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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jun 13.

KEY POINTS

  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s Nasr Unit commander, the senior-most LH commander killed since 7 October 2023. In response, LH significantly increased the frequency, number and intensity of its cross-border attacks against northern Israel.
  • Continued escalation of armed hostilities in northern Israel will elevate spillover risks, particularly in Syria due to a likely increase in IDF strikes targeting weapons transfers to LH.
  • Hamas’ response to the proposed ceasefire agreement and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s subsequent criticism highlights the sustained hurdles facing a ceasefire in the near term.
  • Gaza Strip: Increased Israeli airstrikes are possible amid ongoing IDF operations in Rafah (southern Gaza) and the Netzarim Corridor (north-central Gaza). The IDF’s Division 162 remains active in several sectors across Rafah. Operations in western Rafah are likely to continue in the coming days. The Givati Brigade is also operating in the Shaboura neighbourhood. Additionally, the IDF’s Division 99 continues to operate in the Netzarim Corridor, where it is combatting militants. In recent days, the IDF has recorded an increased number of encounters with explosive-rigged structures, particularly in Rafah. This is due to its hitherto greater utilisation of ground forces (as opposed to airstrikes). However, as the operation in Rafah continues and the number of such incidents increase, efforts to reduce casualties will elevate the likelihood of the IDF increasing its use of airstrikes in the area.
  • West Bank: IDF activity in the northern West Bank reflects rising militant threats. Overnight on 10-11 June, the IDF conducted an 18-hour-long operation in the Jordan Valley’s Fara area (Tubas governorate). During the operation, IDF forces located and destroyed an explosives lab that contained over 80 devices and barrels of explosive material. Additionally, the IDF deployed an attack helicopter during a small-arms exchange with militants on 11 June that broke out amid an operation targeting a militant compound in Kafr Dan (Jenin governorate). The amount of explosives found during the operation and the deployment of high-value and sophisticated assets reflect the growing militant threat in the northern West Bank.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Cross-border hostilities have intensified following the IDF’s targeted killing of a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) senior commander. Overnight on 11-12 June, the IDF killed Taleb Sami Abdullah (Abu Taleb) and three other LH operatives in an airstrike against Jwaya (South governorate). Abu Taleb was the commander of LH’s Nasr Unit; he commanded the central area of southern Lebanon from the border to the Litani River. He was the senior-most LH member that the IDF has killed since 7 October 2023. Following the strike, LH launched over 215 rockets and missiles towards northern Israel on 12 June, marking the largest attack by the group since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. IDF air defences intercepted most of the rockets, though the barrages caused several wildfires; the biggest blaze broke out in Birya Forest (Northern district, Israel). Additionally, the barrages triggered sirens for the first time since October 2023 in Tiberias (Northern), which is located 21 miles (34km) from the border. On 12 June, during Abu Taleb’s funeral procession, Hashim Safi al-Din, LH’s second in command, stated that the group would increase the intensity and quantity of its operations against Israel. LH retaliation and escalation is likely to continue in the coming days, instigating further targeted IDF killings and strikes against Lebanon. While escalation by both parties is likely to stay below the threshold of an all-out war, it will further elevate the security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, including those stemming from wildfires ignited by ordnance.
  • Israel-Lebanon: The IDF’s strike against a weapons shipment on the Lebanon-Syria border marks Israel’s deepest strike into Lebanon; it allegedly activated Syrian air defences. Overnight on 10-11 June, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted an airstrike against a vehicle convoy in Baalbek-Hermel governorate (Lebanon), located approximately 93.2 miles (150km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. This marks the IDF’s longest-range strike against Lebanon since 7 October 2023 and follows LH’s downing of an IDF Hermes 900 drone on 10 June. Also on 10 June, a missile struck a house in Fneidik (Akkar governorate, Lebanon), injuring a child and causing material damage. It is not known if the missile was a Syrian surface-to-air (SAM) missile, an IDF artillery shell or even ordnance from a secondary explosion caused by the IDF strike against the weapons shipment. The incident reflects the growing spillover risks stemming from IDF-LH hostilities, particularly in border areas.
  • Red Sea: On 12 June, the Iran-backed Houthis struck a commercial ship with an unmanned surface vessel (USV), causing significant damage. The attack hit the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned M/V Tutor, causing severe flooding and damage to the engine room. The attack reflects a recent increase in Houthi attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Additionally, in the past week, US forces also increased their strikes against Houthi weapons in Yemen, including rocket launchers.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Hamas’ response to an Israeli-proposed ceasefire agreement highlights the continued sticking points that will likely stall negotiations in the coming days. On 10 June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution calling on Israel and Hamas to accept an Israeli-proposed three-phase ceasefire agreement outlined by US President Joe Biden on 31 May (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 3 June 2024). Hamas subsequently responded to the proposal on 11 June, stating that it would only accept an agreement that leads to a permanent ceasefire which includes a complete withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza. Hamas officials have stated that these requests are minor changes that will not impede further negotiations, while Israeli officials have characterised the response as a rejection of the proposal. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has supported Israel’s stance, characterising some Hamas demands as unworkable. Although ceasefire discussions are reportedly ongoing at the time of writing, Hamas is highly unlikely to accept an agreement that does not meet its maximalist demands, while Israel is highly unlikely to agree to a ceasefire precluding a potential resumption of combat operations if Hamas does not fulfil its hostage-release commitments. Consequently, negotiations are unlikely to progress substantially over the coming days, undermining the prospects for a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement in the short term.
  • Despite increased funding commitments, humanitarian conditions in Gaza are highly unlikely to improve in the short term. On 11 June, Blinken attended a regional conference in Jordan on how to improve humanitarian aid conditions in Gaza. Blinken announced a new USD 400 million package to improve the provision of aid into Gaza and called for regional partners to increase aid commitments and delivery co-ordination efforts. Yet despite these announcements, elevated bilateral tensions between Israel and Egypt vis-à-vis the movement of aid through the Rafah border crossing and ongoing hostilities in southern Gaza will likely continue to disrupt aid deliveries. On 9 June, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it would temporarily suspend aid deliveries via a US-constructed pier facility in central Gaza due to a mortar fire incident that damaged two warehouse facilities in the area. Disruption to aid deliveries and distribution will likely continue in the coming weeks, exacerbating humanitarian concerns, especially as food, water and energy insecurity remains critical.
  • The Israeli finance ministry’s potential distribution of Palestinian Authority (PA) revenues to Israeli civilians highlights increasing tensions and the elevated risk of unrest in the West Bank. On 13 June, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich announced that he had signed an order to distribute over USD 35m of tax funds collected by Israel on the PA’s behalf to Israeli victims of terror attacks. In early May, the finance ministry indefinitely suspended the transfer of tax revenues to the PA, undermining its capacity to provide public sector services in the West Bank and to pay civil servants’ salaries (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 13 May 2024). While there is a realistic possibility that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will overrule Smotrich’s order or that legal challenges will delay its implementation, the statement highlights substantially elevated tensions between the Israeli government and the PA. Smotrich is highly likely to continue delaying financial transfers to the PA over the coming weeks, exacerbating socio-economic health concerns and the risk of domestic unrest in the West Bank.
  • On 12 June, the UN’s Commission of Inquiry released a report alleging that the IDF has committed crimes against humanity in Gaza, highlighting significant reputational concerns for firms with operations in Israel. The report details findings from an investigation into possible war crimes committed by Hamas during the 7 October 2023 attacks and by the IDF during ground operations in Gaza. The commission alleges that the IDF has engaged in acts of ‘extermination’, ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman and cruel treatment’ amounting to crimes against humanity. Although Israeli officials have rejected the commission’s findings, the report’s publication highlights significantly elevated reputational concerns for firms with operations in Israel, particularly firms in the defence and security sectors. The UN Human Rights Council will review the report in its next session (beginning on 17 June). In the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility that UNSC members such as Algeria will propose resolutions to sanction Israel based on human rights concerns. However, the US will likely veto any resolution seeking to apply broad, multi-lateral sanctions against Israel.
  • Continued legal action challenging arms exports to Israel highlights the elevated risks of operational disruption facing technology and defence firms in Europe. On 11 June, a court in Berlin (Germany) rejected an urgent request by several Palestinians residing in Gaza to stop the German government from approving permits for the export of weapons to Israel (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 June 2024). Lawyers representing the Palestinians argued that Germany’s supply of weapons to Israel could lead to violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. The court ruled that the plaintiffs could not prove that arms exports were ongoing or imminent, and declined to issue the requested ban. Despite this ruling, pro-Palestine activists are highly likely to continue launching legal challenges against governments currently approving (or considering the approval of) permits for arms exports to Israel. Similar cases will sustain the risk of substantial operational and supply chain disruption facing arms manufacturers, particularly those based in Europe. However, they are unlikely to undermine the Israeli security forces’ capacity substantially.

FORECAST

The uptick in hostilities across the Israel-Lebanon border is likely to continue, elevating the risk of IDF strikes against Syria. LH is likely to sustain a heightened rate of strikes into northern Israel in the coming days, including through the use of longer-range rockets and drones, driving elevated security risks as far as Nazareth (Northern). In response, the IDF is likely to continue conducting targeted strikes against LH, while also hitting deeper into Lebanon, including Baalbek-Hermel. Furthermore, the IDF is likely to increase the frequency of its airstrikes into Syria, targeting weapons transfers to LH in addition to operatives. These strikes are also likely to target Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel. This will prompt greater efforts by Syrian air defences to intercept Israeli fighter jets, elevating the risk of misfired missiles striking locations in Lebanon, Syria and northern Israel. Increased Syrian air defence activity will also elevate the threats across Syrian airspace. Despite the continued armed escalation between Israel and LH, a major escalation consisting of a large IDF ground operation into Lebanon remains unlikely. However, continued large rocket barrages into northern Israel will elevate the risk of the IDF intensifying its airstrikes against Lebanon, elevating the likelihood of a snowball effect leading to a major escalation. Furthermore, incidents involving large numbers of casualties, particularly civilians, will also elevate the risk of escalation. Israeli schools break for the summer on 30 June (20 June for high schools). They return on 1 September, which will ease evacuation operations in the event of armed escalation. As such, the summer period will involve a heightened risk of further escalation stemming from cross-border hostilities. Ultimately, while it is unlikely, we assess that a major escalation is still possible.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
  • Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
  • An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)

Jun 12.

  • Israel-Lebanon: Killing of LH senior commander has elevated security, armed escalation risks. Overnight on 11-12 June, an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) airstrike killed Taleb Abdullah (Abu Taleb), a senior Lebanese Hizballah (LH) commander, as well as three other commanders in Jwaya (South governorate, Lebanon). Abu Taleb was the most senior LH commander to be killed by Israel since 7 October 2023. He commanded the central area of southern Lebanon from the border to the Litani River. The IDF strike followed an LH rocket barrage against northern Israel on the eve of the Shavuot holiday (11 June). Following the strike, LH launched over 160 rockets towards northern Israel earlier on 12 June, triggering sirens for the first time since October 2023 in Tiberias (Northern district, Israel), located 21 miles (34km) from the border. The intensification of hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border is likely to continue in the coming days. The continuation of LH’s longer-range strikes will elevate security risks in northern Israel, including from wildfires caused by rockets and shrapnel. Despite the current escalation, we assess that an immediate major IDF ground operation into Lebanon remains unlikely. The IDF is likely to increase its targeted attacks against Lebanon, elevating bystander and collateral security risks, particularly in southern Lebanon.
  • Germany: Rejection of Israeli arms export ban will possibly intensify pro-Palestine unrest. On 11 June, the Berlin High Administrative Court rejected an urgent request by several Palestinian residents of Gaza to stop the German government from approving permits for the export of weapons to Israel. Lawyers representing the Palestinians argued that Germany’s supply of weapons to Israel could lead to Israel violating international law. Germany has experienced some of the most volatile pro-Palestine protests across the EU, particularly in the Neukölln district of the capital Berlin. We assess that the court’s decision will possibly aggravate Palestinian unrest in the coming weeks, particularly if a possible appeal to the Berlin-Brandenburg Higher Administrative Court is also rejected. Meanwhile, earlier on 12 June, the police conducted raids on eight properties linked to the German-speaking Muslim Community (DMG) in Braunschweig (Lower Saxony state) and Berlin. The raids underscore heightened scrutiny by the German authorities over organisations they consider potential Islamist extremists since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has driven a sharp uptick in attacks motivated by ‘religious ideology’.

Jun 10.

KEY POINTS

  • High numbers of Palestinian casualties during hostage rescue operations undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will elevate the threat of domestic unrest in states across the region and risk exacerbating anti-Western sentiment.
  • Benny Gantz’s withdrawal from the government coalition risks reducing broader Israeli representation within the current administration, raising unrest and policy risks.
  • Increasing tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border will drive further escalation and IDF strikes into southern Lebanon, though an imminent escalation of ground operations remains unlikely in the coming week.
  • Gaza Strip: On 8 June, the IDF conducted a hostage rescue operation in Nuseirat (Deir al-Balah governorate, Gaza) using heavy bombing to cover their exfiltration; the action highly likely caused a large number of Palestinian casualties. The IDF managed to rescue the four hostages alive and employed heavy fire from the ground, sea and air to facilitate the extraction. This caused a large Palestinian death toll, and it is unclear how many civilian casualties there are; reports on the total casualties range between 100 to 274. This is the third successful hostage rescue operation since 7 October, reflecting the low success rate and challenges associated with such operations, including civilian casualties.
  • West Bank: Overnight on 9 June, two Palestinians, one of whom was armed, set fire to a home trailer in Sde Ephraim (an illegal Israeli farm outpost, Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) causing no casualties. The IDF has launched a manhunt for the suspects, elevating mobility risks in the central West Bank. The incident reflects growing ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation in the West Bank, elevating attack risks by both Palestinian militants and Israeli settlers.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah (LH) continued its gradual escalation of cross-border hostilities with the deepest drone strike to date and the targeting of IDF fighter jets. On 8 June, an explosive drone launched from Lebanon detonated in an open area in the Jezreel Valley, near Nazareth (Northern governorate), causing no casualties or major damage. The IDF failed to intercept the drone, which reached 24 miles (40km) deep into Israel, signalling the deepest drone strike since 7 October. On 9 June, an LH cell targeted IDF fighter jets using anti-aircraft missiles also for the first time since 7 October. The IDF responded with a drone strike targeting the cell in the Tyre area (South governorate). We assess that while there is a growing risk of LH targeting IDF jet fighters with surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, it is unlikely that LH used them in this incident. Nevertheless, the targeting of manned aircraft, even with low-capability or short-range anti-aircraft missiles signals another escalation. In response, the IDF is likely to further increase its attacks in Lebanon over the coming days. This continued gradual escalation elevates the risks of a significant IDF operation in Lebanon. We assess that a major ground operation remains unlikely in the coming week, but is an increasingly realistic possibility in the coming month.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Opposition leader Benny Gantz withdrew from the coalition government, highlighting increasing policy and protest risks amid heightened tensions between government factions. On 9 June, Benny Gantz withdrew the National Unity party from the coalition government, stating that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was prioritising coalition politics over the effective resolution of the Israel-Hamas War. Gantz and National Unity Knesset member (MK) Gadi Eisenkot also withdrew from the War Cabinet, highlighting an increasing crisis of representation amid elevated intra-coalition tensions. While Netanyahu’s coalition still retains a majority, the withdrawals will likely undermine its perceived legitimacy, exacerbating anti-government sentiment and driving protest activity in major urban centres. The withdrawals will also likely increase the influence of right-wing factions within the coalition, increasing policy risks (see FORECAST).
  • Anti-government protest activity continued to proliferate throughout Israel, elevating operational disruption risks nationwide. On 8 June, major cities saw numerous anti-government demonstrations calling for the government to secure additional hostage releases, stabilise the Northern district and call a general election. In Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), tens of thousands of protesters blocked the Ayalon highway, Begin Street and Kaplan Street, triggering localised, low-intensity clashes with mounted police units. The police also arrested over 30 protesters and employed water cannons, highlighting elevated bystander risks during demonstrations. Thousands of demonstrators also gathered in Haifa (Haifa district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), restricting movement through both cities. Smaller demonstrations also occurred in Beersheba and Mitzpe Ramon (both Southern district), Caesarea (Haifa district) and Hod Hasharon (Central district). Also on 8 June, farmers impacted by evacuations on the Israel-Lebanon border established temporary blockades at the Amiad junction on Highway 90 (Northern district) and the Karkur junction on Highway 65 (Haifa district). These demonstrations highlight proliferating anti-government protest activity amidst persistent insecurity and stalling ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, sustaining risks of temporary disruption to overland movement over the coming weeks.
  • On 10 June, the Knesset will vote on legislation that alters conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men, increasing protest risks, particularly in Jerusalem. The proposed legislation mandates that ultra-Orthodox men choose at the age of 21 between serving in the IDF, joining the workforce or engaging in non-military national service, along with progressively increasing recruitment targets for yeshiva graduates into the IDF (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 16 May 2024). The bill was originally introduced as a legislative stopgap in 2022, though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has likely revived efforts to pass the legislation amid concerns that the judiciary will uphold an ongoing court challenge to de facto conscription exemptions. Substantial changes to conscription practice would significantly increase tensions between Netanyahu’s Likud party and its ultra-Orthodox coalition partners which form a significant part of the government’s majority. However, at least two Likud MKs (including Defence Minister Yoav Gallant) have indicated they will vote against the legislation, increasing the likelihood that it will not pass the first reading. Continued tensions over conscription practices will likely trigger further protests from pro- and anti-conscription groups, particularly in the Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), Jerusalem and Tel Aviv areas, elevating risks of operational disruption over the coming days.
  • Increasing bilateral tensions between Israel and Colombia highlight elevated risks of trade restrictions. On 9 June, Colombia announced it would suspend coal exports to Israel in response to the Israel-Hamas war and ongoing IDF operations in southern Gaza . Colombia accounts for 50% of Israel’s coal imports, and, while the ban is unlikely to significantly increase short-term energy security concerns given a moderately diversified energy sector, prolonged restrictions will likely increase energy costs for consumers. There is also a realistic possibility that other sources of coal and wood charcoal imports, such as Indonesia, Paraguay and South Africa will adopt similar trade restrictions over the coming weeks, increasing threats to Israeli energy security. Amid elevated bilateral tensions linked to IDF operations in southern and central Gaza, Israel will likely remain vulnerable to targeted trade restrictions, elevating operational disruption risks.
  • The United Nations Secretary-General will add the IDF to a list of persistent wartime children’s rights violations, increasing reputational concerns for firms with operations in Israel. On 7 June, the Secretary-General formally notified Israel’s UN representatives that his office has added the IDF to a ‘List of Shame’ attached to the forthcoming annual report on wartime violations of children’s rights. The report will likely increase reputational concerns for firms with operations in Israel, particularly government-linked entities and firms in the defence and security sectors. The report will also likely trigger increased efforts to sanction Israel, particularly at the United Nations Security Council session on 26 June, which will review the report. While the US will likely veto resolutions implementing broad sanctions on Israel, the report will likely bolster efforts to sanction bilaterally through trade restrictions and arms embargoes, elevating compliance concerns.
  • US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken began a diplomatic tour of the Middle East on 10 June, underscoring continued diplomatic efforts to progress ceasefire negotiations. Blinken will visit Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Qatar over the coming days, likely to increase diplomatic pressure on Hamas to accept an Israeli-proposed ceasefire agreement (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 3 June 2024). Despite significant international pressure to accept the deal, Hamas is unlikely to accept the current proposal due to concerns that it will not establish a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Consequently, IDF combat operations in Gaza will almost certainly continue over the coming days, sustaining critical security risks throughout the enclave and driving regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jun 24. Hamas says it creates broad prospects for a ceasefire deal in Gaza.

  • Summary
  • Hamas says it puts the ball in Israel’s court while Israel contends Hamas rejected key elements of the U.S. ceasefire plan

Hamas on Wednesday said its “positive” response to a U.S. ceasefire plan for the eight-month-old war in the Gaza Strip opened a “wide pathway” to reach an agreement, but the outlook was uncertain as neither the Palestinian group nor Israel publicly committed to a deal.

Hamas submitted its formal response on Tuesday to a proposal outlined by U.S. President Joe Biden on May 31. Israel said the response was tantamount to a rejection while a Hamas official said the Palestinian group merely reiterated longstanding demands not met by the current plan.

Egypt and Qatar said they had received Hamas’ response but did not disclose the contents.

Early on Wednesday, Izzat al-Rishq, a member of Hamas’ political bureau, said in a statement the group’s answer was “responsible, serious and positive” and “opens up a wide pathway” for an accord.

Another Hamas official, who declined to be identified, told Reuters on Tuesday the response reaffirmed the movement’s stance that a ceasefire must lead to a permanent end to hostilities in Gaza, withdrawal of Israeli forces, reconstruction of the Palestinian enclave and release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel.

“We reiterated our previous stance. I believe there are no big gaps. The ball is now in the Israeli courtyard,” the official said.

The United States has said Israel accepted its proposal, but Israel has not publicly stated this. As Israel has continued assaults in central and southern Gaza that are among the bloodiest of the war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly said Israel would not commit to an end of its campaign in Gaza before Hamas is eliminated.

Hamas signals ‘readiness’ to negotiate Gaza truce

An Israeli official said on Tuesday the country had received Hamas’ answer via the mediators and that Hamas “changed all of the main and most meaningful parameters.”

The Israeli official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Hamas “has rejected the proposal for a hostage release that was presented by President Biden.”

Earlier a non-Israeli official briefed on the matter, who declined to be identified, said Hamas proposed a new timeline for a permanent ceasefire with Israel and withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, including Rafah.

The U.N. Security Council on Monday voted in favor of a U.S. resolution supporting the proposal outlined by Biden. Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri told Reuters on Tuesday that Hamas accepted the Security Council resolution and was ready to negotiate over the details of a ceasefire.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in Tel Aviv to meet Israeli officials on Tuesday, described the comments by Hamas as a “hopeful sign” but said they were not conclusive.

More important “is the word coming from Gaza and from the Hamas leadership in Gaza. That’s what counts, and that’s what we don’t have yet,” Blinken told reporters in Tel Aviv.

CEASEFIRE PLAN

Biden’s proposal envisages a ceasefire and phased release of Israeli hostages in Gaza in exchange for Palestinians jailed in Israel, ultimately leading to a permanent end to the war.

This would be a three-phase plan starting with an initial six-week ceasefire with an Israeli military withdrawal from populated areas of Gaza and the release of some hostages while “a permanent end to hostilities” is negotiated through mediators.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the Israeli official’s remarks on Tuesday. Earlier U.S. officials said they were reviewing Hamas’ response, as did Qatar and Egypt.

For months, negotiators from the U.S., Egypt and Qatar have been trying to mediate a ceasefire in the enclave of 2.3 m people.

Separately, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday said in a report to the Security Council that Israel’s army and security forces as well as Palestinian militants Hamas and Islamic Jihad killed and maimed children in 2023.

Israel is retaliating against Hamas, which rules Gaza, over an Oct. 7 attack by its militants.

More than 1,200 people were killed and over 250 taken hostage by Hamas during the raids, according to Israeli tallies. More than 100 hostages are believed to remain captive in Gaza.

Israel launched an air, ground and sea assault on the Palestinian territory, killing more than 37,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities. Gaza is in the grip of a humanitarian crisis due to widespread hunger, scarcity of essentials, infrastructure destruction and continuing displacement of civilians.

The U.S. military resumed bringing humanitarian aid into the enclave via a floating pier on Tuesday after a two-day halt due to bad weather, three U.S. officials said.

The pier was out of operation for 10 days for repairs, and briefly re-opened on Saturday. The U.N. still is not moving aid from the pier to warehouses while it reviews security. (Source: Reuters)

 

11 Jun 24. Israel Prepares for Northern War with Hezbollah, Intensifies Syria Strikes. For over six months, hostilities between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel have continued in parallel with the Gaza war, heightening fears of a wider regional conflict. On Sunday, Israel announced it had taken another step in preparing for a possible war on its northern front, with intensified covert strikes in Syria aimed at weapons sites, supply routes, and Iranian-linked commanders, according to regional officials and diplomats.

A notable escalation occurred on June 2, when an Israeli air raid near Aleppo killed 18 people, including an adviser with Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards, at a clandestine, fortified weapons site. Earlier in May, Israeli airstrikes targeted a convoy of trucks transporting missile parts to Lebanon and killed several Hezbollah operatives.

Jordan has also thwarted a suspected Iranian-led plot to smuggle weapons into the kingdom to aid opponents of the ruling monarchy, according to two Jordanian sources. The weapons, sent by Iranian-backed militias in Syria, were seized in March, with the cell members arrested. The cache included explosives and firearms intended for use by a Muslim Brotherhood cell allied with Hamas.

Since the onset of the Gaza war on October 7, Israel has increased its campaign against Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah. This low-level campaign, which had been ongoing for years, escalated significantly after the Gaza conflict began. Israeli strikes have killed dozens of IRGC and Hezbollah officers in Syria, up from just two last year, according to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

A direct confrontation between Iran and Israel occurred in April when Israel allegedly bombed an Iranian consular building in Damascus, killing a top IRGC commander. In retaliation, Iran launched approximately 300 missiles and drones at Israel, most of which were intercepted. Israel then conducted drone attacks on Iranian territory, temporarily reducing its strikes on Iranian proxies before resuming them.

The Israeli strikes in Syria have targeted advanced anti-aircraft weapons, heavy rockets, and precision-guidance systems for missiles. The June 2 attack near Aleppo highlighted Israel’s ability to strike fortified and concealed targets, aiming to weaken Hezbollah and Iran’s military capabilities before any potential conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Amid these developments, Hezbollah has continued to launch rockets and drones at Israeli positions along the Lebanon-Israel border, with daily exchanges of fire since October 8. Israeli strikes have killed around 240 Hezbollah fighters, including top commanders, in Lebanon and Syria since the start of the Gaza war, nearing the group’s losses in the 2006 war with Israel. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

10 Jun 24. Eyeing showdown with Hezbollah, Israel presses shadow campaign in Syria.

  • Summary
  • Israel targets Hezbollah weapons supplies in Syria: sources
  • Targets include Syrian air defences: Syrian source
  • June 2 strike hit weapons site in quarry: Syrian official
  • Israel’s Syria strikes picked up after lull: think-tank
  • Dozens of IRGC and Hezbollah officials killed: think tank

Israel has intensified covert strikes in Syria against weapons sites, supply routes and Iranian-linked commanders, seven regional officials and diplomats said, ahead of a threatened full-scale assault on Tehran’s key ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.

A June 2 air raid that killed 18 people, including an adviser with Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards, targeted a clandestine, fortified weapons site near Aleppo, three of the sources said. In May, an air strike hit a convoy of trucks headed to Lebanon carrying missile parts and another raid killed Hezbollah operatives, four said.

Israel has for years struck militant groups backed by arch-foe Iran in Syria and elsewhere, in a low-level campaign that burst into open confrontation after Israel and Palestinian group Hamas – another Iranian ally – went to war in Gaza on Oct. 7.

Israel has since killed dozens of Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Hezbollah officers in Syria, from just two last year before the Oct. 7 attack, according to a tally by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank.

The battle hit fever pitch in April when Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing the top IRGC commander for operations in the Levant. In retaliation, Iran fired some 300 missiles and drones at Israel, almost all of which were shot down. Israel then attacked Iranian territory with drones.

This direct confrontation, a first for the two countries, stopped there. Israel also briefly reduced the number of strikes it was carrying out against Iranian proxies, said Selin Uysal, a French diplomat seconded to the Washington Institute, citing the tally, which counted publicly-known attacks in the weeks immediately before and after.

“There was a slowdown” after the face-off in April, she said.

“But they are picking up again because of suspected Iranian weapons transfers to Lebanon. There is a kinetic effort in Syria and Lebanon to disrupt the supply chain between Iran and Hezbollah.”

Reuters interviewed three Syrian officials, an Israeli government official and three Western diplomats about Israel’s Syria campaign. The officials asked not to be named to talk freely about sensitive matters. (Source: Reuters)

 

11 Jun 24. UN Security Council backs Israel-Hamas ceasefire plan.

The United Nations Security Council on Monday backed a proposal outlined by President Joe Biden for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and urged the Palestinian militants to accept the deal aimed at ending the eight-month-long war.

Hamas welcomed the adoption of the U.S.-drafted resolution and said in a statement that it is ready to cooperate with mediators over implementing the principles of the plan “that are consistent with the demands of our people and resistance.”

Russia abstained from the U.N. vote, while the remaining 14 Security Council members voted in favor of the resolution supporting a three-phase ceasefire plan laid out by Biden on May 31 that he described as an Israeli initiative.

“Today we voted for peace,” U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield told the council after the vote.

The resolution welcomes the new ceasefire proposal, states that Israel has accepted it, calls on Hamas to agree to it and “urges both parties to fully implement its terms without delay and without condition.”

Algeria, the only Arab member of the council, supported the resolution because “we believe it can represent a step forward toward an immediate and lasting ceasefire,” Algeria’s U.N. Ambassador Amar Bendjama told the council.

“It offers a glimmer of hope to the Palestinians,” he said. “It’s time to halt the killing.”

The resolution also goes into detail about the proposal, and spells out that “if the negotiations take longer than six weeks for phase one, the ceasefire will still continue as long as negotiations continue.”

ISRAEL’S GOALS

However, it did not contain enough detail for Moscow. Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia asked what Israel had specifically agreed to and said the Security Council should not be signing up to agreements with “vague parameters.”

“We did not wish to block the resolution simply because it, as much as we understand, is supported by the Arab world,” Nebenzia told the council.

Israel’s U.N. Ambassador Gilad Erdan was present for the vote, but did not address the council. Instead, senior Israeli U.N. diplomat Reut Shapir Ben Naftaly told the body that Israel’s goals in Gaza had always been clear.

“Israel is committed to these goals – to free all the hostages, to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities and to ensure that Gaza does not pose a threat to Israel in the future,” she said. “It is Hamas that is preventing this war from ending. Hamas and Hamas alone.”

The council in March demanded for an immediate ceasefire and unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas.

For months, negotiators from the U.S., Egypt and Qatar have been trying to mediate a ceasefire. Hamas says it wants a permanent end to the war in the Gaza Strip and Israeli withdrawal from the enclave of 2.3 m people.

Israel is retaliating against Hamas, which rules Gaza, over an Oct. 7 attack by its militants.

More than 1,200 people were killed and over 250 taken hostage by Hamas on Oct. 7, according to Israeli tallies. More than 100 hostages are believed to remain captive in Gaza.

Israel launched an air, ground and sea assault on the Palestinian territory, killing more than 37,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities. (Source: Reuters)

 

 

07 Jun 24. US destroys eight Houthi UAS in 24 hours as UK targets drone bases. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported on June 6 that its forces successfully destroyed eight Houthi uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in 24 hours. Additionally, a coalition ship successfully engaged one UAS over the Red Sea. USCENTCOM forces also successfully destroyed two Houthi uncrewed surface vessels in the Red Sea. USCENTCOM determined these systems presented an imminent threat to US, coalition forces, and merchant vessels in the region. There were no injuries or damage reported by US, coalition, or commercial ships as a result of this activity. US intelligence suggests that the UAS are being launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen over the Red Sea. On May 30, the UK Ministry of Defence confirmed two locations near Hudaydah as being involved with the Houthi anti-shipping attacks, with a number of buildings identified as housing drone ground control facilities and providing storage for very long range drones, as well as surface to air weapons used to impede coalition operations to safeguard shipping in the region. Furthermore, a set of Houthi facilities at Ghulayfiqah, further south on the Yemeni coast, had also been identified as being involved in the command and control of their anti-shipping campaign. As a result of this intelligence, Royal Air Force Typhoon aircraft conducted strikes on the target buildings at these three locations. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

09 Jun 24.  Centrist politician Benny Gantz has resigned from Israel’s emergency government and called for early elections, accusing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of mishandling Israel’s war in Gaza. In a speech on Sunday evening, Gantz, a former general who joined Netanyahu’s coalition in the aftermath of Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, said he had decided to leave the government because the premier was preventing Israel “from moving forward to a true victory”. “Fateful strategic decisions are met with hesitancy and procrastination due to political considerations,” Gantz said. “In the autumn, a year after the disaster, we need to hold elections that will establish a government that will win the trust of the people . . . I call on Netanyahu: set a date.” In a wide-ranging speech, Gantz also backed a US-led push to free the roughly 120 Israeli hostages still held in Gaza via a deal with Hamas, and supported a commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding October 7. Recommended News in-depthIsrael-Hamas war Israel’s raid to free hostages takes ‘horrific’ toll on central Gaza Gantz’s departure follows months of tensions within Netanyahu’s coalition with far-right and ultrareligious groups over the course of the war, with Israel still far from its goals of destroying Hamas and securing the release of the hostages still held by the militant group. Gantz said last month that he would leave the government if Netanyahu did not agree to a new plan for the war and its aftermath by June 8. Netanyahu instantly rejected his demands, accusing Gantz of issuing “an ultimatum to the prime minister instead of issuing an ultimatum to Hamas”. But after Gantz’s departure — which he had postponed by a day following the rescue of four Israeli hostages in Gaza on Saturday — Netanyahu called on him to change his mind. “Israel is in an existential war on multiple fronts,” he wrote on X. “Benny, this is not the time to abandon the campaign — this is the time to join forces.” However, opposition politicians welcomed Gantz’s resignation, which was accompanied by that of his ally Gadi Eisenkot, who also joined the emergency government and war cabinet in the wake of Hamas’s attack. “It’s time to replace this extremist and failing government with one that will restore security for the people of Israel, bring the hostages home, rebuild the economy and restore Israel’s international standing,” Yair Lapid, head of the largest opposition group Yesh Atid, wrote on X. Polls suggest that if elections were held today, Gantz’s National Unity party would win the most votes. But since Netanyahu’s coalition holds 64 seats in Israel’s 120-seat parliament even without Gantz and his party, the former general’s departure will not automatically topple the government or trigger elections before they are due in 2026. However, it is likely to change the dynamics in Netanyahu’s coalition. While Gantz’s positions on many issues relating to the war — such as his support for an assault on Rafah — did not diverge much from Netanyahu’s, his presence provided a counterbalance to ultranationalists such as finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. Minutes after Gantz’s speech, Ben-Gvir demanded that he be allowed to replace him in the five-man war cabinet headed by Netanyahu that has overseen the conduct of the war. “The international pressure on Netanyahu will probably increase as he won’t have the protection of having [centrists like] Gantz and Eisenkot in the war cabinet,” said one diplomat. “But ultimately he still has the numbers. Unless the rightwing decide to leave, or drag him so far [on policies] that he has to say no, it looks like he will be OK for now.” (Source: FT.com)

 

07 Jun 24. Airstrike in Southern Lebanon Escalates Tensions on Israel-Hezbollah Front. On June 6, 2024, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the southern Lebanese town of Wadi Jilo, targeting Hezbollah infrastructure. This action comes amid escalating cross-border hostilities between Israel and the Hezbollah terror group. Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin, head of the IDF’s Northern Command, stated that the military is prepared to expand the conflict if necessary to end months of deadly exchanges.

This escalation follows a series of drone attacks by Hezbollah, including one on the northern Israeli town of Hurfeish, which resulted in the death of a reservist and injuries to ten others. On Thursday, the city of Kiryat Shmona was also impacted by an attack, causing property damage but no injuries. The IDF has been responding to these provocations with counterstrikes targeting Hezbollah operatives and infrastructure. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

07 Jun 24. Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Unveil New Solid-Fuel Missile “Palestine.”

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have revealed a new solid-fuel missile, dubbed the “Palestine,” which bears similarities to a previously displayed Iranian missile claimed to fly at hypersonic speeds. The Houthis launched the missile at the southern Gulf of Aqaba port of Eilat in Israel on Monday. The attack triggered air raid sirens but resulted in no reported damage or injuries.

Footage released by the Houthis on Wednesday showed the missile being elevated on a mobile launcher before rapidly ascending, emitting white smoke—a characteristic of solid-fuel missiles. These missiles can be deployed and fired more swiftly than liquid-fuel counterparts, an advantage for the Houthis whose launch sites have been frequently targeted by U.S. and allied forces.

The Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, stated that the “Palestine” missile was a locally made weapon. Despite these claims, the technical sophistication required for such missile and guidance systems suggests external support, likely from Iran. The Houthis have consistently received armaments from Iran throughout the conflict, despite a U.N. arms embargo. Seized shipments have contained Iranian weaponry, missile components, and fuel, contradicting Iran’s public denials of arming the Houthis.

Iranian media have echoed the Houthis’ claim of local manufacturing, but the missile’s design features align with those of the Fattah missile developed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The Fattah missile, unveiled last year, is reported to reach speeds of Mach 15 and has a range of up to 1,400 kilometers, slightly less than the distance from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen to Eilat.

Hypersonic missiles, traveling faster than Mach 5, pose significant challenges to missile defense systems due to their speed and ability to maneuver unpredictably. This makes them difficult to intercept compared to traditional ballistic missiles with predictable trajectories.

The launch is part of a broader pattern of Houthi attacks in solidarity with Palestinians amidst the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The Houthis have also conducted joint operations with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance, targeting ships in Israel’s Haifa port. These operations have intensified international shipping risks through the Red Sea corridor, drawing retaliatory strikes from the U.S. and Britain since February. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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