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NEWS IN BRIEF – ISRAEL – HAMAS CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

May 16.

KEY POINTS

  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has gradually expanded its Rafah operation, adding a third brigade to its forces in eastern Rafah (though the operation remains limited in its scope).
  • Lebanese Hizballah (LH) conducted its deepest confirmed drone attack into Israel in retaliation for an IDF strike that killed a senior commander; the uptick in hostilities and retaliatory strikes will likely persist in the coming days.
  • Gaza Strip: On 15 May, the IDF concluded its operation in Zeitoun in central Gaza; the Rafah operation continues to expand slowly. The operation in Zeitoun lasted a week. It marked the third time that the IDF has conducted operations in the area, underscoring militants’ capacity to return to previously cleared areas repeatedly. Furthermore, overnight on 15 May, the IDF Commando Brigade joined Brigade 401 and the Givati Brigade in operations in eastern Rafah under the command of Division 162. The addition of the Commando Brigade to the fighting highlights the gradual expansion of the Rafah operation, which is likely to continue in the coming days; it will possibly expand towards central Rafah.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah (LH) conducted its deepest strike into Israel following Israel’s assassination of a senior commander. On 14 May, the IDF conducted a drone strike in southern Lebanon, killing Hussein Ibrahim Makki, a senior field commander of the LH Southern Front unit. In response, LH launched over 60 rockets on 15 May towards Mount Meron Air Traffic Control base and Biranit base. Additionally, on the same day, LH launched two drones towards the Tiberias area (Northern district) marking the deepest confirmed drone incursion since the start of the war. One drone was intercepted by air defences and the other struck a sensitive military site near the Golani Interchange, located around 21 miles (35km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. The site hosts a missile-detecting blimp known as Sky Dew. The IDF confirmed the strike and announced that it is still assessing the damage, indicating that the system is indeed possibly damaged. In response, the IDF struck targets in Baalbek-Hermel governorate (Lebanon) overnight on 15 May, hitting several locations near al-Nabi Shayth and Brital, as well as a weapons factory. On 16 May, the uptick in cross-border hostilities continued; LH retaliated by launching over 60 rockets towards the northern Golan Heights and Upper Galilee. The frequency and intensity of the attacks, as well as the nature of the targets, highlight yet another escalation in the conflict (though operations remain limited in scope and are currently unlikely to develop into a full front).
  • West Bank: Militants in Qalqilya and Tulkarm employed explosives during clashes with the IDF, underlining the proliferation of armaments in the West Bank. The explosives were used while Palestinian militants attempted to resist IDF operations on the night of 15 May to arrest persons wanted in connection with terror financing. These incidents highlight the continued escalation of militant activity and terror financing in the West Bank, particularly in the north of the territory.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • The US has installed a temporary pier off the Gaza coastline, increasing aid delivery capacity. On 16 May, the US military successfully anchored the pier off the coast and announced that aid deliveries would begin on 17 May. The construction reflects continued efforts to increase aid deliveries into Gaza and to avoid bottlenecks and delays associated with overland deliveries (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 9 May 2024). The US has also stated that the UN will distribute aid deliveries through the pier, though ongoing combat operations in northern, central and southern Gaza will almost certainly sustain the threats to humanitarian staff and operations. As such, further disruption to aid distribution will sustain humanitarian concerns throughout Gaza, particularly in Rafah.
  • Anti-aid protests targeting aid convoys have escalated in the West Bank, increasing the risks of misidentification. On 13 May, anti-aid activists associated with the Tzav 9 group stopped a convoy en route to Gaza at the Turkumiya checkpoint (Hebron governorate), looting aid supplies. Activists remained at the checkpoint and subsequently conducted an overnight arson attack against another vehicle. On 15 May, Israeli activists attacked a commercial vehicle near the Givat Asaf settlement outpost (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate), looting the contents and assaulting the driver. While this incident likely resulted from activists misidentifying the truck as an aid vehicle, continued protests will sustain the likelihood of violence and looting targeting trucks moving through the West Bank. Increasingly violent protest activity will elevate the likelihood of disruption to overland movement and supply chain continuity, while staff will face elevated risks of harassment and targeted violence.
  • On 15 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed legislation reforming ultra-Orthodox conscription, elevating tensions within the coalition. Ultra-Orthodox men are broadly exempt from serving in the IDF so long as they remain in full-time religious studies until the age of 26. The proposed legislation mandates that ultra-Orthodox men choose at the age of 21 between serving in the IDF, joining the workforce or engaging in non-military national service, along with progressively increasing recruitment targets for yeshiva graduates into the IDF. The legislation was originally proposed by the former defence minister and current opposition leader Benny Gantz in 2022 as a legislative stopgap. However, Gantz now opposes the legislation’s implementation, citing demographic changes and evolving security needs linked to the Israel-Hamas war. The Attorney General has also indicated that the legislation will likely face numerous legal challenges; the current defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has stated that he will oppose the proposal if it does not receive broad coalition support, undermining its viability.
  • Increasing disputes related to the post-war governance of Gaza highlight elevated coalition tensions that are undermining government stability. On 15 May, Gallant made a televised address stating that insufficient post-war planning is undermining the IDF’s military progress in Gaza and that he will not allow the IDF to engage in long-term governance of the enclave. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded by indicating that he would not engage in long-term governance planning until the IDF dismantles Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. Netanyahu also reiterated his opposition to the Palestinian Authority (PA) administering the territory following combat operations. Continued tensions between Gallant and Netanyahu amid broader disputes within the coalition government will likely undermine efforts to form and implement a long-term governance strategy in Gaza.
  • US President Joe Biden will seek procedural approval for over USD 1 billion in munitions sales to Israel, highlighting close relations despite elevated tensions. The package includes mortar shells, tank rounds and tactical vehicles. These will likely replace stocks of munitions used in IDF operations in Gaza. Despite elevated tensions linked to IDF operations in Rafah and the Biden administration’s restriction of certain weapons sales to Israel (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 9 May 2024), the prospective sale indicates that bilateral relations remain strong. The US is highly likely to continue selling munitions and fighter jets to Israel in the coming months, moderating regulatory and supply chain disruption risks for firms within the defence and security sector.
  • Pro-Palestine demonstrators clashed with the police in Athens (Greece) during protests near the Israeli embassy, highlighting persistent global bystander and collateral risks. On 16 April, approximately 2,500 demonstrators gathered near the embassy, where numerous participants threw stones at the building and clashed with security personnel. As the Israel-Hamas war continues to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions worldwide, assets close to Israeli-linked entities, such as embassies and trade missions, will likely continue facing elevated collateral risks, particularly in the event of clashes with the security forces.

FORECAST

The current uptick in hostilities between Israel and LH is likely to continue for at least the coming days. In response to the launch of 60 rockets against strategic positions in northern Israel on 16 May, the IDF is likely to retaliate with more targeted drone strikes on LH commanders. Additionally, the IDF is likely to increase the number of strikes in southern Lebanon as well as in Baalbek-Hermel. LH in turn is likely to increase its rocket (and particularly drone) launches against Israel in an effort to test how the possible damage to the Mount Meron base and blimp has affected Israel’s air defences. This will further elevate the risk environment in northern Israel, particularly near the Israel-Lebanon border. Security and bystander security risks will remain elevated in northern Israel, southern Lebanon, including Tyre (South governorate), and Baalbek-Hermel in the coming days. While further successful LH incursions deeper into parts of Israel such as the Tiberias area remain unlikely in the coming days, the incident on 15 May (see Military Developments) indicates LH’s growing capability and a possible escalation in the scale of the conflict. The frequency of long-range drone strikes is likely to remain low in the coming days, though it will likely gradually increase in the coming months. Nevertheless, while the current uptick points to an increased risk of ‘snowballing’ escalation, we assess that hostilities are presently unlikely to evolve into a full-scale conflict in the coming days.

Reforms to ultra-Orthodox conscription will elevate threats to government stability and risks of protest activity, particularly in Jerusalem. Ultra-Orthodox parties will almost certainly oppose the reforms and seek further exemptions to conscription practices, while more centrist coalition parties will likely oppose the legislation given broader economic and security concerns. Disputes relating to the post-war governance of Gaza will likely further exacerbate these tensions, elevating the risk of policy stagnation. While there is a realistic possibility of various parties threatening to dissolve the coalition over the coming weeks, withdrawals are unlikely to result in the coalition losing its majority, moderating risks of government instability in the short term. Even so, as changes to conscription practices are highly contentious, proposed reforms will likely escalate ethno-religious tensions and elevate risks of protest activity by both ultra-Orthodox and secular communities. Demonstrations are most likely in locations with significant ultra-Orthodox populations, such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem. Demonstrations will likely disrupt overland movement along key thoroughfares and there is a realistic possibility of clashes with the security forces, which will in turn elevate collateral and bystander risks.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
  • Operations in Rafah escalate significantly in their intensity and breadth
  • An IDF targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)

May 15.

*US-Israel: Continuation of aid to Israel will likely sustain domestic unrest risks in short term. On 14 May, the US State Department moved a USD 1 bn weapons package for Israel into the congressional review process. The package draws from the USD 26 bn supplemental bill passed in April and includes tank rounds, mortars and armoured tactical vehicles. However, President Joe Biden has still delayed a shipment of high payload bombs over concerns about a major invasion into Rafah (Palestinian Territories). In response, House Republicans drafted a bill requiring Biden to send offensive weapons to Israel. A vote will be held on 16 May, though Biden has stated that he would veto the bill if it is passed. In the short term, a continuation of military aid will possibly trigger further activism in major urban centres and on university campuses. Bystander risks will be sustained in areas adjacent to any large-scale protests. In the near term, we assess that the conditioning of aid to Israel will continue to increase partisanship and policy risks, possibly resulting in policy stagnation ahead of November’s election.

May 13.

KEY POINTS

  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded its limited operation in Eastern Rafah and opened an operation in Jabalia, northern Gaza, in response to the return of militants to previously cleared areas.
  • Cross-border hostilities are likely to continue to increase in response to the further expansion of operations in Rafah.
  • Israel’s Memorial Day and Independence Day (12-14 May), as well as Palestinian Nakba Day (15 May) will further elevate ethno-religious and security risks across Israel.
  • Gaza Strip: Over the monitoring period Israel further expanded its limited operation in Rafah, southern Gaza, as well as opened an operation in Jabalia, northern Gaza. While Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded their operation in Rafah on 11 May, the operation remains limited to parts of eastern Rafah. Israel will likely continue to conduct Rafah operations in this piecemeal manner, advancing into small parts of the territory one by one. Regardless, in response to the Rafah operations, there has been an uptick in cross-border rocket fire into southern Israel, primarily targeting Kerem Shalom and Sderot, but with one barrage also hitting Beersheba on 10 May. Additionally, on 12 May, Israel opened a new military operation in Jabaliya, northern Gaza, underlining the return of Palestinian militants to areas the IDF had previously cleared. Furthermore, it highlighted the limited ability of the IDF to secure lasting solutions to terrorism and militancy without civil infrastructure to replace Hamas.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah (LH) increased its cross-border hostilities, increasing drone launches towards northern Israel. In the early morning of 13 May, two LH drones exploded near Beit Hillel, causing a small fire but no casualties. The drones successfully breached Israeli airspace without triggering alarms. The incident reflects the growing capabilities of LH and increased knowledge of Israel’s air defence systems. This trend will likely drive a gradual increase in security risks across northern Israel, particularly near military positions, including Iron Dome launchers. Additionally, later that day, an LH barrage of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) in the Yiftah area, injured four IDF soldiers. The incident reflects continued LH probing operations on the Israel-Lebanon border area and the targeting of military personnel, increasing the risk of misidentification near the border area.
  • West Bank: Ethno-religious tensions remain high amid Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian communities. On 12 May, unknown individuals, likely Israeli settlers, set fire to a house in Duma (Nablus governorate). Vandalism on the targeted property was consistent with symbols used by members of either Israel’s far-right or settlers during attacks on Palestinians. The attack underscores elevated security risks in the West Bank, particularly during the Israeli Memorial and Independence Days (12-14 May) and Nakba Day (15 May).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • In Israel and the West Bank, an uptick in violence and protests targeting NGOs active in Gaza highlights increasing threats to staff and assets. On 13 May, unidentified individuals conducted two arson attacks targeting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in Jerusalem. Though the resulting fire did not result in any injuries or damage to UNRWA facilities, the attacks highlight increasing risks of low-capacity attacks targeting aid organisation facilities, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Additionally, protest activity continues to target aid convoys travelling to Gaza via the West Bank. On 13 April, Israeli protesters associated with the anti-aid, Tzav 9 group targeted a humanitarian convoy near the Turkumiya checkpoint (Hebron governorate, West Bank), stopping a vehicle and looting aid supplies. Further incidents of targeted protest activity and violence are highly likely over the coming weeks, increasing risks of operational disruption for NGOs in Israel and security threats to staff and facilities.
  • Protest activity continues at pace, with demonstrations around Memorial Day underscoring increasing anti-government sentiment. On 13 May, protesters heckled government representatives at numerous Memorial Day ceremonies throughout Israel, highlighting increasing anti-government sentiment amidst stalling hostage release negotiations. On 11 May, thousands of demonstrators attended the weekly demonstration calling for hostage releases and a general election. In Tel Aviv, police employed water cannons and conducted approximately 30 arrests, while smaller demonstrations also occurred in Haifa (Haifa district) and Jerusalem. Increasing protest attendance will sustain the risks of police employing increasingly assertive dispersal techniques, elevating incidental risks to bystanders. Nevertheless, widespread unrest and violence remain unlikely, moderating risks to assets in major population centres.
  • Tensions within the Israeli government coalition continue to delay key spending decisions, increasing risks of unrest in the West Bank and sustaining broader policy risks. On 12 May, the Palestinian Authority announced it would be unable to pay public sector employees’ salaries in full due to the Israeli Finance Ministry delaying fund transfers. The Finance Ministry has indefinitely delayed the transfer of approximately USD 46 m of taxes collected on behalf of the PA during April but has not commented on the delay. The PA has stated it will be able to pay approximately 50% of staff salaries, increasing short-term socio-economic health concerns and risks of protest activity, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Similarly, on 10 May, numerous media outlets reported that in April, Smotrich had vetoed the approval of the procurement of two new fighter jet squadrons financed by US military aid until the Knesset defence budget committee is convened. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is highly likely to overrule Smotrich and ensure the squadrons are purchased imminently, continued delays to public spending decisions and financial transfers underscore elevated tensions within the coalition government, sustaining policy risks in the short to medium term.
  • South Africa requested additional provisional measures from the ICJ in its case against Israel, while Egypt has announced it will join the case, highlighting increasing regional tensions. On 10 May, South Africa filed an urgent request with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), calling for the court to issue provisional measures preventing the IDF’s expansion of operations into Rafah. The request forms part of South Africa’s case which alleges that Israel’s operations in Gaza violate the 1948 Genocide convention (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 26 January 2024). Although the ICJ is unlikely to rule in favour of the request, continued contestation of the IDF’s operations will likely continue driving protest activity both regionally and globally. Proceedings at the ICJ will also sustain elevated reputational concerns for firms linked to the Israeli government, particularly in the security and defence sectors. Subsequently, on 12 May, Egypt announced it would join South Africa’s case, highlighting increasing regional tensions (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 13 May 2024). Despite this move, however, Egypt and Israel’s trade relations will likely remain strong, with security co-ordination likely continuing, particularly relating to the Rafah border crossing and administration of the Philadelphi corridor.

FORECAST

Further IDF operations in Rafah are highly likely, elevating security risks in southern Gaza, and southern and northern Israel. Gaza-based militants will almost certainly resist IDF operations, with resultant clashes sustaining critical threats to life in southern Gaza for civilians and NGO staff. Additionally, Gaza-based militants will likely increase the frequency of rocket launches towards southern Israel, including Beersheba (Southern), to clear weapons caches and prevent the IDF from capturing munitions. Furthermore, LH is likely to further increase the frequency and intensity of rocket and drone launches towards Israel in response to further operations in Rafah. These will sustain significant security risks near the Israel-Lebanon border and will further elevate security risks in the rest of northern Israel. LH is highly likely to continue targeting military positions, and there is a realistic possibility of attacks on key military bases and infrastructure such as Mount Meron and the Northern Command in Safed (Northern). These will further elevate risks for bystanders, including misidentification risks, while the IDF will likely respond by conducting strikes deep within Lebanese territory, including in the Baalbek-Hermel governorate.

Israel’s Independence Day (13-14 May) and Palestinian Nakba Day (15 May) will further elevate security risks throughout Israel. Both dates will elevate risks of cross-border fire from Palestinian and pro-Palestinian militants in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Furthermore, there are increased risks of attacks by radicalised and militant Palestinians as well as Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The risk of shooting and car-ramming attacks on West Bank roads near Israeli settlements and near Israeli security force positions will be heightened. Risks of arson and shooting will also remain elevated, particularly near Palestinian villages. Additionally, risks of sole perpetrator attacks, particularly stabbing, will remain elevated in Jerusalem, particularly East Jerusalem and the Old City in the coming days. These will elevate bystander security risks throughout the week.

Elevated protest activity in Israel will likely continue over the coming days, driving risks of violent clashes with police forces and traffic disruption, particularly in central Israel. Anti-government protests are most likely in Tel Aviv, particularly during the evening of Israel’s Independence Day on 13 May and broader Independence Day celebrations on 14 May. Protests are also likely throughout Israel, with some organisers replacing traditional celebrations of the day with anti-government and hostage release protest events. These will also elevate the risks of further elevated protest activity in the days following Israel Independence Day. While most protests will likely remain peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of protesters in Tel Aviv clashing with police, particularly if they attempt to block the Aylon Highway. Clashes and police attempts to disperse protesters will sustain elevated bystander security risks in and around Tel Aviv, particularly on Kaplan Street, in the coming days.

Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):

  • A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
  • High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
  • Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
  • Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
  • An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
  • US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
  • Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas leadership in Lebanon
  • The ongoing IDF ground operation expands into Rafah

*Egypt-Israel: Security, trade ties will likely remain strong despite Cairo’s support for genocide case. On 12 May, Egypt announced that it intends to back South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Egypt cites the worsening humanitarian situation and attacks by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against the Palestinian population in Gaza. The announcement comes against the backdrop of Israel’s limited operation in eastern Rafah on 6 May, during which it took control over the Rafah border crossing. On 11 May, the IDF expanded its operation. The announcement signals Egypt’s growing concern about Israel’s operations in Gaza, particularly Rafah. However, we assess that the move is unlikely to affect Egypt-Israel trade co-operation in the short term, particularly over energy and gas. Egypt is likely to continue to condemn Israeli actions in Rafah, though the two will likely continue to co-operate on border security, particularly in Rafah and southern Israel. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 May 24. Admiral: Success of Red Sea Operations Are a Tribute to Sailors, Systems. Navy vessels have been plying the Red Sea since December as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a U.S.-led, multinational coalition established to counter attacks by Houthi terrorists on merchant and naval vessels.

“Our forces are engaged in the Red Sea right now we’ve not seen since probably World War II. I mean, those ships are operating inside weapon engagement zones. They have to be prepared on a moment’s notice to conduct engagements, and they have to get it right every single time,” said Navy Rear Adm. Fred Pyle, director of the Surface Warfare Division, at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event yesterday.

“I could not be more proud of how those sailors are performing over the last six months and also how the systems are performing, given what they’re operating in,” he said.

They’re engaging enemy antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as unmanned systems, Pyle said, while also navigating through waters at night where merchant vessels are steaming.

The integrated air- and missile-defense on these ships provides a layered defense distant, close in, and in between, he said, adding that aircraft from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier are also playing a vital role in the mission.

Expensive missiles are being shot at much cheaper drones, the admiral acknowledged.

“Should we find a more cost-effective way of downing say, an inexpensive drone? Absolutely. And we’re working towards that,” he said, adding that there are solutions being considered, but he couldn’t get into more detail because of the classified nature of that effort.

Allies and partners are a vital part of the effort. More than 24 nations are supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian, he noted.

“It’s always good to have an international face on an effort where you’re trying to maintain the flow of global commerce,” he said.

Many months of training have paid off for this mission, particularly in utilizing virtual, live and constructive simulations, Pyle said.

The admiral said that two key lessons learned from the conflicts in the Red Sea and Ukraine are that the services need to increase their munitions stocks and increase the means to resupply anywhere in the world.

“We’re very focused on getting our munitions inventories increased,” he said. “We’re in a sustainable position right now, given what we’re seeing in the Red Sea.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

15 May 24. IDF Strike Destroys Hamas Command Center in UNRWA School. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on a Hamas command center located within a United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) school in central Gaza’s Nuseirat, resulting in the deaths of over 15 terrorist operatives. Among the deceased were 10 members of Hamas, including operatives from Hamas’s elite Nukhba force, who were involved in the October 7 attack on Israel.

The strike, carried out by IDF fighter jets, was based on “accurate intelligence” provided by the Shin Bet security agency and the Military Intelligence Directorate. The IDF emphasized that the operation was carefully planned and executed using precise munitions to minimize civilian casualties. According to the IDF and Shin Bet, the command center had been used by Hamas to orchestrate attacks against Israeli troops operating in central Gaza in recent weeks.

Footage released earlier by the IDF showed Hamas terrorists armed with automatic rifles utilizing a logistics center and warehouse operated by UNRWA within the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. In the video, Hamas members were seen near UN workers and vehicles, patrolling around the warehouse, and at times shooting at the building.

The IDF’s statement highlighted that the strike targeted a Hamas war room embedded inside the UNRWA school, which was used by Hamas commanders for planning multiple attacks. The Nukhba terrorists killed in the strike were reportedly involved in previous ambushes and attacks on IDF troops in the Gaza Strip.

Additionally, earlier on Tuesday, IDF Division 98 killed dozens of Hamas terrorists in Jabalya, northern Gaza, marking the largest battle in the area since mid-March. Meanwhile, smaller battles continued in Rafah and Zeitoun, involving IDF Divisions 162 and 99, respectively, resulting in further casualties among Hamas fighters. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

15 May 24. Jordan foils arms plot as kingdom caught in Iran-Israel shadow war.

  • Summary
  • Weapons sent from militias in Syria – sources
  • Arrested Brotherhood cell linked to Hamas
  • Brotherhood official says suspects acted alone
  • Jordan’s king faces growing perils amid Gaza war

Jordan has foiled a suspected Iranian-led plot to smuggle weapons into the U.S.-allied kingdom to help opponents of the ruling monarchy carry out acts of sabotage, according to two Jordanian sources with knowledge of the matter.

The weapons were sent by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to a cell of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan that has links to the military wing of Palestinian group Hamas, the people told Reuters. The cache was seized when members of the cell, Jordanians of Palestinian descent, were arrested in late March, they said.

The alleged plot and arrests, reported here for the first time, come at a time of sky-high tensions in the Middle East, with an American-backed Israel at war in Gaza with Hamas, part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” network of proxy groups built up over decades to oppose Israel.

The two Jordanian sources, who requested anonymity to discuss security matters, declined to say what acts of sabotage were allegedly being planned, citing ongoing investigations and covert operations.

They said the plot’s aim was to destabilize Jordan, a country that could become a regional flashpoint in the Gaza crisis as it hosts a U.S. military base and shares borders with Israel as well as Syria and Iraq, both home to Iranian-backed militias.

The sources didn’t specify what weapons were seized in the March raid, though said in recent months security services have thwarted numerous attempts by Iran and its allied groups to smuggle in arms including Claymore mines, C4 and Semtex explosives, Kalashnikov rifles and 107mm Katyusha rockets.

Most of the clandestine flow of arms into the country has been bound for the neighbouring Israeli-occupied West Bank Palestinian territory, according to the Jordanian sources. However, some of the weapons – including those seized in March – were intended for use in Jordan by the Brotherhood cell allied to Hamas militants, they said.

“They hide these weapons in pits called dead spots, they take their location via GPS and photograph their location and then instruct men to retrieve them from there,” said one of the sources, an official with knowledge of security matters, referring to the modus operandi of the smugglers.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Islamist movement, of which Hamas is an offshoot founded in the 1980s. The movement says it does not advocate violence, and Jordan’s Brotherhood has operated legally in the kingdom for decades.

Jordanian authorities believe Iran and its allied groups like Hamas and Lebanon’s Hezbollah are trying to recruit young, radical members of the kingdom’s Brotherhood to their anti-Israel, anti-U.S. cause in a bid to expand the Tehran’s regional network of aligned forces, according to the two sources.

A senior representative of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood confirmed that some of its members were arrested in March in possession of weapons but said whatever they did was not approved by the group and that he suspected they were smuggling arms to the West Bank rather than planning acts in Jordan.

“There is dialogue between the Brotherhood and the authorities. They know if there are mistakes it’s not the MB, only individuals and not MB policy,” said the representative, asking not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Another senior figure in Brotherhood, who also requested anonymity, told Reuters the arrested cell members had been recruited by Hamas chief Saleh al-Arouri, who masterminded the Palestinian group’s operations in the West Bank from exile in Lebanon. Arouri was killed by a drone strike in Beirut in January in an attack widely attributed to Israel.

Spokespeople for the Jordanian government and the U.S. Department of Defense declined to comment for this article, while the Iranian foreign ministry wasn’t immediately available. Israeli officials from the prime minister’s office and foreign ministry didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

Over the past year, Jordan has said it has foiled many attempts by infiltrators linked to pro-Iranian militias in Syria who it says have crossed its borders with rocket launchers and explosives, adding that some of the weapons managed to get through undetected. Iran has denied being behind such attempts.

IN A FIX: JORDAN’S KING ABDULLAH

Jordan’s King Abdullah is walking a tightrope.

Most of his 11 m people are of Palestinian origin, because Jordan took in ms of Palestinian refugees fleeing their homeland in the turbulent years following the founding of Israel. The Gaza crisis has put him in a tough position, struggling to reconcile support for the Palestinian cause with a long-standing U.S. alliance and decades-old recognition of Israel.

The war has sparked widespread public anger, with calls by protesters to cut ties with Israel and street demonstrations erupted in recent week.

Last month, after Jordan joined a U.S.-led effort to help Israel in downing salvos of drones and missiles fired by Iran, critics posted concocted images on social media of the king wrapped in an Israeli flag with comments such as “traitor” and “Western puppet”.

The disconnect between the government’s position and public sentiment has never been more pronounced in the wake of the shooting down of the drones, according to Jordanian journalist Bassam Badari.

“There was discontent,” he said. “Jordan used to skilfully stand at an equal distance from all the countries in the region, but with its intervention Jordan aligned itself with the American axis.”

Adding to Abdullah’s concerns, any tension with the Brotherhood could also carry risks, said two Jordanian politicians who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter. The group commands wide popular support in the country.

Jordanian authorities have not spoken publicly about the alleged weapons plot and the arrests.

One of the two Jordanian sources with knowledge of the alleged plot said intelligence officials had called in 10 senior Brotherhood figures to inform them that they arrested a cell that acted as a bridge between their movement and Hamas.

‘NO SUCH THING AS A JORDAN OPTION’

The Jordanian decision to join Western powers in the downing of Iranian drones bound for Israel was partly driven by fears among officials that the kingdom could be sucked into Iran’s strategic struggle against Israel, according to Saud Al Sharafat, a former brigadier-general in the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate.

“The Iranians have instructions to recruit Jordanians and penetrate the Jordan arena through agents,” he added. “Their recruitment efforts span all segments of society.”

Another motivating force for Jordan, according to many officials and diplomats in the region, was the unprecedented attack on a U.S. military base in Jordan in January by Iran-aligned groups based in Iraq, which left three U.S. soldiers dead and 40 injured. The attack was reportedly in support of Hamas in its war with Israel.

A diplomat close to Tehran said the Iranian ambition to establish a proxy foothold in Jordan went back to Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards who was assassinated by the U.S. in 2020.

Soleimani believed that given Jordan’s strong ties with the U.S. and the West, building up an allied group there capable of fighting Israel was crucial to Tehran’s strategic ascendancy in the region, the diplomat told Reuters.

The hostility between Iran and Jordan dates back to 2004, in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, when King Abdullah accused Iran of trying to create a “Shi’ite crescent” to expand its regional power.

King Abdullah defended his decision to shoot down the drones as an act of self-defence, not carried out for the benefit of Israel. He warned that “Jordan will not be a battlefield for any party”.

The military intervention also aimed to signal to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government that Jordan was a crucial buffer zone for regional security, according to the two Jordanian politicians.

The Jordanian monarchy supports the establishment of a Palestinian state. While some right-wing politicians in Israel have envisaged Jordan becoming an alternative Palestinian state, King Abdullah has repeatedly warned that there is no such thing as a “Jordan option”.

“The official position is that a two-state solution is not only in Palestinians’ interest,” said Marwan Muasher, a former Jordanian foreign minister who is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think-tank.

“It is also in Jordan’s interests because it will establish a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil rather than a state on Jordan’s soil.” (Source: Reuters)

 

13 May 24. Israeli forces press Gaza offensive from north and south.

  • Summary
  • First foreign United Nations staff member killed
  • Hamas’ armed wing says it has lost contact with militants guarding four Israeli hostages, including Hersh Goldberg-Polin
  • Aid agency says Al-Mawasi not set up to receive displaced, has health concerns

CAIRO, May 13 (Reuters) – Israeli forces pushed deep into the ruins of Gaza’s northern edge on Monday to recapture an area from Hamas fighters, while in the south tanks and troops pushed across a highway into Rafah, leaving Palestinian civilians scrambling to find safety.

Some of the most intense fighting for weeks is raging in both the north and south. Israeli operations in Rafah, which borders Egypt, have closed a main crossing point for aid. Humanitarian groups say this has worsened an already dire situation.

Hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing again. Around half of Gaza’s population took sanctuary there after Israel ordered evacuations from northern Gaza in October.

Gaza’s health authority appealed for international pressure to reopen access via the southern border to allow in aid, medical supplies and fuel to power generators and ambulances.

“The wounded and sick suffer a slow death because there is no treatment and supplies and they cannot travel,” it said.

A foreign U.N. security staff member was killed on Monday when a U.N.-marked vehicle travelling to a hospital in Rafah was struck – the first international U.N. fatality in the Gaza war, a U.N. spokesperson said, bringing the total death toll of U.N. personnel to around 190.

In northern Gaza’s Jabalia, a sprawling refugee camp built for displaced Palestinians 75 years ago, Israeli forces pushed into an area where they claimed to have dismantled Hamas months ago.

Residents fled along rubble-strewn streets carrying bags of belongings. Tank shells landed in the centre of the camp and health officials said they had recovered 20 bodies from overnight airstrikes.

“We don’t know where to go. We have been displaced from one place to the next… We are running in the streets. I saw it with my own eyes. I saw the tank and the bulldozer. It is on that street,” said one woman, who did not give her name.

An Israeli air strike on a house in Al-Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza Strip killed at least eight people, said Mahmoud Basal, a spokesperson of the Gaza Civil Emergency Service. He said several other people were wounded and missing.

The Palestinian death toll in the war has now surpassed 35,000, with 57 killed in the past 24 hours, according to Gaza health officials, whose figures do not differentiate between civilians and fighters.

Israeli troops are seeking to wipe out Hamas. A senior U.S. State Department official on Monday said Washington did not think that goal of total victory was “likely or possible.” The militant group, which has said it is committed to Israel’s destruction, burst into Israel on Oct. 7, killing 1,200 and taking more than 250 hostages, by Israeli tallies.

Hamas’ armed wing said because of Israeli bombardments it had lost contact with militants guarding four Israeli hostages, including U.S.-Israeli citizen Hersh Goldberg-Polin, who appeared in a video released by Hamas in late April.

Attending a Memorial Day ceremony on Monday to mark Israel’s fallen soldiers, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war against Hamas was a struggle to secure Israel’s “existence, liberty, security and prosperity”.

“Our war of independence is not over yet,” he said.

In Rafah, Israel stepped up aerial and ground bombardments on eastern areas, killing people in an airstrike on a house in the Brazil neighbourhood.

Residents said Israeli air and ground bombardments were intensifying and tanks had cut off the main north-south Salahuddin road.

“The tanks cut the Salahuddin road east of the city, the forces are now in the southeast side, building up near the built-up area. The situation is dreadful and the sounds of explosions never stopped,” said Bassam, 57, from the Shaboura neighbourhood in Rafah.

“People continue to leave Rafah … no place looks safe now and people do not want to escape at the last minute,” he told Reuters via a chat app.

RAFAH ASSAULT SPLITS U.S. AND ISRAEL

UNRWA, the main U.N. aid agency in Gaza, estimated that about 360,000 people had fled the southern city since the Israeli military gave its first evacuation order a week ago.

They are moving to empty tracts of land, including Al-Mawasi, a small strip along the coast, designated as an expanded humanitarian area by Israel.

But Shaina Low of the Norwegian Refugee Council aid agency said it was not set up to receive uprooted families.

There was “no space to install latrines or water points. There are huge piles of solid waste. My colleague spoke about seeing donkey carcasses on top of trash, so there are all sorts of health concerns,” Low said.

The assault on Rafah has caused one of the biggest splits in decades between Israel and its main ally the U.S., which paused some deliveries of weapons.

U.S. President Joe Biden, who is running for reelection this year, has faced heavy criticism from his own supporters domestically for his support of Israel. Some of those critics have accused Israel of committing genocide, a claim dismissed by the White House and Israel.

“We do not believe what is happening in Gaza is a genocide,” U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters.

Washington says Israel must not assault Rafah without a plan to protect civilians, which it has yet to see.

Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant’s office said on Monday he had briefed U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the “precise operation” in the Rafah area.

The State Department said Blinken spoke with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on Monday and reaffirmed that Washington does not support a major military ground operation by Israel in Rafah.

Hamas’ armed wing said its fighters were engaged in gun battles with Israeli forces in one of the streets east of Rafah, and in the east of Jabalia.

In Israel, the military sounded sirens several times in areas near Gaza, warning of potential Palestinian cross-border rocket and or mortar launches.

Israeli protesters blocked aid trucks headed for Gaza, strewing food packages on the road at Tarqumiya checkpoint, west of Hebron in the Israeli occupied West Bank.

Sullivan expressed concern about reports of Israeli settlers attacking a humanitarian aid convoy on its way to Erez Crossing in northern Gaza, the second such incident in less than a week.

“It is a total outrage that there are people who are attacking and looting these conveys,” Sullivan said. “It is completely and utterly unacceptable behavior.” m(Source: Reuters)

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