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Military And Security Developments
Jul 12.
KEY POINTS
- Israel-Lebanese Hizballah (LH) cross-border hostilities intensified following an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeted strike; an LH rocket later killed two Israeli civilians, underscoring the elevated risks of miscalculation and major escalation.
- Increasing ethno-religious tensions in Israel over the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF from August will elevate domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF’s operation in Sabra neighbourhood (west Gaza City) likely illustrates the blueprint for Israel’s long-term tactics in the Gaza Strip. On 9 July, IDF armoured units encircled a UNRWA compound comprising 20 buildings in Sabra serving as a camp for displaced people. The operation came on the back of intelligence indicating that Hamas militants are using the compound as an operational command and recruitment centre and also for the production of rockets. Following the encirclement of the compound, the IDF created corridors for residents to exit the area. The operation was unique due to its element of surprise and the rapidity of the encirclement. Furthermore, the IDF already destroyed underground tunnels in the area in November-December 2023. The operation reflects the development of tactics that will enable the IDF to exert long-term control over Gaza and prevent militants from regaining their military strength and capabilities.
- West Bank: Intense IDF operations in Nur Shams (Tulkarm governorate) following the appointment of a new high commander for the Central Command reflects the likely augmentation of Israel’s operational footing in the northern West Bank. On 8 July, Major General Avi Bluth officially entered office as the new commander of the IDF’s Central Command, which is responsible for the West Bank area. Bluth previously served as the commander of the IDF’s West Bank Division. He stated that his priority is to ensure the West Bank remains a secondary front, particularly in the event of escalation between Israel and LH. On the same day, the IDF launched an intense operation in Nur Shams that lasted 15 hours, during which time roads were excavated as deep as 6.5 feet (2 meters) to uncover IEDs. This has resulted in widespread damage. The depth of excavation reflects new protocols following an IED blast on 26 June (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 27 June 2024). The operation, together with the new commander, likely signals an uptick in IDF operations in the West Bank in the coming weeks. These will likely further elevate ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population, increasing the risk of attacks against IDF positions in the West Bank.
- Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border hostilities continue to escalate gradually; an LH rocket barrage killed two Israeli civilians, highlighting the elevated risks near IDF bases. On 9 July, an Israeli drone strike killed Yasser Qarnabash (a senior LH officer) close to the Lebanon-Syria border in Rif Dimashq governorate (Syria). Qarnabash was responsible for the facilitation of personnel and weapons transfers between Syria and Lebanon and was a former personal guard of LH leader Hassan Nasrallah. Later that day, LH launched a barrage of rockets in retaliation, targeting IDF bases in the Golan Heights. One rocket, likely targeting the IDF’s Division 36 Command base, directly hit a car along Highway 91 in the vicinity of the Nafah Junction, killing two Israeli civilians. Early investigations following the strike highlighted that highways and roads close to IDF bases in northern Israel are designated as open areas. These areas are not protected by Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system, highlighting severe security risks along roads near IDF bases, particularly as LH prioritises targeting military positions. On 10 July, an LH explosives-laden drone lightly injured an IDF soldier in the Golan Heights close to Bet HaMekhes Junction along Highway 91. In addition, an LH explosives-laden drone critically injured an Israeli civilian on 11 July near Kibbutz Kabri (Northern district), close to Nahariya (Northern). These incidents reflect the growing success of LH in penetrating IDF air defences with drones as well as the increasing range and frequency of LH attacks in the past week.
- Israel-Syria: Israel slightly increased its strikes against Syria, reflecting its elevated efforts to disrupt weapons transfers, while also underscoring the overall deterioration of the security environment. On the night of 8-9 July, Israel allegedly struck two buildings near the port city of Baniyas (Tartous governorate), causing material damage but no casualties. Baniyas is one of the entry points for Iranian weapons into Syria and Lebanon. The attack reflects Israel’s elevated efforts to disrupt weapons supplies to Syria and LH amid escalating tensions. Additionally, on 10 July, the IDF targeted a Syrian army site in Quneitra governorate with artillery and tank fire. The IDF claims that the site violated the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria (1974) in the buffer zone. This rare IDF confirmation highlights Israel’s efforts to prevent escalation with the Syrian government and to stop any further deterioration of the security environment.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Ceasefire negotiations continue in Qatar, with reports indicating that Israel and Hamas have agreed on a framework for a potential agreement. On 11 July, the Washington Post reported that negotiators have provisionally agreed to a framework for a ceasefire which would consist of an initial six-weak ceasefire, the withdrawal of IDF personnel from densely populated areas, the release of 33 hostages and the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. Negotiations would continue during the initial ceasefire period, and remain de facto in place until an agreement is reached (including if negotiations take longer than six weeks). The second ceasefire phase would include the release of all remaining living hostages, a complete IDF withdrawal, the deployment of a multi-national security force to Gaza and the devolution of civilian administration to technocrats associated with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Although neither Hamas nor Israel have commented on the state of negotiations, such a framework would represent a substantial relaxation of both parties’ maximalist demands, which have stalled previous talks. Over the coming days, negotiations will likely continue, improving prospects for an agreement in the medium term. However, negotiations will remain highly sensitive and prone to sticking points, particularly those related to developments in IDF ground operations in Gaza City.
- Despite commitments to re-anchor the US-built pier to facilitate aid deliveries, humanitarian conditions in Gaza are unlikely to improve. On 9 July, the Pentagon announced that the US would move to re-operationalise the pier facility by 14 July. The US authorities removed the pier on 28 June due to unfavourable weather conditions, and the facility remains in the port of Ashdod (Southern district). Although the US will likely re-install the facility in the coming days, it will remain prone to significant disruption linked to both weather conditions and ongoing clashes in central Gaza. Due to rising costs and frequent damage, the US is highly likely to dismantle the facility permanently over the coming weeks, while also pressuring Israel to co-ordinate increased overland aid deliveries.
- The frequency of anti-government protests continues to increase in Israel, highlighting persistent travel and operational disruption risks. On 10 July, dozens of individuals associated with hostages held in Gaza, including family members, began a four-day march from Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Demonstrators will march along Highway 1, elevating risks of travel and supply chain disruption in central Israel. The demonstration will likely increase in size over the coming days, with large protests highly likely in Jerusalem on 14 July. Demonstrations are highly likely to gather outside the Knesset and near the prime minister’s official residence on Gaza Street, restricting movement through West Jerusalem. The police will likely adopt an elevated security posture and there is a realistic possibility of low-intensity clashes with demonstrators, particularly in the event of any deviation from pre-authorised protest routes/locations. However, widespread clashes remain unlikely, moderating bystander and collateral risks.
- Government coalition infighting highlights the elevated risks of policy stasis preceding the Knesset’s summer recess. On 8 July, the Otzma Yehudit party opposed an amendment to the Religious Services Law, despite its backing from the ultra-Orthodox Shas party (the second-largest coalition party). Shas Members of the Knesset (MKs) subsequently walked out from all legislative sessions, triggering the government whip to withdraw all legislation from the Knesset’s agenda on 9 July. Otzma Yehudit MKs opposed the amendment as part of ongoing efforts to pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into appointing National Security Minister and party leader Itamar Ben Gvir to the War Cabinet (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 17 June 2024). Although Shas announced that it would resume voting with the coalition government on 10 July, elevated inter-party tensions are highly likely to persist over the coming weeks, driving risks of policy stasis. Due to the upcoming Knesset summer recess (28 July-27 October), short-term legislative deadlock will drive governance concerns throughout Q3. Nevertheless, there is a realistic possibility that the government will shorten the recess, particularly in the event of an escalation along the Israel-Lebanon border.
*Israel: US sanctions against settlers are unlikely to significantly impact bilateral relations . On 11 July, G7 foreign ministers condemned Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s announcement last month that the Israeli authorities would legalise five settlements in the West Bank. This came as the US announced new sanctions on several Israeli settlers accused of violence towards civilians and against far-right groups Lehava and Tsav9. It is likely that as settlement legalisation progresses and violence persists, the US will place further sanctions on Israeli individuals and entities accused of facilitating violence, elevating compliance risks for entities servicing settler communities, particularly financial institutions. It is unlikely (at this stage) that the US will sanction members of the Israeli government, but further sanctions on right-wing groups will likely elevate tensions between Israel and the US. However, this is unlikely to impact bilateral relations significantly. The G7 statement elevates the risk of other countries imposing sanctions on Israeli individuals and businesses, exacerbating compliance challenges and reputational risks for associated firms.
Jul 10.
*Israel-Palestinian Territories: Uptick in IDF’s West Bank operations will raise ethno-religious tensions. On 8 July, General Avi Blot became the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) new Central Command chief. Subsequently, the IDF intensified its operations in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), particularly in northern governorates. These operations included extensive activity in the Nur al-Shams refugee camp (Tulkarm governorate) on 9 July, where the engineering corps destroyed dozens of explosives, including a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The IDF also killed two militants. We assess that this uptick in IDF operations in the West Bank will likely persist in the coming days. Further large-scale operations are likely in refugee camps, as are clearing operations to destroy IEDs along major thoroughfares. These intensive operations will highly likely exacerbate already-heightened ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, while also driving radicalisation risks among younger people, particularly in targeted refugee camps. This will increase the likelihood of attacks against Israeli settlements, as well as IDF assets/personnel and Israeli civilians, driving bystander safety risks.
Jul 08.
KEY POINTS
- A recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) airstrike killed a key operative in Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH) air defence unit, prompting retaliation by LH which included the longest-range rocket strikes into northern Israel since October 2023.
- Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented four non-negotiable lines for a ceasefire deal with Hamas, undermining the prospects of such an agreement.
- Gaza Strip: The IDF launched an operation in west Gaza City (Gaza governorate, Palestinian Territories) to disrupt militants’ restructuring efforts and likely signal preparations for a possible ceasefire. The main focus of the current operation is the Tel al-Hawa neighbourhood, with fighting also occurring in Daraj, Rimal, Sabra and Tuffah following evacuation orders on 7 July. The IDF has cited its main objective as the counteraction of efforts from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas to rehabilitate these areas. The operations are likely part of broader efforts to further secure the area in preparation for a possible ceasefire.
- West Bank: Clashes between the IDF and gunmen in Nablus (Nablus governorate) during the escort of Jewish pilgrims to Joseph’s Tomb highlight elevated ethno-religious tensions and security risks in the West Bank. Overnight on 7-8 July, the IDF escorted 500 Jewish worshipers to the site of Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus. Palestinian news media reported clashes between the IDF troops and gunmen in the area during the escort, although with no injuries or casualties. Pilgrimages to the tomb occurred on a nearly monthly basis before 7 October 2023 and often sparked clashes with Palestinian locals. However, these pilgrimages have largely been on hold since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. The escort reflects a likely effort from the IDF to balance security in the area with religious demands; in the past month, pilgrims increased their efforts to enter the Tomb without escorts. Travel of this nature will continue elevating ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, sustaining risks of security incidents in Nablus and domestic unrest in the area.
- Israel-Lebanon: An IDF targeted killing of a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operative in Baalbek-Hermel governorate reflects sustained escalation risks as does the LH response. On 6 July, the IDF killed Maytham al-Attar, a prominent member of LH’s air defence unit, in a targeted strike in the town of Chaat (Baalbek-Hermel governorate) approximately 69 miles (112km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. Following the strike, LH retaliated on 7 July with three rocket barrages against IDF bases in northern Israel including the air traffic control base in Mount Meron and the IDF Northern Command base in Safed (Northern district). Additionally, LH launched rockets to an unspecified base west of Tiberias (Northern district), approximately 18 miles (30km) from the Israel-Lebanon border, seriously injuring one Israeli individual and marking the organisation’s furthest rocket strike since 7 October 2023. However, these rocket barrages were significantly smaller than last week’s, comprising 10-20 rockets per barrage. LH also continued launching drones and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM); many of these launches were notably close to the border. On 7 July, an ATGM strike injured three individuals near Zarit (Northern district), including a US citizen who was in the area training IDF reservists in the usage of a drone system which they had privately bought from his employer. The attacks reflect the sustained elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon and the continued risk of misfire or miscalculation leading to snowballing escalation.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a list of non-negotiable positions for further ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, undermining prospects for a potential agreement. On 7 July, Netanyahu announced that Israel would not negotiate on four key demands: the ability to resume fighting in Gaza until it achieves its war aims, the end of weapons smuggling via the Gaza-Egypt border, prevention of militant re-infiltration into northern Gaza and prioritisation of the release of living hostages. On 8 July, the Times of Israel published comments from an unnamed mediation official indicating that the statement had ‘severely harm[ed]’ negotiations after Hamas reportedly agreed to moderate its position on the immediate implementation of a permanent ceasefire in exchange for hostage releases. The demands also highlight increasing brinkmanship within ceasefire negotiations. This highlights diminishing prospects for an agreement in the short term. As such, humanitarian conditions in Gaza will likely continue deteriorating as negotiations stall, while protest activity in Israel will likely continue increasing in scale and frequency.
- Two consecutive days of protests in Israel highlight increasing risks of travel and operational disruption while indicating an increase in anti-government sentiment. On 6 July, protesters carried out demonstrations calling for the government to secure hostage releases in urban centres nationwide. Tens of thousands of demonstrators attended protests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), restricting movement through the city and lighting fires on the Ayalon Highway. The police employed water cannons to extinguish fires and disperse protesters, highlighting elevated bystander risks as protest activity remains widespread. Protesters carried out imilar, smaller-scale demonstrations in Caesarea and Haifa (both Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Mitzpe Ramon (Southern district). Protest activity continued on 7 July, with organisers calling for a ‘Day of Disruption’ to demand a general election and to mark the nine-month anniversary of the 7 October attacks. Thousands of protesters gathered in urban centres nationwide, including in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, blocking major thoroughfares including Highways 2, 4, 6 and 90. Beyond protests in regular hotspots such as Democracy Square (Tel Aviv) and Gaza Street (Jerusalem), demonstrators also targeted government ministers’ private residences throughout Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, highlighting the increasing spread of protest activity as well as operational and travel disruption risks. Protesters also gathered outside the Histadrut labour federation headquarters in Tel Aviv and the private residence of the federation’s leader, calling for the union to announce a general strike until the government organises a general election. While a general strike remains unlikely in the short term, continued delays to hostage releases will moderately increase labour flexibility concerns, particularly in highly unionised sectors.
- The Israeli government has approved a series of budget cuts to fund aid for displaced Northern district residents; however, increasing fiscal pressure will likely undermine long-term socio-economic health. On 8 July, the Israeli government approved a 1% spending cut across all government ministries to fund relocation and support costs for the approximately 60,000 residents displaced due to cross-border hostilities with Lebanon. This NIS 500 m (USD 135 m) reduction in government spending will increase the risks of cuts to public services, particularly within the housing and health ministries. The cuts come amid increasing pressure on the Israeli government to reduce government spending due to an increasing deficit. Compared to the same period in 2023, government spending has increased by over 34%, mostly due to increased military expenses. Over the coming months, government spending will likely continue increasing relative to GDP, undermining investor confidence and increasing inflationary pressures on the NIS. Longer-term fiscal concerns will likely result in further budget cuts, driving socio-economic health concerns and broader anti-government sentiment. There is also a realistic possibility that continued cuts will likely delay the Ministry of National Security’s efforts to expand prison capacity, undermining security and policing capacity.
- Continued pro-Palestine protests in Morocco highlight elevated regional tensions, though a suspension of bilateral relations remains highly unlikely. On 7 July, thousands of protesters attended a pro-Palestine march in Tangiers (Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region) to denounce the Israel-Hamas war. Protesters also held smaller-scale demonstrations in the capital Rabat and other major cities after Friday prayers on 5 July. Demonstrations highlight persistent risks of domestic unrest linked to the Israel-Hamas war and increasing pressure on the Moroccan government to withdraw from the Abraham Accords. Though such a withdrawal remains highly unlikely in the short term, there is a realistic possibility that elevated regional tensions will moderate prospects for continued growth in bilateral economic relations in the medium to long term.
- The victory of a left-wing alliance in the French parliamentary elections has increased concerns over antisemitic incidents in France, underscoring elevated ethno-religious tensions and risks of targeted violence. On 7 July, the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) became the largest alliance in the French National Assembly after the second round of voting in the snap parliamentary election (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 8 July 2024). The coalition includes the hard-left La France Insoumise (LFI) party, which critics have frequently accused of failing to denounce antisemitism, particularly given the significant uptick in antisemitic incidents amid the Israel-Hamas conflict. Although the NFP failed to secure a governing majority, concerns over the potential role of the LFI in a coalition government have triggered calls from several prominent Jewish leaders, including the rabbi associated with the Grand Synagogue of Paris, for young members of France’s Jewish community to emigrate to Israel. These statements highlight increasing concerns over targeted harassment and violence along ethno-religious tensions, particularly in France. Several key figures within Israel, such as the leader of the secular, right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, have echoed these calls, increasing the likelihood of an uptick in immigration from France over the coming months in the event of LFI forming part of a coalition government.
FORECAST
Israel and LH are likely to continue slowly escalating cross-border hostilities over the coming weeks, sustaining risks of major escalation in the coming three months. As the IDF continue to conduct targeted strikes against LH commanders and operatives, LH will likely continue gradually increasing the frequency and intensity of its strikes into northern Israel. However, targeted killings of LH operatives are unlikely to significantly reduce LH’s military strength or capabilities (with the notable exception of senior commanders). This will sustain a significant threat to Israel, particularly on its northern border in the event of a major escalation. Nevertheless, the IDF will likely continue targeting LH operatives and commanders in the coming weeks, trying to slowly chip away at the organisation’s knowledge base and operational experience. LH is likely to continue responding to such attacks, gradually escalating its response. This dynamic will elevate risks of miscalculation or misfire resulting in a large casualty incident in either Israel or Lebanon. Such an incident will significantly elevate the risks of a major escalation, such as a large IDF airstrike campaign in southern Lebanon and retaliatory escalation snowballing into war. These risks are particularly elevated in the coming three months, particularly from the end of July.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
- Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
- An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
*Morocco: Pro-Palestine marches will sustain elevated mobility disruption risks in major cities. On 7 July, thousands of protesters conducted a pro-Palestine march in the city of Tangiers (Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region) to denounce the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and Morocco’s ties with Israel. This comes two days after similar (but smaller) protests were held in the capital Rabat and other major cities after Friday prayers on 5 July. The resumption of pro-Palestine protests in the country is highly likely due to the circulation of reports that an Israeli ship docked at Tangier port in June. However, no official statement has confirmed this incident. Nevertheless, we assess that these protests will likely persist throughout July and later in the summer in most major cities, including Rabat, elevating inter- and intra-city mobility disruption. We also assess that bystander risks will remain limited as the Moroccan security forces are unlikely to resort to crowd dispersal methods to mitigate against further public dissent towards the government and the monarchy. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jul 24. IDF Targets Syrian Infrastructure in the Golan Heights. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had shelled Syrian military infrastructure in the Golan Heights. The IDF targeted sites they claim violate the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria. The strikes involved tanks and artillery hitting locations in southern Syria, specifically in the buffer zone established by the agreement. The IDF justified the strikes by stating that the Syrian military is responsible for activities within its territory and that Israel will not permit breaches of the disengagement terms. The Golan Heights has largely been under Israeli control since 1967, with a UN-monitored buffer zone separating Israeli-occupied territory from Syria to prevent direct conflict. Israel has increased its military actions against Hezbollah and other Iran-linked entities in both Syria and Lebanon. The escalation follows the death of two Israeli civilians in a Hezbollah rocket attack on the Golan Heights. The IDF has been actively targeting Hezbollah’s military capabilities, particularly focusing on missile and electronic warfare systems. In the latest incident, IDF strikes aimed to dismantle Syrian infrastructure deemed to breach the 1974 agreement. Israeli media suggested the targets were in Quneitra, within the buffer zone. The IDF’s strategy is to counteract Hezbollah and Iran’s influence in the region. This includes targeting supply lines and key operatives involved in transporting weaponry. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
07 Jul 24. EU naval mission says it destroyed two drones in Gulf of Aden. The EU naval mission protecting ships crossing the Red Sea said its frigate Psara had destroyed two unmanned aerial vehicles in the Gulf of Aden on Sunday. The Aspides mission began in February in response to drone and missile attacks on vessels by Iranian-aligned Houthi militants. The Houthis describe the attacks as acts of solidarity with Palestinians in Israel’s war in Gaza. Other countries, including the United States, also have naval forces operating in the area. (Source: Reuters)
05 Jul 24. Hezbollah Launches Major Rocket and Drone Attack on Israel. Lebanon’s Hezbollah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel on Thursday, marking one of the group’s largest attacks in recent history. The barrage was in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike that killed Mohammed Nasser, a senior Hezbollah commander. Hezbollah’s assault targeted multiple Israeli military bases, including those in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and the town of Kiryat Shmona near the Israel-Lebanon border. Israeli military officials reported numerous projectiles and aerial threats, with many intercepted. However, the attack resulted in the death of one Israeli soldier and sparked several fires. Nasser, killed near Tyre in southern Lebanon, was a significant figure within Hezbollah, participating in conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the 2006 war with Israel. Hezbollah’s response, including the launch of Katyusha rockets and Iranian-made Falaq missiles shows their willingness to continue fighting Israel. Following Hezbollah’s attack, Israel struck various locations in southern Lebanon, including the towns of Ramyeh and Houla. Lebanese media reported casualties, including at least one person killed in Houla. The Israeli air force also conducted flights over Beirut, breaking the sound barrier as a show of force. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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