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Military And Security Developments
Aug 26.
26 Aug 24. DOD Remains Postured to Support Israel’s Defense, Deter Aggression. The Defense Department remains committed to deterring aggression in the Middle East and supporting Israel’s defense, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder today.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant twice over the weekend to discuss Israeli actions to defend against attacks by Lebanese Hezbollah after the Iran-backed militant group launched a drone and rocket attack against Israel on Saturday.
Israel responded to the attack with what it described as preemptive strikes against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon. Those strikes were carried out without U.S. involvement, Ryder said.
“We provided some intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, ISR, in terms of tracking incoming Lebanese Hezbollah attacks, but did not conduct any kinetic operations as they were not required,” Ryder said.
Austin reiterated Israel’s right to defend itself, in his calls with Gallant and underscored the United States’ ironclad resolve to support Israel’s defense against threats from Iran and its regional partners and proxies.
“We remain postured to support Israel’s defense against any aggression from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah or other actors,” Ryder said. “As we’ve been from the start, we remain intently focused on de-escalating tensions in the region, while also remaining focused on securing a cease-fire as part of a hostage deal to bring all of the hostages home and to end the war in Gaza.”
Last week, the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group arrived in the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility after Austin ordered the Lincoln to accelerate its deployment to the region earlier this month. It joined the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group already on station there.
The plus-up is part of adjustments to U.S. military posture in the region to ensure U.S. force protection, increase support for the defense of Israel, and ensure the U.S. is prepared to respond to various contingencies, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said last week.
Over the weekend, Austin ordered both carrier strike groups to remain in the region. The additional ships complement other forces in the region, which include an Air Force F-22 Raptor squadron, and the USS Georgia an Ohio-class cruise missile submarine operating nearby.
“The additional forces in the theater send a very clear message to all actors in the region that we’re serious when it comes to supporting the defense of Israel, as well as protecting our forces should they be attacked,” Ryder said.
He added that the U.S. maintains the capability and capacity to respond to a wide variety of contingencies in the region.
“I can’t emphasize enough that we are not seeking any type of escalation in the region,” Ryder said. “The opposite, in fact. We’re looking … to de-escalate. We’re looking to get a cease-fire signed and the hostages released and start lowering the temperature around the region.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
Aug 25.
Lebanese Hizballah Strikes. On 25 August, at approximately 0530hrs (local time), Lebanese Hizballah (LH) launched a large-scale attack against Israel, involving more than 320 rockets and 20 drones. They were mostly intercepted and have caused limited confirmed damage. Prior to this, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a pre-emptive strike at approximately 0430hrs (local time), hitting thousands of rocket launchers at 40 launch sites in southern Lebanon.
SIGNIFICANCE
- LH claim the attack was a retaliation to Israel’s assassination of Fuad Shukr in the capital Beirut on 30 July. Israel believes the Glilot-base compound, near Herzliya (Tel Aviv district), which is home to Israel’s 8200 intelligence unit and the Mossad headquarters, was one of the intended targets.
- LH claimed to have hit 11 Israeli bases, but there has been no confirmation of this. Israel claimed that ‘very little damage’ was sustained overall, but is still assessing the situation. The LH attack’s furthest confirmed reach was in Acre (Northern district), where it caused limited material damage. So far, only one individual (civilian) has reportedly been injured, also in Acre. An Israeli interceptor hit a high-voltage line, causing intermittent power outages in Acre and north-west Israel.
- In southern Lebanon, three deaths have been confirmed in the villages of Khaim and Tiri (both Nabatieh governate) due to Israeli strikes, according to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health.
- Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) temporarily closed but fully resumed operations at 0700hrs (local time). Airlines suspended flights to and from TLV and Lebanon’s Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY).
- Both Israel and LH announced the success of their respective operations. LH announced that this is the first stage of its response, which will take an extended time period to materialise fully, likely indicating co-operation with Iran.
- LH Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah is scheduled to speak today (25 August) at 1800hrs (local time).
Cross-border hostilities between the IDF and LH have increased in the past two months, including hostile rhetoric and threats of major escalation between the two.
Aug 23.
- Israel-Lebanon: LH strike on key IDF base will elevate risk of rocket, drone strikes in northern Israel. Earlier on 23 August, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) fired three rockets against an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) air traffic control base in Mount Meron (Northern district); at least one rocket successfully struck the base. The base is a key component in Israel’s early detection and air defence system; damage to its infrastructure increases the risk of cross-border rockets and drone incursions striking northern Israel. The latest attack comes amid an uptick in hostilities between Israel and LH (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 22 August 2024). Israel is likely to retaliate forcefully, elevating the security risks not only in southern Lebanon, but also deeper into the country, including in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. We assess this will sustain the current uptick in hostilities and elevate the risk of escalation snowballing into a broader conflict, driving the risk of injury and damage facing staff and business operations on the ground in the coming week.
Aug 22.
KEY POINTS
- The uptick in Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) hostilities is likely to persist in the coming days, sustaining the risk of escalation snowballing into an unmanaged conflict.
- Hamas’ calls for Palestinians to gather at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on 23 August will elevate the risk of violent clashes with the Israeli security forces, as well as the risk of domestic unrest in regional countries.
- Gaza Strip: The death of an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier due to an Israeli airstrike in Gaza highlights the proximity of Israeli airstrikes to IDF ground positions and the risks pertaining to operational failures and/or errors, as well as the sustained security risks facing bystanders and NGO staff. On 19 August, a technical failure caused an Israeli fighter jet’s ordinance to divert 300 metres from its intended target. It struck a building in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) where IDF troops were operating, killing one officer and injuring an unspecified number of soldiers. The distance between the original target and the IDF troops underlines the close proximity of Israeli ground forces to Israeli airstrikes. The incident also highlights the sustained and severe risks facing bystanders and NGO staff operating in Gaza, including those located within humanitarian corridors and along roads protected by the IDF.
- West Bank: Palestinian militant activity remains elevated in the northern West Bank amid calls by Hamas to attack Israelis. Over the past week, militants targeted IDF soldiers in Balata (Nablus governorate), Jenin (Jenin governorate), Nablus (Nablus governorate) and Tubas (Tubas governorate), with the intensity levels broadly in line with those observed during the previous week. However, on 21 August, Hamas called for militants to increase their attacks against Israelis in the West Bank, elevating the attack and security risks impacting the area in the coming days, particularly over the coming weekend. Additionally, Hamas called for Palestinians to gather at the al-Aqsa mosque on 23 August, elevating the risks facing staff in Jerusalem’s Old City due to likely clashes with the security forces after Friday prayers.
- Israel: Plans by Arab-Israeli minors to use Molotov cocktails against vehicles near Karmiel (Northern district) reflect the increasing radicalisation and attack risks across Israel. On 21 August, the Israeli security forces confirmed that two minors were arrested on 4 August. The detainees had planned to target vehicles of Jewish residents along Highway 85 (near Gilon Junction) with Molotov cocktails and to start a wildfire in the nearby forest. Details of the report indicate that the two minors are Arab-Israelis, underscoring that radicalisation is growing among young Arab-Israeli communities. The development underscores the elevated risk of attacks across Israel, particularly along roads and transport hubs in northern Israel.
- Israel-Lebanon: IDF strikes deep inside Lebanese territory and LH’s targeting of civilians point to an uptick in hostilities, elevating the risk of unmanaged escalation. Throughout the week, the IDF has intensified its strikes against Lebanon, conducting an airstrike in Baalbek-Hermel governorate on 20 August, as well as in Beqaa governorate on 21 August, which are located 49.7 miles (80km) and 62.1 miles (100km) from the Israel-Lebanon border, respectively. The strikes targeted LH weapon caches, causing secondary explosions and underlining the elevated bystander security risks in the vicinity. LH also intensified its strikes in retaliation, launching barrages of over 50 rockets towards northern Israel on 21 August. Notably, one of the barrages directly targeted Katzrin in northern Israel, as opposed to one of several IDF bases in the area. In response, the IDF launched simultaneous strikes against more than ten locations in southern Lebanon. The current uptick in hostilities is likely to persist in the coming days, elevating the risk of uncontrolled escalation, particularly in the event of a high casualty incident involving civilians on either side.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Prospects for a ceasefire-hostage deal remain limited despite US pressure (as reflected through US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s Middle East tour). On 21 August, Secretary of State Blinken concluded his most recent tour of the Middle East, during which he submitted a bridging proposal to Israel and Hamas that included a detailed strategy for the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from Gaza and a plan to resolve remaining differences between the parties swiftly. Blinken claims that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supports the proposal, though the lack of Hamas representation in Doha (Qatar) reduces the likelihood of its adoption. While Blinken’s comments were likely designed to boost the perceived success of his visit for the benefit of a US audience, they were reported in Israel as evidence that the Israeli government and Netanyahu are moderating their position. This will likely encourage the Israeli government to hold out until Hamas makes concessions, undermining ceasefire and hostage discussions due to take place in Cairo (Egypt) later this week. This will sustain the conflict and reduce the likelihood of hostage releases.
- The police arrested several protesters and used a water cannon at an ultra-Orthodox rally, underscoring the growing risk of violence at anti-conscription demonstrations. On 21 August, members of the Israeli ultra-Orthodox community protested against the conscription of Yeshiva (seminary) students outside the military recruitment office in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). In all, seven demonstrators were arrested after hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters gathered at the office, resulting in clashes with the police (which included blunt objects being thrown and localised vandalism). Demonstrations among the community have been ongoing since the government began issuing draft orders for ultra-Orthodox men in July. As the IDF continues to enforce conscription notices, demonstrations will almost certainly continue around recruitment offices in Jerusalem and Tel HaShomer (Tel Aviv district), as well as in ultra-Orthodox population centres like Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv). Future protests will likely trigger further clashes with the police, elevating security risks and operational disruption for businesses in the vicinity of recruitment centres, as well as the risk of physical harm facing bystanders and damage to proximate street-level property.
- The UAE is reportedly considering participating in a Gaza peacekeeping force, highlighting a shift in the Gulf state’s approach to the prospects of being involved in an international peacekeeping mission. On 22 August, Israeli media reported that the UAE was considering joining a prospective peacekeeping force in Gaza, with ceasefire talks now allegedly focused on establishing a UN-run operation in the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors, as well as at the Rafah border crossing. This comes after the UAE stipulated in May that it would only form part of a pan-Arab peacekeeping force if the Palestinian Authority (PA) is given jurisdiction over governing Gaza. However, Netanyahu previously rejected any future role for the PA in Gaza. The UAE’s willingness to engage in an international peacekeeping mission points to the possible incentives for doing so, such as discussions with the US over upgrades to al-Dhafra air base in Abu Dhabi (UAE).
- The smuggling of weapons from Gaza to Israel by IDF soldiers is likely to drive violent organised crime risks and undermine the capabilities of the police. During a crackdown on illegal arms in Netanya and Tayibe (both Central district, Israel) on 19 August, the Israeli police reported that they located and seized a collection of illegal weapons, including a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launcher. They suspect that the weapons previously belonged to Hamas. An influx in the volume of weapons entering Israel from Gaza is likely the result of IDF soldiers and reservists smuggling arms from the conflict zone. The smugglers likely intend to sell the captured equipment, allowing organised crime groups (OCGs) to access the weaponry. This will elevate the likelihood of criminals using explosives when committing crimes in Israel, augmenting bystander security risks for those in the vicinity of any such armed criminal activity. The use of explosives will likely undermine the capabilities of the police to combat organised crime throughout Israel due to the increased risk of harm facing security personnel (as well as their limited access to mitigative safety equipment).
FORECAST
Calls by Hamas for Palestinians to gather at the al-Aqsa mosque after Friday prayers on 23 August will elevate ethno-religious tensions and attack risks. Clashes with the security forces in the area are likely, elevating bystander security risks. In the context of Hamas’ recent incitement to increase attacks against Israelis in the West Bank, any such clashes would almost certainly exacerbate ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks. These would in turn elevate the likelihood of sole-perpetrator and low-capability attacks (such as stabbings) targeting the Israeli security forces in Jerusalem, particularly in the Old City. This would also elevate cross-fire security risks for individuals in close proximity to Israeli checkpoints and security personnel. We assess that the risk of militant attacks in the West Bank, including those targeting Israeli civilians, is likely to increase slightly in the coming week, primarily around transport hubs, along roads and in settlements, particularly in the northern West Bank. Violent clashes during the planned gathering at al-Aqsa, particularly those resulting in deaths or injuries among Palestinian civilians (or if the security forces enter the compound), will elevate the risk of domestic unrest in regional countries, particularly Iraq and Jordan.
Weekend ceasefire negotiations in Cairo will reduce the likelihood of an Iranian attack, in turn lowering the risk of a major escalation between LH and Israel in the coming days. Iran likely wants to avoid the perception that it is sabotaging the ceasefire negotiations by launching its promised retaliation against Israel during the talks. As such, while an Iranian attack during the ceasefire talks remains possible, we assess that it is a low-likelihood scenario. This also reduces the likelihood of Israel escalating hostilities with LH into a limited ground offensive or broader war in the coming days, as Israel is unlikely to take such action before Iran launches its promised retaliation. However, the risk of miscalculation and misjudgement along the Israel-LH front will remain elevated amid the current uptick in hostilities, sustaining an increased risk of escalation snowballing into an unmanaged conflict.
Domestic unrest in Israel is likely to intensify in the coming days following the retrieval of hostages’ bodies from Gaza and growing co-operation within the ultra-Orthodox community. On 20 August, the IDF retrieved the bodies of six Israeli citizens from Khan Yunis. Some of them had been shot, driving speculation they were executed. With growing international pressure over ceasefire negotiations and with the second round planned this weekend, anti-government protests are likely to intensify in frequency and scale in the coming days, particularly on Saturday evening. This will increase the risk of clashes with the police, driving bystander risks, particularly around hotspots, and increasing the risk of travel disruption, particularly in Tel Aviv. In addition, anti-conscription protests by ultra-Orthodox communities are likely to increase gradually in the coming weeks; the arrest of individuals refusing to answer conscription orders would almost certainly trigger a significant increase in protests and violence. Hotspots for ultra-Orthodox protests will likely remain around conscription offices in Beersheba (Southern district), Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem, Tel HaShomer and Tiberias (Northern). Protests in Bnei Brak, including the blockading of Highway 4, also remain likely. Clashes with the police, particularly in Jerusalem, remain highly likely, elevating bystander security risks and travel disruption risks during protests.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
Aug 20.
- Germany: Security risks will remain elevated during upcoming Pro-Palestine protests. On 21 August, demonstrators will hold a pro-Palestine protest in the capital Berlin at Karl-Marx-Platz from 1900hrs (local time). The protest follows large-scale violent Palestinian demonstrations on 17 August in the Kreuzberg district of Berlin. The 17 August protest began with around 250 people in Berlin-Kreuzberg and grew to approximately 1,000 participants. Activists chanted Pro-Palestinian slogans and there were reports of the physical harassment of journalists. According to the police, at least ten officers were injured during clashes with anti-war activists. Germany has experienced some of the most volatile pro-Palestine protests in the EU, particularly in the Neukölln district of Berlin, an area with a high immigrant population and entrenched far-left groups. We assess there is a realistic possibility that the upcoming pro-Palestine protest will lead to violent confrontations with the security forces, elevating bystander risks near Karl-Marx-Platz. Videos circulating on social media documenting alleged police violence during protests on 17 August will also likely fuel tensions.
- Israel: Protests will elevate travel disruption risks; clashes with security forces are likely. On 21 August, members of the Israeli ultra-Orthodox community will protest the conscription of Yeshiva (seminary) students outside the military recruitment office in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Demonstrations among the community have been ongoing since the government began issuing draft orders for ultra-orthodox men in July. Demonstrators protested outside recruitment offices and key highways. The protest will likely consist of hundreds of young ultra-Orthodox men, elevating risks of crowding around the recruitment centre and driving travel disruption in its vicinity. Protestors will likely clash with the police, elevating the risk of harm to bystanders and damage to proximate street-level property. As the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continues to enforce conscription notices, demonstrations will almost certainly continue around the recruitment offices in Jerusalem and Tel HaShomer (Tel Aviv district) and in ultra-Orthodox population centres like Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district). We assess that these protest actions will likely trigger further clashes with police, elevating security risks and operational disruption for businesses in the vicinity of recruitment centres.
Aug 19.
KEY POINTS
- An attempted suicide bombing in southern Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) reflects increased security risks and a possible shift in militants’ tactics back towards bombing campaigns; however, such capabilities remain low.
- An attack from Israeli settlers targeting a Palestinian village in the West Bank has elevated ethno-religious tensions, radicalisation and attack risks. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will likely mitigate further attacks in the coming days, though, in the longer term, the rate of such incidents will continue to rise.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF expanded clearing operations in response to sustained Hamas rocket fire targeting southern Israel, driving major security risks within Gaza and the surrounding envelope. On 16 August, the IDF removed a section of northwest Khan Younis (Khan Yunis governorate) and southern Deir al Balah (Deir al Balah governorate) from the humanitarian zone after claiming that Hamas fighters launched rockets towards Nirim (Southern district, Israel) from the area. Subsequently, on 16 August, the IDF’s 98th division launched a wide clearing operation in the area, extending this to northern Deir El-Balah on 18 August. As such, clashes with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have intensified in these areas, particularly in the Abu Hadaf and Hamad neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, the IDF’s 162nd division continued its clearing operations in Tal al-Sultan in Rafah (Rafah governorate), focusing on destroying military infrastructure and tunnels. In central Gaza, the IDF’s 252nd division has continued its clearing operations around the Netzarim Corridor to secure its outposts but mortar attacks from Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) persist.
- West Bank: An uptick in settler violence sustains elevated risks of ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation. On 15 August, dozens of Israeli settlers attacked the Palestinian village of Jit (Qalqilya governorate) in the northern West Bank, killing one Palestinian and setting fire to at least four homes and six vehicles. On 17 August, the IDF intercepted six Israeli settlers equipped with pepper spray as they attempted to enter Rujeib village (Nablus governorate). Elsewhere, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades militants opened small-arms fire on Avnei Hefetz settlement on 16 August, while an unidentified Palestinian killed a security guard in Kedumim settlement on 18 August. Attacks involving and against Israeli settlers will likely further radicalise both communities, sustaining patterns of ethno-religious retaliatory violence and driving attack risks throughout the West Bank.
- Gaza-Israel-West Bank: An explosion in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) possibly indicates a shift in Hamas’ operations towards attempting maximum disruption inside Israel, further elevating security risks. On 18 August, a bomb detonated inside a backpack instantly killing the carrier and wounding one passerby on Lehi Road in south Tel Aviv. Subsequently, on 19 August, Hamas claimed responsibility, stating the operation was executed jointly with PIJ and warned that suicide attacks inside Israel would return. It is still not clear if the suicide bomber travelled from the West Bank or from inside Israel. We assess that the attack possibly reflects a shift in Hamas’ tactics prompted by the direction of newly-appointed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. As such, Hamas will likely attempt further such attacks in the coming weeks in line with efforts to trigger disruption in major civilian population centres in Israel. That said, the group can no longer replicate the same scale of bombing campaign it launched in the 1990s when it conducted numerous suicide bombings targeting bus stops and clubs.
- Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border clashes remain within the established conflict threshold, sustaining physical security risks to residents in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. On 17 August, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) launched at least 55 rockets targeting kibbutz Ayelet HaShahar and a drone attack on kibbutz Misgav Am (both Northern district). The latter strike injured two IDF service personnel. The strikes followed a previous IDF airstrike on a weapons depot in Lebanon’s Nabatieh (Nabatieh governate) on 16 August that killed at least ten Syrians. The IDF has continued to target LH commanders, conducting an airstrike that killed the Radwan force commander Hussein Ibrahim Kassab in Tyre (South governorate) on 17 August. LH conducted further rocket attacks on 18 August including the launch of 20 rockets at the Kiryat Shmona area (Northern district, Israel). On the same day, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) announced that an explosion lightly injured three UN peacekeepers on patrol near Yarine (South governorate). While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack so far, the incident highlights significant security risks for UN staff and assets along the border. Meanwhile, IDF airstrikes inside southern Lebanon persisted, targeting buildings in Ayta ash-Shab, Beit Lif and Houla (all Nabatieh governorate). On 19 August, in response to Kassab’s assassination, LH launched five explosive-laden drones towards northern Israel, two of which impacted Gesher Haziv and Ya’ara (both Northern district) killing one IDF soldier and injuring an unspecified number of others.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Hamas’ rejection of the US hostage-ceasefire deal highlights continued sticking points in negotiations which are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. On 18 August, Hamas officials rejected a US-proposed ceasefire agreement in its current form, citing issues with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Philadelphi Corridor on the Gaza-Egypt border. Additional sticking points include Israel’s demand to maintain an IDF presence in the Netzarim Corridor in Central Gaza, freedom of movement between southern and northern Gaza and details regarding prisoner and hostage release numbers. The US plans to hold another round of negotiations later this week. However, an agreement remains unlikely, with both Israel and Hamas indicating that they are unwilling to withdraw their demands.
- Charges against an Israeli citizen highlight increasing Iranian efforts to exacerbate polarisation within Israel. On 19 August, Israeli local media reported that the state attorney filed charges against an Israeli citizen for acting on the instructions of an Iranian foreign agent in exchange for payment in cryptocurrency over the past four months. The charged individual allegedly attempted to encourage Israelis to join a telegram group that aimed to recruit Israelis as Iranian agents and distributed posters calling for a military coup. Over the past months, we’ve observed increasing reports of Iranian agents recruiting Israelis, in some cases without the target’s knowledge. The main aim of the operation is to increase social divides within Israel by propagating extreme views on all sides of the political and societal spectrum. Iranian engagement with this operation will likely continue to accelerate, particularly in line with increased bilateral tensions and in the context of Iran promising retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in the capital Tehran on 31 July.
FORECAST
Increasing international pressure and continued ceasefire negotiations will elevate domestic unrest risks in Israel. Amid renewed ceasefire negotiations in the past days, anti-government protests have intensified in frequency and number with reports illustrating higher levels of disruptive activities (primarily blockading junctions and key roads). With a second round of negotiations planned this week and mounting pressure from international parties, particularly the US, protests will likely continue growing in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility of mild traffic disruption due to protest activities throughout the week, and major disruption is likely throughout the weekend, particularly near protest hot spots such as Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Violent clashes with police and counter-protests remain a low possibility throughout Israel, though this risk will be higher near key traffic hubs, increasing bystander security risks. Violent riots are unlikely, however, clashes with police will elevate risks to assets in the vicinity of any altercations.
The IDF will likely augment its presence in the West Bank, likely launching a large security operation in the coming days following the attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. Heightened Israeli security is likely throughout Israel in the coming days, particularly in and around big cities, elevating risks of transit disruption. Additionally, the IDF will likely further augment its checkpoints and operations in the West Bank, particularly in the northern West Bank and Nablus governorate. Calls from Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to renew suicide bombing within Israel will likely increase the probability of potential attacks. Despite relatively low capabilities, this will drive elevated attack risks in the coming weeks, particularly in and around transport hubs and large gatherings in Jerusalem.
An augmented IDF presence in the West Bank will reduce the risk of successful Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian population centres; however, ethno-religious tensions and security risks will remain heightened. Israeli settlers will likely attempt further attacks in the coming weeks, however, there is a possibility that the threat of damage posed by such attacks will be mitigated by the IDF’s heightened local presence over the same time frame. Regardless, ethno-religious tensions and prospects for Israeli settler attacks in the West Bank will continue to increase over the long term, driving risks of radicalisation and inter-communal clashes threatening civilians and residences. The increasing involvement of IDF troops in counteracting Israeli settlers’ efforts will drive the risk of clashes between settlers and security forces, elevating bystander risks. Any successful Israeli settler attack will act as a flashpoint for retaliatory attacks from radicalised individuals and Palestinian militant organisations, targeting Israeli settlements and vehicles on roads.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
- An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
- An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
- An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
(Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 24. USS Lincoln Strike Group Arrives in U.S. Central Command. The USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group has arrived in the U.S. Central Command’s area of operations, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh announced today.
The Lincoln group joins the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group in the region.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III ordered the Lincoln to accelerate its deployment to Central Command earlier this month, Singh said. The secretary ordered the plus-up of U.S. forces in the region “as part of broad adjustments to U.S. military posture” to ensure U.S. force protection, increase support for the defense of Israel and ensure the United States is prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies, she said.
An Air Force F-22 Raptor squadron has already arrived in the region, and the USS Georgia — a cruise missile submarine — is operating nearby.
The deployment of U.S. forces to the region may have gotten into the “headspace” of Iranian officials who have threatened strikes on Israel. Singh said the forces are well-positioned to counter any attack from Iran or Iranian-backed proxies.
“We remain focused on efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region, and while also remaining focused on securing a ceasefire as part of a hostage deal, to bring all of the hostages home and to end the war in Gaza,” Singh said.
The deputy press secretary said conversations continue with Ukrainian officials on their strategy to counter Russian attacks in their country. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said Ukraine continues operations in the Kursk region of Russia and that Ukrainian forces are fighting against the “occupiers” in the Donbas region. Bottom line for the United States, Singh said, is that efforts to support Ukraine will continue. She said presidential drawdown authority packages will continue, as will training of Ukrainian service members. (Source: U.S. DoD)
21 Aug 24. A Greek-owned oil tanker was ablaze and drifting in the Red Sea after what appeared to be the most successful attack on shipping by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis in more than two months. The Sounion, carrying crude oil from the southern Iraqi port of Basra to an undisclosed destination, was hit about 77 nautical miles west of the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, which is controlled by the Houthi rebel group. The strikes early on Wednesday were reported by the UK’s Dubai-based Maritime Trade Operations office (UK MTO), which did not identify the vessel. A spokesman for Greece’s Delta Tankers confirmed that the Sounion, which it manages, had been hit. The “Suezmax” vessel, able to carry about 1mn barrels of oil, is the largest type able to use the Suez Canal when laden with cargo. The Houthis have been targeting commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since November, prompting many shipowners to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Suez Canal. The canal is a vital link from ports in Asia and the Middle East to Europe. The group last inflicted significant damage on a vessel in mid-June. The Houthis have said they are acting in support of Palestinians in Gaza since Israel responded to Hamas’s assault on October 7 and that they are attacking vessels with links to Israel, the UK and US. UK MTO reported that a security team on the vessel initially engaged in an exchange of small-arms fire with armed men in two small boats just before 6am local time on Wednesday. The vessel was hit two hours later by two projectiles and suffered a further attack just before 9am local time. “There is a fire onboard and the vessel has lost engine power,” UK MTO reported. “The vessel is drifting and not under command.” Martin Kelly, senior Middle East analyst at maritime risk consultancy EOS Risk Group, said the apparent attack method reflected how strikes by UK and US forces on the Houthis have degraded many of their capabilities, particularly by attacking radar installations. That has forced them to use crewed spotter boats, such as those reported by UK MTO. (Source: FT.com)
16 Aug 24. Hizbullah unveils underground rocket base. The Islamic Resistance armed wing of Lebanon’s Hizbullah group released a video on 16 August showing for the first time a tunnel network that can be used to launch heavy artillery rockets.
Titled ‘Our mountains are our treasures’, the video showed a tunnel network that was identified by a poster as Imad Facility 4, implying there are at least three others named after the late Hizbullah commander Imad Mughniyeh.
In one 20 second tracking shot, the camera followed motorcyclists along a winding tunnel where multiple vehicles – some of them clearly multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) – were parked in adjoining bays. Another shot showed 14 MRLs driving along a tunnel past the camera. The MRLs had numbers on their cabs, with the highest being 14.
Some of the MRLs were shown being parked in launch positions, where metal doors opened in the roofs of the tunnels above them to enable them to launch their rockets.
All the MRLs that could be seen clearly appeared to be loaded with the type of rocket that Hizbullah has identified as the Kaibar-1 and the Israeli military refers to as the M-302, saying it is a Syrian-made series with a diameter of 302 mm and ranges between 90 km with a 170 kg warhead for the M-392A and 200 km with a 125 kg warhead for the M-302E.
(Source: Janes)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
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