likely remain broadly peaceful. However, despite increasing domestic and international pressure Israel and Hamas are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement in the coming days (see FORECAST).
  • In Jerusalem, the police’s increasing allowance of Jewish religious practices in the al Aqsa mosque compound will elevate ethno-religious tensions and risks of clashes. On 27 November, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir stated in a Knesset briefing that he had changed policies regarding Jewish religious practices in and around the al Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem. Current ordinances state that, while Muslims can pray within the compound at any time, non-Muslims can only enter at specific times and are prohibited from engaging in religious practices therein. Although Ben Gvir has not formally changed this policy since his appointment in 2022, police in Jerusalem have become increasingly permissive of Jewish religious demonstrations in and around the compound, driving ethno-religious tensions in the Jerusalem area. Ben Gvir’s statements will likely further embolden Jewish extremists to engage in observable religious demonstrations within the compound, increasing the risks of clashes in East Jerusalem. Ben Gvir’s statements will also likely sustain diplomatic friction with Jordan (which administers the compound), sustaining regional tensions.
  • The Palestinian Authority (PA) announced that Rawhi Fatou will serve as interim president if President Mahmoud Abbas vacates his position, possibly indicating efforts to advance succession planning. On 27 November, the PA announced that Fatou, the president of the Palestinian National Council and a high-ranking Fatah leader would serve as interim president for 90 days if the position becomes vacant. The announcement comes amid increasing pressure on the PA to engage in substantial reform and establish a succession plan for Abbas, given his advanced age. Although Fatou’s designation will possibly moderate risks of instability in the West Bank in the event of Abbas’ death, he is highly unlikely to engage in meaningful reform of the PA during any such transition, sustaining governance concerns. The appointment also likely reflects Abbas’ efforts to moderate potential challenges to his authority from high-ranking Fatah members, such as Hussein al-Sheikh, secretary of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Executive Committee. In the coming months, high-level factionalism and entrenched corruption will likely continue undermining prospects for significant PA reform, sustaining tensions with the US and other regional parties.
  • Several commercial airlines have announced the resumption of flights to Israel, highlighting a stabilising travel risk environment. Following the ceasefire implementation in Lebanon on 27 November, airlines including Aegean Airlines and Wizz have announced that they will resume flights to and from Israel ahead of schedule. The announcements follow months of reduced flight services to Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV), with numerous airlines routinely extending flight suspensions due to conflict-related travel risk concerns. Although larger airlines including Air France, Lufthansa and Virgin Atlantic have not expedited the resumption of commercial services, services to TLV will likely progressively resume on schedule over the coming weeks, increasing commercially-available travel routes to Israel. These resumptions will likely moderate risks of travel and air freight delays in the coming weeks. However, a resumption of services to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) remains unlikely in the short term, given sustained concerns regarding possible IDF airstrikes in the airport’s vicinity and its use as a weapons storage and transit facility by LH.

FORECAST

The ceasefire between Israel and LH will likely hold over the coming days, however, sporadic violations by both sides will increase the risk of incidents snowballing back to armed conflict. Following the announcement of the ceasefire, there have been numerous cases of suspected LH operatives approaching IDF troops in southern Lebanon as well as activity in proximity to previously abandoned military infrastructure. These are likely operatives testing the limits and reaction of the IDF to violation of the ceasefire agreement, elevating risks of sporadic armed clashes and strikes in the coming days. However, we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold in the coming days. Growing incidents of violations, either by activities of LH operatives or IDF armed engagement, will increase the risk of snowballing escalation and armed conflict. These risks will grow with the frequency of violations and time since the ceasefire entered into force. As such there are sustained security and bystander risks in areas in southern Lebanon, particularly near the Israel-Lebanon border.

Furthermore, several working mechanisms designed to safeguard the ceasefire (such as the monitoring committee and UN observers) remain largely undisclosed to the public. This will likely present areas of ambiguity and an opportunity for challenges to the ceasefire in the coming months, likely sustaining the fragility of the ceasefire until such safeguards are formally established and tested.

While there will likely be a renewed push by international parties to secure a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, prospects for a successful ceasefire remain low in the coming weeks. While there is a realistic possibility that the ceasefire between Israel and LH will weaken Hamas’ position, the militant group currently shows little willingness to compromise its stance. Furthermore, hostages, Palestinian prisoners and Israel’s stated goal of destroying Hamas will likely continue to pose key challenges to negotiations. In light of this, Israel will likely continue extending its posture and clear operations in southern and northern Gaza in the coming weeks to compound pressure on Hamas while advancing its control of the strip. This will sustain elevated security risks and concerns over worsening humanitarian conditions in Gaza in the coming weeks. Additionally, given the ceasefire achieved with LH and the lack of movement in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, there is a realistic possibility of increasing pro-ceasefire protests across Israel, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) over the coming weeks. While these are likely to slightly elevate travel disruption risks and domestic unrest risks, they are unlikely to turn violent, maintaining moderate bystander security risks around large protest locations.

Iranian proxies will likely continue attacks against Israel, sustaining security risks across Israel and increasing risks of Israeli retaliation. Drone and missile targeting by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) as well as the Iran-backed Houthis will likely continue. IRI drone incursions into Israel will sustain elevated security risks in northern and eastern Israel. This will elevate the risks of Israel retaliating to IRI attacks by striking affiliated targets in Iraq and Syria, elevating security risks around militant positions. Houthi attacks on maritime routes in the Red Sea as well as against Israel will also almost certainly continue. These will sustain security risks across Israel, the Red Sea area and Yemen due to possible Israeli or US-led retaliation strikes against Houthi positions.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
  • An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
  • An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
  • An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
  • An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon

Nov 27.

* Region: Alleged Hamas weapons depots, attack plans possibly indicate escalation of tactics abroad. On 25 November, the German authorities started proceedings against four members of Hamas who were arrested in December 2023. The Dutch, Egyptian and Lebanese individuals are accused of planning attacks against Jewish targets in Europe. The organisation also allegedly tried to establish weapons depots in Bulgaria and Denmark for this purpose. In addition, the German authorities have accused the four members of planning attacks against non-Jewish/Israeli targets, such as the US air base at Ramstein (Rhineland-Palatinate state) and the Tempelhof recreation area in Berlin (both Germany). The last Hamas attack in Europe took place in 1988 (when such attacks in Europe were more common). However, no Palestine-linked terrorists have ever planned attacks against non-Jewish/Israeli targets in Europe. If the allegations prove correct, we assess this development possibly indicates a significant escalation of Hamas’ tactics in Europe (and therefore the overall terrorist threat facing the continent). However, it remains possible that the plans stem from a radicalised faction of Hamas and do not reflect the organisation’s general strategy abroad.

*Israel-Lebanon: Ceasefire agreement signals reduced hostilities, latent threat of conflict resumption. On 27 November at 0400hrs (local time), a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) entered into force. The development follows almost 14 months of conflict, and comes after days of heavy LH bombardment against northern Israel and intensified airstrikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against Beirut (Lebanon). The agreement stipulates a progressive withdrawal of the IDF and LH from southern Lebanon over the next 60 days, along with the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) south of the Litani River. The ceasefire will likely reduce armed conflict and security risks in northern Israel and Lebanon. However, delays in the LAF’s deployment and a lengthy implementation period will sustain the risk of the deal collapsing. Furthermore, an early return of displaced Lebanese civilians (possibly mixed with LH militants) will sustain moderate security and bystander risks near IDF forces in southern Lebanon, including those stemming from sporadic armed clashes and misidentification. We also assess that the recent destruction of civilian property will likely lead to widespread informal shelter usage, driving human rights and health risks.

Nov 26

  • Israel-Lebanon: Anticipation of ceasefire agreement will intensify hostilities, drive bystander risks. Later on 26 November, Israel’s Security Cabinet will convene to discuss and possibly approve the US and France’s proposal for a ceasefire with Lebanese Hizballah (LH). This comes as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued new restrictions in areas of the Golan Heights on 25 November, anticipating increased LH hostilities prior to an agreement. LH rocket attacks will likely intensify in the coming hours and days, elevating bystander risks near military targets and population centres in northern and central Israel, particularly Haifa (Haifa district), Nahariya and Safed (both Northern district). We assess that Israel will likely intensify its strikes on key LH targets in the capital Beirut (Lebanon), straining healthcare infrastructure and driving internal displacement and security risks. An initial ceasefire will likely last 60 days and seek the withdrawal of Israel and LH and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to southern Lebanon. However, contention over buffer zones and safeguarding will likely continue to pose challenges to the agreement, sustaining ongoing regional tensions.

Nov 25.

KEY POINTS

  • The significant uptick in cross-border hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) despite ceasefire negotiations reflects the ongoing elevated security risks, which are likely to be sustained in the coming days.
  • The cessation of administrative detention for Israeli settlers and perceptions of a more permissive environment will drive settler violence and insecurity in the West Bank.
  • The murder of an Israeli Chabad representative in the UAE and a shooting near the Israeli embassy in Amman (Jordan) highlight the growing security risks near Israeli-affiliated entities and assets across the region.
  • Gaza Strip: IDF evacuation orders for Gaza City and impending operations therein have elevated the risk of further rocket launches against population centres in the Gaza Envelope. On 23 November, the IDF issued evacuation orders to residents of the Kuba neighbourhood in Gaza City following rocket launches from the area towards population centres in the Gaza Envelope. IDF raids and operations in the area are likely to continue in the coming days, likely motivating militants to launch their unused rockets against Israel before they are captured by the IDF. Such barrages will sustain elevated security and bystander risks in southern Israel in the coming days, while IDF operations will sustain elevated security risks in northern Gaza.
  • West Bank: An Israeli settler riot in Hebron and an attack against the head of the IDF’s Central Command underscore the increased security risks tied to a greater perception of legal impunity among Israeli settlers following the restructuring of the administrative detention policy. On 22 November, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, announced the end of the administrative detention policy for West Bank Israeli settlers. The policy allows the Israeli security forces to detain and hold individuals suspected of terrorism without charge for up to six months; it can also be renewed indefinitely. While it is mostly used against Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was also employed (in sporadic cases) against extremist right-wing Israelis. Following the announcement on 22 November, dozens of Israeli extremists rioted in Hebron during a gathering for an annual pilgrimage. The rioters attacked IDF personnel tasked with securing the gathering, including the head of the IDF’s Central Command, Maj Gen Avi Bluth. According to local reports, the rioters also vandalised nearby Palestinian shops. The violence highlights an increasingly emboldened Israeli settler population driven by both favourable government policies and the re-election of US President Donald Trump. The announcement by Katz and increasing settler violence are also likely to drive radicalisation among the local Palestinian population in the West Bank, increasing the risk of sole-perpetrator and Palestinian militant attacks against Israeli entities. Elevated security and bystander risks emanating from both Palestinian and settler violence will persist in the coming weeks, particularly around small Palestinian villages and orchards, as well as along highways, in the vicinity of Israeli settlements and near security checkpoints/outposts.
  • Israel-Lebanon: The highest number of LH rocket launches against Israel in a 24-hour period since 7 October 2023 has underscored the continued uptick in hostilities and elevated security risks amid ceasefire negotiations. On 24 November, LH launched over 254 rockets against northern and central Israel, triggering over 541 sirens across Israel’s Northern and Central districts. Rockets directly hit residential areas in Haifa (Haifa district), Kfar Blum, Nahariya (both Northern), Petah Tikva and Rinatya (both Central); they caused material damage and moderately injured eight individuals. Additionally, one unexploded missile landed close to Highway 2 near Shefayim (Central), prompting the closure of the area for bomb removal squads to operate. The uptick comes amid ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Israel and LH and is likely to continue in the coming days as LH seeks to bolster its negotiating position, sustaining elevated security and bystander risks across Israel.
  • Israel-Lebanon: The IDF conducted strikes on 12 key LH military facilities in Beirut (Lebanon) in response to the uptick in LH rocket barrages. On 24 November, the IDF announced that it struck 12 key LH facilities in the Dahieh suburb of Beirut. These include the headquarters of LH’s coastal missile unit, as well as its intelligence hub and Unit 4400 (responsible for weapons smuggling from Iran through Syria). This comes amid a broader escalation in IDF strikes on Beirut in the past week as part of an ongoing uptick in cross-border hostilities with LH. While the IDF is increasingly issuing evacuation warnings to targeted areas in Beirut ahead of strikes, security and bystander risks remain significantly elevated, particularly in southern Beirut. There is also a realistic possibility of a gradual increase in strikes in central and northern Beirut in response to recent LH rocket launches. Elevated security risks will also persist across Lebanon, particularly in southern Lebanon and Baalbek-Hermel governorate.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Hamas claims that IDF operations in northern Gaza resulted in the death of a hostage, increasing the likelihood of protests in Israel in the coming week. On 23 November, a Hamas spokesperson claimed that IDF operations killed a female hostage and ‘endangered’ another; the IDF has announced it is investigating the allegation. The claim reflects continued efforts by Hamas to frame ongoing IDF operations in Gaza as incompatible with efforts to secure the safe release of hostages. In the coming weeks, Hamas is highly likely to continue making similar statements regarding the safety of Israeli hostages as part of efforts to undermine domestic support for IDF operations in Gaza and increase pressure on the Israeli government to make broader concessions in ceasefire negotiations. Such statements will likely trigger an uptick in the frequency of small-scale anti-government protests throughout Israel and increase attendance at the large-scale weekly rallies in major cities, which take place on Saturdays. Although protest activity is highly likely to remain broadly peaceful, a growing attendance will elevate the risk of travel and operational disruption, particularly in Haifa, Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
  • The murder of an Israeli rabbi in the UAE highlights the elevated risk of violence targeting Jewish and Israeli individuals throughout the Middle East and North Africa region. On 24 November, the UAE’s authorities announced the arrest of three Uzbek nationals for the murder of Israeli-Moldovan Rabbi Zvi Kogan. Kogan was reported missing on 21 November and was later found dead in al-Ain (Abu Dhabi emirate). Kogan worked for the UAE’s chapter of the Chabad foundation, a high-profile Orthodox Jewish religious outreach organisation. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterised Kogan’s death as an ‘antisemitic terrorist act’, while Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) has reiterated advisories against non-essential travel to the UAE for Israeli and Jewish individuals due to the elevated risk of attacks. On 23 November, former Member of the Knesset Ayoob Kara stated that there were indications of Iranian involvement in the attack (which Iran has denied). Although the UAE has not released further details on the case, there is a realistic possibility that Iran co-ordinated or facilitated the attack, either through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or in conjunction with a regional proxy. If Israel explicitly accuses Iran of conducting the attack, regional tensions are highly likely to increase, though direct clashes remain unlikely in the short term. There is also a realistic possibility that the alleged perpetrators conducted the attack independently, reflecting the elevated risk of radicalisation among Central Asian nationals. Yet regardless of intent, the attack highlights the significantly elevated risk of violence targeting high-profile Israeli and Jewish individuals throughout the Middle East, particularly in states with active Jewish religious and outreach organisations.
  • A shooting attack targeting the Israeli embassy in Amman (Jordan) highlights the elevated bystander and collateral risks near Israel-linked installations. On 24 November, an unidentified individual opened fire in the immediate vicinity of the Israeli embassy in Amman, injuring three police officers. The authorities shot and killed the perpetrator on site. Jordanian officials have not released further details regarding the attack; at the time of writing, it remains unclear whether the perpetrator was affiliated with a militant group. Even so, the incident highlights the elevated risks of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting Israel-linked installations in Jordan, and comes amid sustained ethno-religious tensions linked to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. In the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility of further attacks targeting the embassy, increasing the risk of operational disruption and threats to bystanders in the Rabiah area. However, the Jordanian security forces likely retain the capacity to disrupt higher-level militant attacks targeting Israeli entities, moderating the risk of critically successful and high-casualty attacks. More broadly, installations associated with Israel, including embassies, private-sector entities and Jewish religious establishments, will face elevated risks of targeted protests, violence and attacks throughout the region, particularly in states with lower security force capacities, increasing the incidental risks facing bystanders.
  • A violent pro-Palestine and anti-NATO demonstration in Canada highlights the elevated risks of unrest amid sustained ethno-religious tensions in North American and European cities. On 22 November, violent demonstrations broke out in Montreal (Quebec province, Canada) outside the meeting place for NATO’s annual assembly after anti-NATO and pro-Palestine protests merged into a single march. Protesters reportedly threw smoke bombs at the police, targeted two cars with arson attacks and vandalised nearby storefronts. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has since condemned the protest as violent and antisemitic, highlighting the elevated risks of unrest amid growing ethno-religious tensions linked to the ongoing Israel-Hamas War. In the coming months, pro-Palestine protest activity will likely continue at pace in North American and European cities, raising localised disruption risks. Although widespread unrest and violent protest activity remain unlikely, there is a realistic possibility of counter-demonstrations triggering clashes, which would in turn raise bystander and collateral risks.
  • A legal challenge to weapons exports from the Netherlands underscores increasing risks of supply chain disruption for defence and technology firms with links to Israel. On 22 November, a pro-Palestine NGO coalition in the Netherlands filed a petition with a district court in the Netherlands to stop all arms exports to Israel. The coalition has argued that arms sales to Israel violate the Netherlands’ commitments under the 1948 Genocide Convention. In February, a Dutch court temporarily halted the export of F-35 aircraft parts to Israel, citing concerns over the violation of international humanitarian law (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 12 February 2024). The case will possibly result in a similar temporary suspension for weapons and drone components exports to Israel, disrupting supply chain continuity for defence and technology firms with operations and warehouses in the Netherlands. More broadly, pro-Palestine NGOs will likely launch further legal challenges to government-approved weapons exports across Europe in the coming months, increasing compliance concerns for defence and technology firms, particularly those with links to the Israeli government.

FORECAST

In the coming days, there is likely to be an uptick in cross-border hostilities between Israel and LH; this assessment comes amid growing prospects for a ceasefire this month. It is likely that LH will continue to increase its cross-border attacks against Israel in the coming days as it attempts to portray itself in a manner that suggests it is forcing a concession from Israel. However, there is a realistic possibility that such a posture will reduce the prospects for a ceasefire as Israel will be reluctant to reach an agreement at a time when threats to northern Israel are clearly elevated and have not been sufficiently degraded. Even if an agreement is reached, persistent points of contention regarding Israeli operational freedom, buffer zones and safeguards will likely delay a final agreement and its implementation. As such, while there is a realistic possibility of a ceasefire being reached in the coming week, we assess that a ceasefire remains more likely in the coming month.

Israeli settlers and right-wing extremists are likely to continue increasing their attacks in the West Bank in the coming days. Following Katz’ announcement on 22 November, Israel’s security forces have a reduced capacity to police right-wing extremists in the West Bank. This loss of capacity together with already increasing levels of violence among settlers is likely to destabilise the security environment further in the West Bank in the coming weeks. Security and bystander risks emanating from settler violence and radicalised Palestinians are likely to continue increasing. The risk of attacks by Israeli settlers will remain elevated near Palestinian orchards and small villages, as well as along roads close to Palestinian population centres and near places of worship (including Jewish entities). These will also elevate the risk of domestic unrest and radicalisation among the Palestinian population in the West Bank. The risk of attacks by Palestinian militants and radicalised individuals will remain elevated, particularly around Israeli settlements and along nearby roads, as well as close to IDF positions and checkpoints and public transport hubs in the West Bank. The risk of attacks in East Jerusalem and Jerusalem more broadly will also remain elevated, particularly near places of worship such as synagogues, as well as in the vicinity of public transport hubs such as bus stations, especially the central bus station in Jerusalem.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
  • An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
  • An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
  • An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
  • An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
  • Jordan: Border infiltration attempt will elevate security risks along border regions with Iraq, Syria. On 24 November, the Jordanian army killed one individual and arrested six others attempting to cross the border from Syria. The authorities added that there has been a spike in similar incidents by drugs and arms smugglers tied to Iran-backed groups in southern Syria. In the coming days, the Jordanian authorities will almost certainly augment their posture along the borders with Iraq and Syria, particularly focusing on the regions adjacent to Syria’s As-Suwayda and Daraa governorates. Furthermore, a wider crackdown on local smuggling networks in Jordanian border villages is also likely, including arbitrary arrests and stop-and-search operations. We also assess that Jordan will augment its security posture at the Jaber-Nassib crossing in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of localised transit and supply chain disruption. There is a realistic possibility that Jordan will resume limited drone and airstrikes against smugglers inside Syria, elevating security and bystander risks in border areas. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Nov 24. Lebanese Army: M113s and HMMWVs predominate in patchwork force. The Lebanese Army will be tasked with providing the bulk of a peacekeeping force to ensure the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel persists. The role the Lebanese Army has been tasked to perform as part of the ceasefire between Israel and Iranian-backed Hezbollah will be critical in ensuring the nascent peace could extend beyond the near term, following a devastating conflict that has results in thousands of military and civilian deaths.

Cross border bombardment from Hezbollah into northern Israel had become a common occurrence since the outbreak of overt hostilities between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip, which followed the bloody incursion by Hamas militants into Israel in October 2023.

In response, Israel initiated a bombing campaign over southern Lebanon, targetting key military sites and Hezbollah leaders, which resulted in widespread destruction of infrastructure and the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians.

Reacting to the ceasefire, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd J Austin said on 26 November the move was “good for Israel, good for Lebanon, and good for the security of the region”, citing the ability of “tens of thousands” of Lebanese and Israeli civilians to return to their homes.

Into this operating area, thousands of Lebanese Army and UN peacekeepers under the UNIFIL force are expected to be deployed, in a bid to maintain the ceasefire and create a buffer zone between Hezbollah and Israel.

This raises the real prospect of direct confrontation between Lebanese Army troops and Hezbollah forces, a political dilemma given the ethnic, social, and religious make-up of Lebanon. Alternatively, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could also be brought into further contact with Israeli forces, with 45 LAF personnel killed by Israeli action, according to a 25 November UNIFIL release, citing Lebanese figures.

“The LAF has reported a series of Israeli strikes in recent weeks, resulting in the loss of personnel, damage to premises, and destruction of assets,” UNIFIL stated.

Although the national land force of Lebanon, the Lebanese Army is effectively a third-party in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Hezbollah, with its own political and security structures deeply embedded in the south of the country, has come to operate effectively as state-with-a-state since following the withdrawal of Israel forces from Lebanon in 2000.

How capable is the Lebanese Army?

Numbering around 70,000 personnel, the Lebanese Army has struggled to develop effective command and control structures, while its patchwork equipment inventory containing a mix of legacy and newer platforms, mostly provided by the US, as well as countries such as France, the UK, Russia, and Italy.

According to GlobalData analysis, the Lebanese Army operates up to 10 US-origin M60A3 main battle tanks (MBT), delivered in 2009, along with an unspecified number of M48A5 and T-55 tanks. It is likely the Lebanese MBTs are in a poor state of readiness and not suitable for buffer-zone operations.

Potentially one of the platforms that could be used are the M113 armoured personnel carriers (APC), of which around 1,250 were delivered between 2012-2015 from the United States. The M113 is a workhorse of many militaries with the design dating back to the 1960s, and is still in service across the world, including several hundred with the Israel Defence Forces.

Armoured multirole vehicles such as the Lebanese Army’s HMMWV (~1,500 vehicles of various types) would also be suitable for peacekeeping and patrol operations. In addition, some 100 Land Rover Defender 90 4x4s were also delivered by the UK to Lebanon in 2021, along with 60-tonnes of spare parts in 2024.

The Lebanese Army was also provided 32 Bradley M2A2 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) by the US from 2017-2018, which could augment the M113s and HMMWVs likely to be utilised in the peacekeeping mission.

Lebanon does maintain some medium-range artillery through 72 M198 155mm towed howitzers provided by the US from 2015-2016, along with 12 M109A3, and potentially the M109A5 variant, self-propelled howitzers in 2015.

In addition, a range of Russian-origin towed and self-propelled artillery is listed in its inventory, including the ZPU-2, ZPU-4, ZU-23-2, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka systems. The ubiquitous BM-21 ‘Grad’ 122mm rocket launcher is also in service, although numbers are unknown.

It is thought that Hezbollah seized a range of military equipment from the Lebanese Army, including M113 APCs, during previous periods of instability.

Lebanon defence spending flatlines amid crises

Defence spending insight from GlobalData indicates that Lebanon’s expenditure registered a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of -3.1% from 2018-2022 and was anticipated to record a negligible CAGR of 1.2% through to 2027, valuing up to $1.89bn. This still corresponds to more than 6% of GDP, with the country’s economy heavily damaged by financial crises, pandemics, and hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.

The previous Syrian civil war and Israeli-Lebanon conflict resulted in a large number of refugees crossing the border into Lebanon, which has burdened the Lebanese economy, led to sectarian violence, and complicated its internal security.

The country faces sectarian violence, threats of militancy, homegrown extremism, and unrest at refugee camps, according to previous GlobalData analysis. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

27 Nov 24. Still counting its dead, Hezbollah faces long road to recover from war.

  • Summary
  • Death toll among Hezbollah fighters could be several thousand, sources say
  • Analyst: Hezbollah retains capabilities, but will be bogged down by reconstruction
  • Hezbollah needs ‘time to tend to wounds’ – Lebanese official
  • Israel says it has set back Hezbollah by decades
  • Group sees its survival, continued resistance as a victory

With the bodies of its fighters still strewn on the battlefield, Hezbollah must bury its dead and provide succour to its supporters who bore the brunt of Israel’s offensive, as the first steps on a long and costly road to recovery, four senior officials said.

Hezbollah believes the number of its fighters killed during 14 months of hostilities could reach several thousand, with the vast majority killed since Israel went on the offensive in September, three sources familiar with its operations say, citing previously unreported internal estimates.

One source said the Iran-backed group may have lost up to 4,000 people – well over 10 times the number killed in its month-long 2006 war with Israel. So far, Lebanese authorities have said some 3,800 people were killed in the current hostilities, without distinguishing fighters from civilians.

Hezbollah emerges shaken from top to bottom, its leadership still reeling from the killing of its former leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and its supporters made homeless en masse by the carpet bombing of Beirut’s southern suburbs and the destruction of entire villages in the south.

With a ceasefire taking hold on Wednesday, Hezbollah’s agenda includes working to re-establish its organisational structure fully, probing security breaches that helped Israel land so many painful blows, and a full review of the last year including its mistakes in underestimating Israel’s technological capabilities, three other sources familiar with the group’s thinking said.

Hassan Fadallah, a senior Hezbollah politician, told Reuters the priority will be “the people.”

“To shelter them, to remove the rubble, to bid farewell to the martyrs and, in the next phase, to rebuild,” he said.

Israel’s campaign has focused largely on Hezbollah’s Shi’ite Muslim heartlands, where its supporters were badly hit. They include people still nursing casualties from Israel’s attack on its mobile communications devices in September.

“I have a brother who was martyred, a brother-in-law who was wounded in the pager attacks, and my neighbours and relatives are all either martyrs, wounded or missing,” said Hawraa, a woman from south Lebanon with family members who fight for Hezbollah.

“We want to collect our martyrs and bury them … we want to rebuild our homes,” said Hawraa, who stayed in her village until she was forced to flee by the Israeli assault in September. She declined to use her full name, citing safety fears.

The Israeli offensive displaced more than 1 m people, the bulk of them from areas where Hezbollah has sway.

Israeli soldiers stand under an Israeli flag in southern Lebanon, after a ceasefire was agreed to by Israel and Hezbollah, as seen from Israel’s side of the border, November 27. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun.

A senior Lebanese official familiar with Hezbollah thinking said the group’s focus would be squarely on securing their return and rebuilding their homes: “Hezbollah is like a wounded man. Does a wounded man get up and fight? A wounded man needs to tend to his wounds.”

The official expected Hezbollah to carry out a wide-ranging policy review after the war, dealing with all major issues: Israel, its weapons, and the internal politics of Lebanon, where its weapons have long been a point of conflict.

Iran, which established Hezbollah in 1982, has promised to help with reconstruction. The costs are immense: The World Bank estimates $2.8 bn in damage to housing alone in Lebanon, with 99,000 homes partially or fully destroyed.

The senior Lebanese official said Tehran has a variety of ways to get funds to Hezbollah, without giving details.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a close Hezbollah ally, is urging wealthy Lebanese Shi’ites in the diaspora to send funds to help the displaced, two Lebanese officials said.

The officials also expected significant donations to come from Shi’ite religious foundations across the region.

Hezbollah did not immediately respond to a detailed request for comment for this story. Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

‘THE RESISTANCE’ WILL CONTINUE

Hezbollah has indicated it intends to keep its arms, dashing hopes of Lebanese adversaries who predicted the pressures generated by the war would finally lead it to hand them to the state. Hezbollah officials have said the resistance – widely understood to mean its armed status – will continue.

Hezbollah opened fire in support of Palestinian ally Hamas on Oct. 8, 2023. Israel went on the offensive against the group in September, declaring the aim of securing the return home of 60,000 people evacuated from homes in the north.

Despite the resulting devastation, Hezbollah’s Fadlallah said the resistance put up by its fighters in south Lebanon and the group’s intensified rocket salvoes towards the end of the conflict showed Israel had failed.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says its campaign has set back Hezbollah decades, eliminated its top leaders, destroyed most of its rockets, neutralised thousands of fighters, and obliterated its infrastructure near the border.

A senior U.S. official said Hezbollah was “extremely weak” at this moment, both militarily and politically. A Western diplomat echoed that assessment, saying Israel had the upper hand and had almost dictated the terms of its withdrawal.

The ceasefire terms agreed by Israel and Lebanon require Hezbollah to have no military presence in an area between the Israeli border and the Litani River, which meets the Mediterranean Sea some 30 km (20 miles) from the frontier.

Hezbollah, which approved the deal, has not declared how it intends to help implement those terms, including whether it actively hands its arms to Lebanese troops who are deploying into the south, or leaves the weapons for soldiers to find.

is deeply rooted in south Lebanon, never implemented the same terms when they were agreed to end a previous war in 2006 war. Israel says the group was preparing for a large-scale assault into northern Israel, pointing to its military build-up at the frontier.

Andreas Krieg of King’s College in London said Hezbollah had retained considerable capability.

The performance of its “core infantry fighters in southern Lebanon and rocket attacks deep into Israeli territory in recent days showed the group was still very, very capable,” he said.

“But Hezbollah will be very much bogged down in the effort of rebuilding the infrastructure and also, most importantly, securing the funds to do so,” he said.

‘REPAYING THE DEBT’

Hezbollah has been handing out cash to people affected by the hostilities since they began, paying $200 a month to civilians who stayed in frontline villages, and offering more as people were forced to flee the areas, according to recipients.

Since the start of the escalation in September, Hezbollah has been paying around $300 a month to help displaced families.

The group has made no secret of the military and financial support it gets from Iran, which shipped huge sums of cash to in 2006 to aid the homeless and help rebuild.

Hezbollah supporters say more will be on the way. One, citing conversations with a local Hezbollah official, said the group would cover a year of rent for the homeless in addition to furniture costs.

Addressing the Lebanese people in an October sermon, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said “the destruction will be replaced… repaying the debt to the wounded, bleeding Lebanon is our duty…”.

The World Bank, in a preliminary estimate, put the cost in damage and losses to Lebanon at $8.5 bn, a bill that cannot be footed by the government, still suffering the consequences of a catastrophic financial collapse five years ago.

Gulf states Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia helped pay the $5 bn reconstruction bill in 2006, the last time Hezbollah and Israel went to war. But there has been no sign that these Sunni-led Arab states are ready to do so again.

A car is pictured under the debris of a destroyed building, after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect, in Tyre, Lebanon, November 27. REUTERS/Adnan Abidi Purchase Licensing Rights Hezbollah conducted a lot of reconstruction work after the 2006 war, financed by Iran and using its construction wing. The project was directed by Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, a Hezbollah leader killed by Israel 11 days after Nasrallah, in a sign of the bigger challenges it will face this time round.

“For Hezbollah the priority is to guarantee the loyalty of the Shi’ite community. The destruction has been enormous and it will impact the organization,” said Mohanand Hage Ali of the Carnegie Middle East Center.

The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. (Source: Reuters)

 

27 Nov 24. Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire takes effect, civilians head back to south Lebanon. A ceasefire between Israel and Iran-backed group Hezbollah came into effect on Wednesday after both sides accepted an agreement brokered by the U.S. and France, a rare victory for diplomacy in a region traumatised by two devastating wars for over a year.  Lebanon’s army, which is tasked with helping make sure the ceasefire holds, said in a statement on Wednesday it was preparing to deploy to the south of the country. The military also asked that residents of border villages delay returning home until the Israeli military, which has waged war against Hezbollah on several occasions and pushed around six km (4 miles) into Lebanese territory, withdraws. The agreement, which promises to end a conflict across the Israeli-Lebanese border that has killed thousands of people since it was ignited by the Gaza war last year, is a major achievement for the U.S. in the waning days of President Joe Biden’s administration. (Source: Reuters)

 

25 Nov 24. Defense Leaders Engage in Israel, United Arab Emirates. U.S. defense leaders last week engaged with counterparts and leaders in Israel and the United Arab Emirates to discuss both security partnerships and shared security challenges.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III capped off a weeklong trip through the Indo-Pacific, including visits to Australia, the Philippines, Laos and Fiji with a call on Saturday to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, who was newly appointed this month.

“Secretary Austin spoke to Israeli Minister of Defense Katz to review regional threats, discuss ongoing Israeli operations and reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Israel’s security,” said Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh during a discussion today with the Pentagon press corps. “Austin emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety and security of Lebanese armed forces and ”

The secretary also discussed U.S. commitment to a diplomatic resolution in Lebanon which allows Israeli and Lebanese civilians to return safely to their homes on both sides of the border, Singh said.

“The secretary also urged Israel to continue to take steps to improve the dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza and emphasized the U.S. commitment to securing the release of all hostages, including U.S. citizens,” Singh said.

Meanwhile, Daniel B. Shapiro, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, visited defense officials in the UAE Nov. 21-22, to discuss enhancements to bilateral ties with the UAE. In September, President Joe Biden designated UAE a “major defense partner of the United States.” That designation is shared only with India.

According to the U.S. State Department, the new designation will allow for greater cooperation through joint training, exercises and military-to-military collaboration between the U.S., the UAE and India.

Following his visit to UAE, Shapiro visited Israel Nov. 24-25, where he met in person with Katz and other Israeli security and intelligence officials to discuss U.S.-Israel security cooperation, regional security challenges and humanitarian assistance in Gaza.

“This department continues to urge for a cease fire, and that includes in Lebanon and in Gaza,” Singh said. “And, of course, we want to see our hostages come home as well. In terms of … the State Department, the has been engaging more on the ceasefire negotiations, but this department has a role … whenever we engage with our counterparts urging for a ceasefire to be put into place.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

25 Nov 24. Israeli officials say a deal to end the fighting with Hizbollah could be finalised “within days”, as US diplomats work to broker a ceasefire agreement that would end more than a year of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group. Israel’s ambassador to Washington Mike Herzog told Israeli army radio on Monday that Israel was “close to a deal”. “We still need to finalise a few points, and it still requires the approval of the cabinet on our end,” he said. “But I think we’ve made progress . . . It could happen within days.” Israel’s ambassador to Washington Mike Herzog, left, pictured with US secretary of state Antony Blinken in Tel Aviv in April © Evelyn Hockstein/Pool/Reuters A person familiar with Israeli government deliberations said a deal could be reached soon and that there was “huge positive momentum”. The proposed agreement would call for an initial 60-day ceasefire, two Lebanese officials said, during which the Israeli military would withdraw from Lebanon and Hizbollah would move its weapons north of the Litani river, which runs 30km from the UN-drawn border. The deal would be based on UN Security Council resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah war but was never fully implemented nor enforced. The Lebanese officials added that they understood the deal was awaiting approval from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet, though the person familiar with Israeli government deliberations said US envoy Amos Hochstein would still need to take some minor “reservations” back to Beirut for approval. Oil prices fell on expectations that a deal was close. Brent crude was down 1.5 per cent at $74.09 a barrel on Monday afternoon. Hochstein has spent months shuttling between the two countries in a bid to broker a ceasefire deal, including last week. Dan Shapiro, a senior US defence official, has been in Israel since Saturday working on the military dimensions of a possible ceasefire in Lebanon. According to the terms of the proposal, the Lebanese Armed Forces, with support from UN peacekeeping body Unifil, would take control of the areas in southern Lebanon vacated by Israeli troops and Hizbollah fighters. (Source: FT.com)

 

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