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Military And Security Developments
Mar 21.
KEY POINTS
- A Houthi missile strike against an open area near Eilat (Southern district, Israel) is unlikely to signal an uptick in escalation; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is unlikely to retaliate.
- IDF operations at the al-Shifa hospital have continued for a fifth day, indicating a large militant presence at the compound. The return of substantial militant activity in previously cleared areas increases the likelihood of Israel deciding to maintain a security presence in Gaza after the war.
- Gaza: The IDF operation and heavy armed clashes at the al-Shifa hospital have continued for a fifth day, underscoring the large militant presence at the facility. The return of Gazan militants to the hospital since it was vacated by the IDF in November 2023 highlights the risks of militants (particularly Hamas) resuming operations in previously cleared areas. This consequently increases the likelihood that Israel will feel it needs to maintain a long-term military/security presence in Gaza.
- Israel-West Bank: During the reporting period there was an uptick in IDF operations in the northern West Bank, including drone strikes against Palestinian militants. On 20 March, the IDF assassinated senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commanders in a drone strike during a joint operation with the Shin Bet in Jenin (Jenin governorate). Overnight on 20-21 March, the IDF killed two militants in a drone strike in Nur Shams (Tulkarm governorate). On 21 March, the IDF military police opened a criminal investigation into a soldier who shot and killed a Palestinian they suspected of carrying a knife, but who was not armed and did not represent a threat at the time. The incident reflects the increased risk of misidentification in the West Bank amid currently heightened tensions; this has consequently resulted in elevated security risks for bystanders.
- Israel-Lebanon: While hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) are currently less intense than in previous weeks, they continue to drive bystander risks. On 21 March, local Arab news reported an increased LH presence in Dahieh, located to the south of Beirut (Lebanon), where they were apparently conducting checks on motorists, pedestrians and residents in an effort to root out an Israeli spy. The report reflects LH’s heightened alertness; this will in turn increase bystander risks across Lebanon, as well as the risk of misidentification.
- Syria: On 19 March, an airstrike killed five Iranian proxy militia commanders in Mayadin (Deir ez-Zur governorate, Syria), one of whom was a senior LH commander. Conflicting reports attribute the strike to US forces in the region. If the US’ involvement is confirmed, the likelihood of a resumption in limited hostilities by Iranian proxies against US forces in the region will increase, elevating bystander security risks in nearby areas. However, we assess that a resumption of hostilities equivalent to the volume of attacks recorded in November-December 2023 remains unlikely.
- Israel-Yemen: On 18 March, a Houthi cruise missile struck an open area near Eilat (Southern district). The IDF claims that it monitored the missile and is investigating why it was not intercepted by its Arrow Air Defence system. This is the first time that a Houthi missile successfully reached Eilat without being intercepted midway. However, the incident is unlikely to prompt the IDF to retaliate and/or drive a major escalation; a significant rise in future such strikes remains highly unlikely.
- Red Sea: On 21 March, media reports claimed that China and Russia reached an understanding with the Houthis that grants Russian and Chinese vessels safe passage through the Red Sea. According to the report, the two states will provide the Houthis with political support via international bodies such as the UN Security Council (UNSC). While it is unclear what political support was discussed, it is possible that this includes vetoing UNSC resolutions against the Houthis.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The UN has warned that Gaza is at imminent risk of famine. On 20 March, the UN released a report indicating that critical food insecurity in northern Gaza will likely deteriorate to famine conditions by May, while conditions in southern Gaza will almost certainly remain critical in the coming months. The report highlights critical threats to life in Gaza that continue to prompt instances of looting and violence against NGO food distribution operations. Although efforts to increase aid deliveries into Gaza are ongoing , without effective governance and distribution structures within Gaza, we assess that critical food shortages are highly likely to persist, further undermining the security environment for NGOs.
- Protest activity continues to proliferate throughout Israel, elevating travel disruption and bystander risks. On 20 March, protesters in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) demanding the release of protesters temporarily blocked the Ayalon North highway near the LaGuardia interchange during rush hour. In Jerusalem, anti-government protesters calling for elections blocked entrances to the Knesset and chained themselves together. Riot police subsequently prevented protesters from attempting to enter the Knesset; this resulted in low-intensity altercations outside the compound. Also in Jerusalem on 20 March, dozens of ultra-Orthodox demonstrators clashed with the police and blocked sections of the Jerusalem Light Rail during an anti-conscription demonstration. During the demonstration, a civilian ran over a protester with their vehicle, underscoring the elevated physical security and bystander risks amid increasing protest activity in major urban centres.
- The US has proposed a draft ceasefire resolution to the UNSC, underscoring increasing bilateral tensions over the IDF’s potential expansion into Rafah. On 20 March, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced that the US has submitted a draft resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire upon the release of hostages held in Gaza. The US has previously vetoed numerous ceasefire resolutions at the UNSC, arguing that an immediate and/or indefinite ceasefire would primarily benefit Hamas and undermine hostage-release negotiations. There is a realistic possibility that the UNSC will adopt the resolution in the coming days. As negotiations between Israel and Hamas currently centre around implementing a temporary ceasefire in exchange for hostage releases, the UNSC resolution is unlikely to alter IDF operations in Gaza significantly. However, the draft resolution reflects the increasing pressure being placed by the US on Israel to scale back and delay the potential expansion of the IDF’s operations in Rafah given significant humanitarian concerns.
- Canada has suspended its approval of arms exports to Israel, highlighting the risks of supply chain disruption facing defence and technology firms. On 18 March, the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution indefinitely suspending arms transfers to Israel amid concerns that weapons will not be used in accordance with international humanitarian law. Although the resolution will not impact previously issued export permits, it highlights the risks of supply chain disruption facing Canadian technology and defence firms with operations in Israel. The ban will most likely impact the production and maintenance of Canadian-made military drones, though it is unlikely to undermine the IDF’s capacity and/or weapons stocks significantly.
- In Israel, Eilat Port’s management has announced significant layoffs, highlighting the socio-economic impacts of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping lanes in the Red Sea. On 20 March, the port’s CEO announced that the company intends to make 60 of its 120 employees redundant after months of inactivity. Since the Houthis began escalating their attacks against vessels transiting the Red Sea (particularly those linked to Israel and/or destined for Eilat) in November, trade through Eilat Port has decreased significantly, causing substantial financial losses. Eilat Port primarily handles imports and exports of vehicles and potash; reduced traffic through the port coupled with planned redundancies underscore the significant economic risks linked to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, particularly with regard to the Israeli automotive industry.
- On 21 March, an unidentified individual threw a Molotov cocktail at the Israeli embassy in The Hauge (Netherlands); the incident underscores the persistently elevated risks of violence targeting Israeli and/or Jewish installations worldwide. The police have detained the suspected perpetrator, and the incident did not result in injuries or material damage to the embassy. As the Israel-Hamas war continues to exacerbate ethno-religious tensions worldwide, the threat of targeted violence will sustain elevated collateral risks for staff, assets and installations near Israeli embassies and consulates.
Mar 20.
*Palestinian Territories: Israeli opposition to pier plans will elevate humanitarian crisis in Gaza. On 19 March, Israeli media reported that the US invited Qatar to operate and finance a temporary pier off the Gaza coast as part of a joint venture. According to the reports, Qatar agreed on the condition that El-Khaesie (a local Gazan firm allegedly linked to Hamas) constructs the pier. Any substantial involvement by Qatar (Hamas’ main ally and financier) in a project that facilitates access to Gaza will elevate the likelihood of increased funds and unchecked aid reaching Hamas. As such, we assess that Israel is likely to oppose the plan; there is a realistic possibility that this would negatively affect the pier’s construction timeline. This would in turn exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in the long term, particularly in the strip’s northern sector. There is also a realistic possibility that the reported agreement will complicate current truce negotiations which are being mediated by Qatar, increasing the likelihood of future negotiations failing.
Mar 19.
*Libya-Tunisia: Augmented security posture at Ras Ajdir border crossing will persist in coming week. On 18 March, Tunisia closed the Ras Ajdir border crossing with Libya amid clashes in the latter between the security forces and militants likely linked to fuel smuggling gangs. The Libyan interior ministry deployed additional forces to the border crossing to search the area and conduct clearing operations. We assess that movement through the Ras Ajdir crossing will likely resume in the coming hours after the surrounding area is fully secured. However, an augmented posture by the Libyan security forces at the crossing will likely persist in the coming week. This will likely include extensive stop-and-search operations for trucks crossing to and from both sides of the border. As such, these measures will likely disrupt cross-border mobility, elevating the risk of travel delays in the coming week. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the security forces will expand their clearing operations into more remote northern border areas, where collateral security risks are consequently likely to increase.
*Egypt: World Bank support will likely mitigate financial crisis; socio-economic risks will persist in H1. On 18 March, the World Bank announced that it would provide Egypt with nearly USD 6 bn over the next three years. Around USD 3bn will be designated to support government programmes, while the remainder will support the growth of the private sector. The first USD 1bn will likely arrive by June. The funding is the latest in a series of international loans, financial support and investments that have recently poured into Egypt; they amount to nearly USD 50 bn. This global bailout will likely mitigate Egypt’s deep financial crisis, enabling the resumption of key imports and the payment of due external debts in the coming months. However, we assess that socio-economic risks will likely persist in the first half of 2024 due to high inflation. Food and fuel price hikes are also possible after the recent devaluation of the EGP. Any such price hikes are likely to elevate the risk of domestic unrest in 2024.
Mar 18.
KEY POINTS
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raided the al-Shifa hospital in northern Gaza, highlighting the return of militants to previously cleared areas and compounds.
- A suspected Lebanese Hizballah (LH) drone found in Ramat Sirin would represent LH’s southernmost drone incursion (if confirmed as such); an IDF response would elevate the risks of a further uptick in cross-border hostilities despite the slight reduction observed during the reporting period.
- Gaza: Overnight on 17-18 March, the IDF raided the al-Shifa Hospital in northern Gaza. IDF personnel surrounded the compound and engaged in armed clashes with militants at the compound. The operation is ongoing. The IDF claims that several senior Hamas commanders are present at the facility. The operation and the presence of militants at the hospital highlight the return of combatants to previously cleared areas, including those assigned for humanitarian purposes. The development is also largely consistent with the IDF’s third phase of operations, underlining its focus on limiting its presence in northern Gaza to targeted operations rather than maintaining a large occupying force.
- Israel-West Bank: The first Friday of Ramadan passed without significant incident, though ethno-religious tensions and attack risks remain high. On 16 March, an Imam at a local mosque in Hebron city (who is also a member of Hamas) fired on the city’s Jewish neighbourhood with an assault rifle before being killed by the IDF. No other casualties were reported. The incident reflects heightened ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks across the West Bank; these have in turn elevated security and bystander risks, particularly around locations occupied by the Israeli security forces and Israeli civilian populations.
- Israel-Lebanon: Over the monitoring period there was a slight reduction in the tempo and volume of cross-border hostilities between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), though security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon remain elevated. On 16 March, Israeli media reported that in the past week, tourists in Ramat Sirin (Lower Galilee) found a crashed (and suspected LH) drone. If the asset is indeed an LH drone, this would mark the southernmost such incursion since the beginning of the war. Additionally, and on the same day, the IDF intercepted a suspicious aerial target above Acre; this was likely another LH drone. The continued LH incursions reflect increased intelligence-gathering efforts by LH; these are driving the risk of escalation both on the part of the IDF (as a response) and LH (which uses the intelligence it collects to inform rocket and missile launches into Israel’s North district).
- Jordan-Syria: On 17 March, the Jordanian air force intercepted an unidentified aerial object attempting to cross into Jordanian airspace from Syria. While there are conflicting accounts regarding the exact nature of the downed object, there is a realistic possibility that it was a missile or a drone launched by pro-Iran militants in Syria or Iraq towards Israel. This would reflect the persistent efforts by Iranian proxies to seek new routes to target Israel, including through Jordanian airspace, sustaining elevated security risks across Israel. The incident is likely to heighten Jordan’s security posture along its borders; the likelihood of a threat actor using Jordan’s territory as a point of access into Israel remains elevated.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- On 15 March, EU diplomats signalled progress towards sanctioning a list of Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The sanctioning of blacklisted Israeli settlers requires a unanimous vote by all EU member states to take effect. Progress has so far been disrupted by vetoes from both Hungary and the Czech Republic, though the former dropped its veto on 15 March. The measure is likely to pass in the next month. The sanctions include both movement and financial restrictions. The development comes after the US imposed additional sanctions on 14 March, targeting three settlers and two outposts in the West Bank (Moshe’s Farm and Zvi’s Farm). Together, these sanctions will elevate compliance and reputational risks for companies with local staff operating in the West Bank in the coming month.
- On 17 March, the Israeli security cabinet approved the resumption of ceasefire and hostage negotiations. Following the approval, the head of Israel’s Mossad flew to Qatar on 18 March to participate in negotiations. Despite the development, negotiations are likely to be prolonged by repeated and extended disruption to communication infrastructure for Hamas leaders in Gaza, resulting in 24-to-36-hour delays whenever they try to pass messages to the delegation in Qatar.
- Over the weekend, protests continued to intensify, particularly in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Thousands participated in anti-government protests in both cities on the evening of 16 March, calling for the release of hostages, an ultra-Orthodox military draft and early elections. The Israeli police, using mounted units and equipped with water cannons, also dispersed protesters who blocked the Ayalon Highway in Tel Aviv. Protesters also briefly blocked the Paris Square intersection in Jerusalem. The protests and police response highlight the elevated likelihood of travel disruption and bystander security risks at weekends, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. These are likely to continue over at least the coming month and increase in response to developments (or lack thereof) in hostage and ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas.
FORECAST
Elevated tensions in the West Bank are likely to continue throughout the week, sustaining high security and bystander risks across Israel, particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The heightened presence of the Israeli security forces in the West Bank is likely to continue, creating localised travel disruption during Ramadan (11 March-9 April). Further IDF raids are likely, particularly in Hebron, Jenin and Nablus governorates, further elevating ethno-religious tensions and the risk of radicalisation while driving the likelihood of attacks against IDF positions across the West Bank and Jerusalem. Palestinian attacks against highways, bus stations and checkpoints remain likely, sustaining bystander security risks in the West Bank and Jerusalem area. While attacks by radicalised individuals in the past two weeks predominantly targeted the Israeli security forces, they will continue presenting substantial bystander security risks throughout Israel due to cross-fire by Israeli security personnel. Additionally, there are growing indications of attempts by Palestinian individuals and militants to infiltrate Israeli civilian population centres in the West Bank. Attacks carried out by Palestinians in these areas, especially those that result in death, will elevate the risk of domestic unrest and retaliatory attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian towns and communities.
Despite the slight reduction in the volume and intensity of hostilities between the IDF and LH, daily exchanges of fire continue to sustain elevated security risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. There is a realistic possibility that the intensity and volume of hostilities will increase in the coming week, particularly as a result of likely IDF retaliation against recent drone incursions. LH and Iranian proxies continue attempting to gather intelligence on potential targets across Israel using drones, reflecting likely preparations of a ‘target bank’ in case of a major escalation, such as an IDF ground operation into Lebanon. We continue to assess that such an escalation, while unlikely in the immediate term, is increasingly likely in the coming six months. We assess that it is a realistic possibility in the next three months.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza (Source: Sibylline)
21 Mar 24. EU naval mission in Red Sea destroys missiles, Houthi seaborne drone. The EU’s naval mission in the southern Red Sea said on Thursday it had destroyed three ballistic missiles and a Houthi seaborne drone to protect merchant ships. The EU’s mission, known as Aspides, said on social media platform X that a French worship had destroyed the ballistic missiles and a German destroyed the drone, operated by the Iran-aligned Houthis and spotted near commercial vessels. Aspides was launched in February to help protect the key maritime trade route from drone and missile attacks by Yemen’s Houthi militia, who say they are retaliating against Israel’s war on Gaza. Other countries, including the United States and Britain, also have naval forces operating in the area. (Source: Reuters)
20 Mar 24. Houthi Rebels Launch First Missile Strike into Israeli Territory from Red Sea. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed that a cruise missile landed in an open area near Eilat early Monday morning, with no reported injuries or damage. This missile, originating from the direction of the Red Sea, was identified as being launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, marking the first instance of a Houthi projectile reaching Israeli territory. The IDF tracked the missile throughout the incident and is currently investigating further.
Additionally, the Houthis attempted to target a Marshall Islands-flagged liquefied petroleum gas tanker, MADO, in the Red Sea with naval missiles on March 15 and March 17. Both attempts missed the tanker, which was en route from Saudi Arabia to Singapore, resulting in no damage or casualties. Despite Houthi claims of targeting an American vessel, records indicate the tanker is owned by Naftomar Shipping & Trading Co Ltd, based in Greece.
In response to threats to maritime security, CENTCOM forces actively engaged and neutralized a significant threat composed of seven anti-ship missiles, three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and three weapons storage containers located in areas under Houthi control in Yemen. The operation, which took place between 1:00 p.m. and 7:40 p.m. Sanaa time, was a response to what CENTCOM identified as an imminent threat to both merchant vessels and US Navy ships navigating in the vicinity. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Mar 24. USN Deploying Key Capabilities to Support Humanitarian Aid to Gaza. The Navy is deploying key logistics capabilities in support of the Army-led mission to establish a temporary pier off the coast of Gaza to deliver critical humanitarian assistance, Navy officials said today.
Sailors from Naval Beach Group 1 have been tasked with constructing a large floating dock known as a roll-on, roll-off discharge facility as part of the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS, mission being led by the Army’s 7th Transportation Brigade from Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia. Naval Beach Group 1 is based at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California.
The roll-on, roll-off discharge facility, which measures 72 feet wide by 270 feet long, will remain approximately three miles off Gaza’s shore and enable cargo ships to offload aid shipments at sea prior to being transported to shore.
Once offloaded, cargo will be transported to shore along an approximately 1,800-foot causeway comprising modular sections linked together, known as a Trident Pier, that will be constructed by the Army unit.
The Navy will operate causeway ferries to transport the cargo from the discharge facility to the Army’s floating pier.
The two units undertaking the mission have trained extensively in delivering the capability in a variety of environments around the globe.
Soldiers from the 7th Transportation Brigade and sailors with Naval Beach Group 1, worked together to deploy the discharge facility and causeway off the coast of Australia last summer in support of Exercise Talisman Sabre, a large-scale joint defense exercise involving Australia and the United States.
“Our capabilities mesh well, and we have already coordinated at the tactical level how we will implement the movement of cargo,” a Navy official said today. “This is a routine mission for us, and we’re just falling in together in step to conduct this mission.”
Once operational, the temporary pier will be capable of delivering up to 2,000,000 humanitarian aid meals per day.
The Army unit began to mobilize less than two days after President Joe Biden called on the military to conduct the emergency operation during his State of the Union Address earlier this month.
Last week four Army vessels set sail from Joint Base Langley-Eustis to join the operation: USAVs Monterrey, Matamoros, SP4 James A. Loux and Wilson Wharf.
Navy officials said today that the forces and equipment used to construct the roll-on, roll-off discharge facility and provide sustained operational support will be transported into theater aboard three ships, the USNSs Roy P. Benevidez, 2nd Lt. John P. Bobo and 1st Lt. Baldomero Lopez.
Once in theater, the sailors will begin construction of the floating dock from modular sections. The capability is expected to be operational in approximately 60 days.
Approximately 260 sailors are slated to deploy as part of the operation. Their skillsets range from ship handling and deck operations to construction and communications.
Defense officials have stressed that there will be no U.S. boots on the ground in Gaza as part of the operation.
In addition to deploying units to construct a temporary pier, the U.S. is conducting a sustained series of humanitarian assistance airdrops into Gaza.
“The DOD humanitarian airdrops contribute to ongoing U.S. and partner-nation government efforts to alleviate human suffering,” officials said in a statement today announcing the latest airdrop. “These airdrops are part of a sustained effort, and we continue to plan follow-on aerial deliveries.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
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