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Military And Security Developments
Feb 08.
KEY POINTS
- Israel is likely opposed to Hamas’ latest ceasefire proposal, which will delay the process of reaching an agreement; this comes as Israel confirms that it is expanding its military operations in southern Gaza to Rafah.
- The US strike in Baghdad (Iraq) has increased the likelihood of retaliatory attacks by Iranian proxies against US assets in Iraq and Syria, including diplomatic assets. The strike will also elevate local anti-US sentiment among Baghdad’s residents, driving the risk of protests targeting the city’s Green Zone.
- Gaza: The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) is preparing to expand its southern operations into Rafah (southern Gaza) following delays in reaching a ceasefire agreement, though such operations are unlikely in the coming days. Rafah is a densely populated urban area; fighting there will increase the likelihood of collateral civilian casualties. The dense urban environment will also significantly increase the IDF’s exposure to possible militant ambushes, limiting its capacity to move freely through the area and secure objectives rapidly. The ambush threat will increase the likelihood of the IDF targeting structures in Rafah to clear areas and enable military mobility, threatening civilians and elevating international condemnation. The expansion into Rafah is unlikely to materialise in the coming days as the IDF is still engaged in combat operations in Khan Yunis. As such, the transition towards Rafah will likely be conducted in gradual stages in the coming three weeks; there is a realistic possibility that residents in Rafah will receive evacuation orders ahead of IDF preparations to enter the city.
- West Bank: A large IDF military exercise took place on 5-6 February; it involved a variety of scenarios, including the kidnapping of Palestinians by Israeli settlers. The drills underline the IDF’s awareness of, and efforts to prepare for, the growing threat of violence posed by Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The military drills were condemned by various political figures, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This criticism, along with attempts to create social outcry against the drills, will likely challenge the IDF’s efforts to prepare for all scenarios in the West Bank. In the long term, this will undermine the security forces’ capabilities to keep West Bank tensions below the threshold of major domestic mobilisation. We continue to assess that major domestic mobilisation in the West Bank is unlikely. However, the environment remains volatile and risks of escalation are gradually increasing, as highlighted by increasing sole-perpetrator attacks against the Israeli security forces in the West Bank over the past two weeks.
- Israel-Lebanon: Clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border continue to escalate gradually. Over the past two weeks, there has been an increase in the number of IDF soldiers injured by Lebanese Hizballah attacks against IDF positions and bases near the Israel-Lebanon border. These attacks reflect increasing tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border and also Lebanese Hizballah’s capacity and willingness to escalate its activities in response to IDF strikes in southern Lebanon. This dynamic will continue to elevate the likelihood of significant armed escalation. However, such escalation is currently highly unlikely in the coming two weeks. We will continue to monitor the situation and adjust our analysis and forecasting accordingly.
- Iraq: A US drone strike killed a senior Kataib Hizballah commander in Baghdad (Iraq) on 7 February. US officials claim the strike was in response to the attack on the Tower 22 base in Jordan on 28 January (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 January 2024). In the aftermath of the attack on Tower 22, the US identified Kataib Hizballah as the likely perpetrator. The strike in Baghdad will likely further elevate diplomatic tensions between the US and the Iraqi government and increase the likelihood of domestic unrest, particularly near the entrances to Baghdad’s Green Zone (where the US embassy is located), elevating security, bystander and mobility disruption risks in the vicinity. The US strike is also likely to exacerbate the risks of regional escalation, particularly between Iranian proxies and US forces. For further analysis, please refer to the FORECAST below.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- The Israeli government is considering amendments to the recruitment law that would increase the period of active duty and the age of retirement from reserve duties. The amendments are likely designed to help the IDF fill shortages that will come about as a result of increased security needs such as guarding and monitoring borders. However, the amendments do not address calls to mandate the recruitment of ultra-orthodox Jews. This issue is highly contentious and will likely drive further anti-government protests, including by reservists. However, if the government does move towards introducing mandatory recruitment for ultra-orthodox Jews, this would likely cause significant domestic unrest among ultra-orthodox communities as well as a backlash by religious parties, threatening government stability. As such legal reforms to mandate the recruitment of ultra-orthodox Jews are currently unlikely; we assess that this will drive anti-government sentiment in the coming weeks among communities which regard the status quo as unfair.
- On 7 February, Hamas countered Israel’s proposed ceasefire agreement. Hamas offered a three-stage deal, with each stage lasting 45 days. Additionally, Hamas demanded the release of 1,500 Palestinian prisoners (500 of whom are serving life sentences) in exchange for the gradual release of hostages throughout these stages. Hamas also demanded the continuation of UNRWA operations in Gaza and the finalisation of an agreement ending the war before the release of the last hostage. Israel is unlikely to agree to Hamas’ latest proposal. While this will delay the finalisation of a ceasefire agreement, negotiations will likely continue in the coming days.
FORECAST
The US strike in Baghdad has likely increased the risk of militant retaliation and regional conflict escalation; elevated tensions with the Iraqi government are also likely. US officials indicated that there will be further retaliatory action for the attack against Tower 22 in Jordan, underscoring the likelihood of further similar assassinations. There is a realistic possibility that the retaliation campaign is also designed to deter further attacks against US forces. However, on the day before the strike, several Iranian-backed Iraqi militant groups reiterated their intention to continue attacking US forces in the region, despite the US retaliatory strikes on 2 February (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 5 February 2024). Following the strike, the Iranian-backed al-Nujaba (HHN) militia called for revenge against the US, with Kataib Hizballah also indicating that it would likely retaliate (despite the stated suspension of its operations against US forces on 30 January). As such, the US strike in Baghdad has likely further elevated security and bystander risks in the region, particularly in the vicinity of US forces and assets based in Iraq and Syria, and possibly even diplomatic assets.
The strike has also likely elevated domestic unrest risks and anti-Western sentiment in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad. In the coming days, large anti-US protests are likely to take place in Baghdad; they will likely prompt mobility disruption, particularly at the entrance points to the Green Zone. Additionally, there are elevated security and vandalism risks facing Western-affiliated assets, businesses and staff, particularly those associated with the US. A heightened security posture by the Iraqi security forces throughout Baghdad is likely in the coming days; there is also a realistic possibility of the police clashing with protesters, elevating physical bystander risks. Tensions will also elevate the risk of Iraqi citizens and militants targeting foreign nationals, driving threats ranging from low-level harassment to kidnaps and attacks.
Rising domestic pressure is likely to exacerbate diplomatic tensions between the US and Iraq. There is a realistic possibility that these tensions will impact the US’ withdrawal process, increasing the urgency around these discussions and possibly applying greater pressure on both sides to set a withdrawal date. These strained relations will likely further challenge US military activities in the region in the long term, while also increasing diplomatic hostility to the US military’s regional presence in the coming months.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
*Iraq: Unrest is likely in Baghdad in coming days after US drone strike against city. On 7 February, the US conducted a drone strike in the Mashtal area of the capital Baghdad, killing Abu Baqer al-Saaedi, a senior commander in Kataib Hizballah (KH). US Central Command stated that al-Saaedi was responsible for planning and participating in attacks against US forces in the region. The strike is part of the US’ tiered retaliatory response to the recent Tower 22 base attack in Jordan. It is highly likely that protests in central Baghdad will take place during and after al-Saaedi’s funeral procession on 8 February. The security forces will likely further augment their posture around entrances to the Green Zone, where the US embassy is situated; they will possibly close major roads leading to the zone, triggering mobility disruption. Domestic unrest risks in the city will likely be elevated over the weekend. We assess that Shia Muslim factions will likely exert further pressure on the government to accelerate current talks over the withdrawal of US troops.
Feb 06.
*Iraq: Peaceful protests are likely across Saladin in coming weeks following provincial elections. On 5 February, the council of tribes and clans in Saladin governorate denounced the decision by the newly elected provincial council to appoint Ahmed al-Jubouri as the new governor. The tribes called for the government and the parliament to intervene and to re-elect both the president of the provincial council and the governor, as well as to split the governorate into two. Al-Jubouri, who served as governor from 2013 to 2014, is a highly controversial figure; he was arrested over corruption allegations in 2019. Protests across the governorate, including in major cities such as Tikrit and Samarra, are likely in the coming weeks, though most will likely be peaceful, driving mobility disruption. While the Co-ordination Framework Bloc (the largest political group in the parliament) is unlikely to support splitting the governorate, we assess that it is likely to support calls for re-elections, driving political tensions.
Feb 05.
KEY POINTS
- US and allied forces conducted large strikes against Iranian-affiliated militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen over the weekend. These were calculated to mitigate the risk of direct conflict with Iran, though there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s proxy militias will retaliate against US forces and assets in the region, elevating security risks in the coming days.
- Israeli banks began freezing accounts of Israeli settlers sanctioned by the US, underlining concerns over compliance risks for Israeli financial institutions, particularly in the event of further US sanctions.
- Gaza: Division 98 assesses that it will overcome the last battalion of Hamas’ Khan Yunis brigade within a week. Furthermore, the division assesses that since the start of operations in Khan Yunis it has mapped approximately 99.4 miles (160km) of underground tunnels in the area. Additionally, fighters belonging to the Givati brigade (assigned to Division 162) are likely to open another checkpoint in Khan Yunis in the direction of the al-Mawasi humanitarian area. This will reduce bottlenecks around the current checkpoint in west Khan Yunis and indicates that clearing operations are likely to continue in the area in the coming week, and also that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is anticipating increased displacement. However, the growing movement of displaced people into the al-Mawasi humanitarian area will likely compound the rising population density and deteriorating conditions, driving international pressure on Israel to stop its operations in Gaza.
- West Bank: IDF operations continued on trend in the West Bank, where on the night of 4-5 February the Israeli security forces arrested 33 people wanted for suspected terrorism. Also on 5 February, the security forces prevented a stabbing attack at a checkpoint in Bethany (Jerusalem governorate), near Maale Adumim, an Israeli urban settlement. The attack is entirely consistent with existing elevated tensions within the West Bank and the continued targeting of the Israeli security forces in the area. This trend will sustain elevated bystander risks near security assets for the foreseeable future.
- Israel-Lebanon: Clashes on the Israel-Lebanon border continued on trend.
- Syria-Iraq: Late on 2 February, US forces conducted strikes against more than 85 targets in Syria and Iraq affiliated with Iranian-backed militias and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US communicated the likely targets of the strikes in the days prior and emphasised that it would not attack targets within Iranian territory, reducing the risks of escalation. US officials indicated that the strikes were simply part of a wider retaliation campaign in the wake of the 28 January attack on the US base in Jordan. This indicates that the US will likely conduct further operations across Syria and Iraq in the coming weeks, though these are unlikely to be as intense as the 2 February strikes. They will likely be conducted in such a way as to reduce the risk of conflict escalation with Iran. However, they will sustain elevated risks of retaliation by Iranian proxies, increasing security and bystander risks in the region, particularly around US assets in Iraq and Syria.
- Yemen: US and UK military forces conducted strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis on 3 February. According to reports, the strikes targeted 36 military positions and assets in 13 locations in Yemen, killing at least 40 Houthi fighters. The US conducted further strikes on 4 February, targeting four prepared-to-launch Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles. These events reflect a partial escalation of the ongoing tit-for-tat dynamics between the US and the Houthis, with the US increasing the level of both its response to Houthi attacks and its pre-emptive strikes. These are unlikely to have significantly reduced the Houthis’ capabilities, driving retaliation risks and sustaining elevated attack risks in the Red Sea area and across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen in the coming week.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel’s National Bank has warned of compliance, money laundering, terrorism financing, legal and reputational risks for Israeli financial institutions seeking to bypass US sanctions imposed on Israeli settlers. Following US sanctions on four Israeli settlers on 1 February (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 2 February 2024), Bank Leumi announced on 4 February that it suspended the account of one of the sanctioned individuals. Additionally, the Postal bank announced on 5 February that it foreclosed the account of another sanctioned Israeli individual on the list. Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, and its communication minister, Dr. Shlomo Karhi, have heavily criticised these decisions and are seeking to have them reversed. This criticism has prompted Israel’s National Bank to publish its warning and to state that it will not interfere in the decisions of Israeli banks to close or freeze accounts of sanctioned individuals. The move reflects the growing likelihood that additional banks will adopt similar measures and freeze assets and accounts of sanctioned Israelis in the coming days. Furthermore, it reflects the growing impacts of US sanctions on Israeli individuals and the risks facing financial institutions which do not comply with the US sanction regime.
FORECAST
Hamas’ delayed response to the ceasefire deal and criticism by Israeli ministers has increased the likelihood of delays to the agreement’s finalisation. Local media reports indicate there is likely a growing divergence between Hamas’ military wing in Gaza and its political wing abroad on the ceasefire issue, with the latter reportedly leaning towards refusing the deal. Additionally, discussions in the Israeli security cabinet have also included challenges from several Israeli ministers; there is a realistic possibility that such dissension reflects the opinion of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As such, it is likely that it will take the two sides longer to reach an agreement than initially expected. However, increasing Israeli domestic pressure will drive the likelihood that the Israeli government will feel compelled to reach an agreement (possibly even under unfavourable terms) in the coming two weeks.
Elevated tensions in the West Bank will likely drive domestic unrest risks during the month of Ramadan (10 March-9 April). Attacks and bouts of domestic unrest often increase in the West Bank during this period. Continued security operations in the West Bank tied to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the deteriorating economic situation of Palestinian communities threaten to compound these risks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir will announce further restrictions on Palestinian communities, including over their access to the al-Aqsa compound; any such declaration would further raise tensions in the West Bank and Jerusalem. As such, we assess that there will be elevated domestic unrest and attack risks in the West Bank and Jerusalem during Ramadan. Although we currently assess it to be unlikely, the mishandling of these increased tensions would exacerbate these risks.
On 5 February, international news outlets circulated an old telegram post from 24 December 2023, citing the risk of Houthi attacks against international internet infrastructure along the bottom of the Red Sea. Such an attack would likely be considered a significant escalation due to the broad impacts, including on the transmission of financial data reliant on the infrastructure. It would therefore likely incur a significant response from the US and the international community. As such, while the latent threat persists, we assess that it is currently unlikely that the Houthis would sabotage underwater internet cables.
Triggers and indicators for escalation
- A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
- High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
- Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
- Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
- An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
- US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
- Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
- The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
- Russia-Turkey-Ukraine: Moscow is unlikely to agree to new grain export mechanism in near term. On 4 February, a Turkish official disclosed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will discuss a new mechanism for Ukrainian Black Sea grain exports at their upcoming meeting. Putin is set to visit Turkey on 12 February to meet with Erdoğan. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that efforts are underway to find ‘new ways’ to transport Ukrainian grain to world markets without providing specifics. The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which was brokered by Turkey and the UN, collapsed in July 2023 when Russia withdrew from the deal. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated on 19 January that there is no reason to resume talks on restarting the BSGI, claiming that Russia’s conditions were never implemented. As such, we assess that Moscow is unlikely to agree to implementing a new mechanism allowing the export of Ukrainian grain unless any such mechanism addresses Russia’s original complaints or Moscow is granted further concessions.
*Iraq: Major mobility disruption in, near Baghdad is likely ahead of key pilgrimage. On 3 February, the security forces began to close several major roads in the capital Baghdad ahead of the Imam Musa al-Kadhim pilgrimage, which will commence on 6 February. Ms of Shia Muslims from Iraq and neighbouring countries commemorate the martyrdom of the Imam at his shrine in Kadhimiya district (Baghdad governorate). The pilgrimage often involves walking through various parts of Baghdad to the shrine, significantly elevating mobility and transport disruption throughout the capital. In addition, due to previous terrorist attacks targeting the event, it is highly likely that the security forces will continue to augment their posture across Baghdad. We assess that this will include establishing checkpoints along major roads in the north of the city and along highways connecting Baghdad with nearby cities. Stop and search operations are also highly likely to continue throughout the night and into 6 February, primarily around Kadhimiya and the adjacent Adhamiyah district.
*Iraq: Assassination of Iran-backed commander will highly likely prompt unrest in Maysan governorate. On 4 February, unidentified gunmen killed Naji al-Kaabi, a prominent commander in the Iran-backed militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in al-Amara city (Maysan governorate). Al-Kaabi was the public relations officer for AAH in Maysan. No group has claimed responsibility for the assassination. While al-Kaabi’s funeral was held earlier on 5 February in Najaf al-Ashraf city (Najaf governorate), it is highly likely that the assassination will prompt domestic unrest and protests by AAH members in Maysan in the coming hours. Protests by AAH members in other cities, including the capital Baghdad, also remain a realistic possibility. As such, the security forces in Maysan will likely augment their posture in the coming days while investigations are underway. In addition, it is likely that security cordons will be established around the headquarters of rival Shia paramilitaries in Maysan to prevent any possible clashes, specifically Sarya al-Salam (SAS), the military wing of the Sadrist movement.
^US: House unveils Israel-only aid bill, signalling increased tensions between House, Senate. On 3 February, Speaker Mike Johnson announced that the House of Representatives will vote on a ‘clean, standalone’ foreign aid bill for Israel next week. The USD 17.6 bn bill is in direct competition with the Senate, which is preparing to vote on its own USD 118bn bill that includes foreign aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, in addition to border security policies. Johnson has already vowed that the Senate bill will not pass in the House and that the Israel bill is a response to ‘the Senate’s failure to move appropriate legislation.’ It is unclear if Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer would bring the House’s Israel-only aid bill to the floor if it clears the lower chamber. The competing national security bills signal increased policy risks in the short-to-medium term due to heightened tensions between the House and the Senate. These tensions and extreme partisanship will sustain policy stagnation risks in the long term, which will likely continue up to the 2024 presidential election. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Feb 24. Centcom Kills Kataib Hezbollah Commander Responsible for Strikes Against U.S. Forces. Last night, U.S. Central Command announced it had conducted a strike in Iraq that killed a Kataib Hezbollah commander responsible for directly planning and participating in attacks on U.S. forces in the region, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder.
“There are no indications of collateral damage or civilian casualties at this time,” said Ryder during a briefing today. “Additionally, initial assessments indicate that there were no additional militants injured or killed beyond the one Kataib Hezbollah commander who was targeted.”
Ryder said the department is confident in the process used to identify the individual and to hold him accountable.
Department Mourns Marines Killed in Helicopter Crash
On Tuesday, five U.S. Marines were killed in a helicopter crash in California. The crew had been participating in a training operation.
In a statement earlier today, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said, “We mourn the tragic loss of five U.S. Marines earlier this week during a training flight enroute from Nevada to California. My prayers are with these brave Marines and their families, loved ones, and teammates.
“As the Marine Corps investigates this deadly crash, it is yet another reminder that across our nation and the world our selfless service members put their lives on the line every day to keep our country safe. The entire Department of Defense honors these brave Marines’ service and grieves their passing.”
During today’s news conference, Ryder added that the five Marines were assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361, Marine Aircraft Group 16, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Their names will be released once notifications have been made to next of kin. (Source: U.S. DoD)
07 Feb 24. Pro-Iran commanders killed by drone strike in Baghdad. Three senior members of Iran-backed militia have been killed by a US drone strike in Baghdad – the latest in a series of retaliatory strikes by Washington.
Reports said a US drone hit a car in the Iraqi capital on Wednesday and killed the members of the Kataib Hezbollah, a powerful militia blamed for a series of recent attacks on US troops in the region.
Among the three said to be killed was high-ranking commander Wissam Mohammed “Abu Bakr” al-Saadi, the commander in charge of Kataib Hezbollah’s operations in Syria.
The strike, on a main road in the Mashtal neighborhood in eastern Baghdad, was the latest by the US and other Western nations in the wake of Iran-backed groups being accused of attacking international shipping in the Red Sea and American troops in bases in Jordan.
Iraq issued a warning to the US in response to the airstrike, calling it a “new aggression by the United States” that would “undermine all understandings between the two countries.” (Source: Daily Telegraph)
08 Feb 24. Drone that Killed US Troops in Jordan Likely Went Undetected.
U.S. forces probably did not detect the approach of the Iranian-made drone that killed three American soldiers last week at a remote base in Jordan, and there was no air defense system on site capable of shooting it down, the military’s initial assessment of the attack has found.
The early findings, which have not been previously reported, indicate that the drone may have been missed “due to its low flight path,” a U.S. defense official with direct knowledge of the assessment told The Washington Post. Additionally, this person said, the base, known as Tower 22, was not outfitted with weapons that can “kill” aerial threats like drones, and instead relied on electronic warfare systems designed to disable them or disrupt their path to a target.
A common strategy among drone operators and other pilots seeking to minimize or evade radar detection is to fly low to the ground. Another U.S. official affirmed the military’s belief that the drone flew too low to be detected. Both officials, like some others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive and ongoing investigation. Defense officials have stressed that assessments can change as investigators learn more.
Taken together, the preliminary findings appear to undermine previous assertions that U.S. air defenses mistook the attacking aircraft for an American drone returning to the base about the same time, and they raise new questions about the Pentagon’s ability to keep pace with the threats facing U.S. personnel deployed across the Middle East since the war in Gaza set off an acceleration of violence.
U.S. Central Command, which oversees military activity throughout the region, has declined to say whether officials believe the militants responsible had knowledge of the base’s limited defenses.
In a statement, Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh said Central Command continues to review the attack.
“For operations security reasons, we won’t discuss specific force protection measures or potential posture changes,” she said. “However, as always, we are committed to taking necessary measures to safeguard our forces [who serve] in harm’s way.”
Tower 22 is located at the nexus of Jordan’s shared border with Syria and Iraq. It functions as a support site for another U.S. outpost, the isolated Tanf garrison in Syria, situated along a key highway connecting Tehran to Damascus. From Tanf, U.S. forces have sought to disrupt Iran’s efforts to supply weapons and materiel to partners and proxies in Syria and beyond.
Although Tower 22 was outfitted with “multiple” electronic warfare systems capable of taking drones offline, it had limited means to protect itself. The defense official with direct knowledge of the military’s early assessment said the outpost was deemed a relatively low-threat environment.
“This was based on the vast majority of the threats and 99 percent of the [Iranian-proxy] attacks being against facilities in Iraq and Syria,”
the official told The Post.
The containerised housing structures at Tower 22 appear to be the standard units typically found at U.S. facilities overseas. They are made of relatively thin metal that is not designed to withstand blasts on their own, and can be easily identified on commercial satellite imagery and services such as Google Maps.
Officials have not said whether protection was installed above the units before the attack. Concrete barriers positioned on the ground among the housing units did help to mitigate the explosion, officials said.Earlier threat assessments that concluded Tower 22 faced a lower risk of attack meant the base appeared not to have been
“outfitted with other active countermeasures similar to what other locations across the region had been,”
said Paul Lushenko, an assistant professor and director of special operations at the U.S. Army War College who has studied and written about drone warfare. (Source: UAS VISION/The Washington Post)
07 Feb 24. Gaza mediators search for ‘final formula’ for Israel, Hamas ceasefire.
- Saudi Arabia says stance firm, no relations with Israel without Palestinian state and end to Gaza conflict
U.S., Qatari and Egyptian mediators prepared a diplomatic push to bridge differences between Israel and Hamas on a ceasefire plan for Gaza after the Palestinian group responded to a proposal for an extended pause in fighting and hostage releases.
Hamas on Tuesday replied to a framework drawn up more than a week ago by U.S. and Israeli spy chiefs at a meeting in Paris with the Egyptians and Qataris.
Details of the response were not disclosed. In a statement Hamas said on Tuesday it responded “in a positive spirit, ensuring a comprehensive and complete ceasefire, ending the aggression against our people, ensuring relief, shelter, and reconstruction, lifting the siege on the Gaza Strip, and achieving a prisoner swap.”
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, on a lightning tour of the Middle East, said he would discuss the Hamas response with Israeli officials when he visits the country on Wednesday.
In Doha, Blinken said, “There’s still a lot of work to do … but we continue to believe that an agreement is possible, and indeed essential.”
Qatar described the Hamas response as “positive” overall while Egyptian security sources told Reuters that Hamas showed flexibility.
“We will discuss all the details of the proposed framework with the concerned parties to reach an agreement on the final formula as soon as possible,” Diaa Rashwan, head of Egypt’s State Information Service, was quoted as saying.
Sources close to the talks have said the truce would last at least 40 days, during which the militants would free civilians among the remaining hostages they hold.
Further phases would follow, to hand over soldiers and dead bodies of hostages, in exchange for releases of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. The truce would also increase the flow of food and other aid to Gaza’s desperate civilians who are facing hunger and dire shortages of basic supplies.
U.S. President Joe Biden said the Hamas response showed “some movement” toward a deal. But it was unclear if either Hamas or Israel were willing to soften their stated hardline positions in order to reach a truce agreement.
A Hamas official who asked not to be identified reiterated to Reuters earlier on Tuesday that the Palestinian Islamist movement would not allow any hostage releases without guarantees that the war would end and Israeli forces leave Gaza.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted Israel will not end its Gaza campaign until Hamas is wiped out and has ruled out the creation of a Palestinian state.
Saudi Arabia has told the U.S. its position stands that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognised on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem, and Israeli “aggression” in Gaza stops, the Saudi foreign ministry said in a statement on Wednesday.
Saudi Arabia put U.S.-backed plans to normalise ties with Israel on ice, sources familiar with Riyadh’s thinking told Reuters in Oct, 2023, as the war between Palestinian militant group Hamas and Israeli forces escalated.
MORE HOSTAGES MAY BE DEAD
There is a growing Israeli movement demanding more effort to bring the hostages home, even if that means a deal with Hamas.
Israel’s military said on Tuesday that 31 of the remaining hostages in Gaza had been pronounced dead. Israel previously said 136 hostages were still in Gaza after 110 were freed under a seven-day November truce when Israel also released 240 Palestinians it was holding.
Citing an Israeli assessment shared with U.S. and Egyptian officials, the Wall Street Journal reported that as many as 50 hostages could be dead, leaving about 80 hostages alive.
Israel began its military offensive in Gaza after militants from Hamas-ruled Gaza killed 1,200 people and took 253 hostages in southern Israel on Oct. 7.
Gaza’s Health Ministry says at least 27,585 Palestinians have been confirmed killed in Israel’s military campaign, with thousands more feared buried under rubble.
On the ground in Gaza, Israeli forces on Tuesday kept up pressure on Khan Younis, the main southern city they have been trying to capture for weeks. At least 14 people were killed by air strikes, Palestinian residents and medics said.
Rafah, just south of it, was also hit by air strikes and tank shelling. Two people were killed in a strike on a house in Rafah while six policemen died after their car was hit, Gaza health officials said.
Israeli leaders vowed last week to push into Rafah next, alarming international aid agencies who say a m displaced civilians would be in harm’s way, pinned against the border fence with Egypt. (Source: Reuters)
06 Feb 24. HMS Richmond takes over from HMS Diamond to protect shipping in the Red Sea. As Houthi attacks against commercial vessels continue, Royal Navy warship HMS Richmond takes over from HMS Diamond to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
HMS Diamond joined Operation Prosperity Guardian, an international task force to protect merchant shipping in the region, in December and has maintained a near constant presence in a ‘high threat area’ of the Red Sea. The destroyer came under fire in three separate attacks by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, successfully destroying nine drones using her world-class Sea Viper missile system and guns.
The UK continues to be at the forefront of the international response to the Houthis’ illegal attacks on commercial shipping – participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, intercepting weapon-smuggling to Yemen, imposing sanctions to hold members of the Houthis to account and conducting necessary, proportionate and targeted strikes against Houthi military targets in Yemen.
Defence Secretary Grant Shapps said: “The UK is committed to protecting freedom of navigation. I visited HMS Diamond in January and thanked the Ship’s Company for their incredible work defending freedom of navigation, saving innocent lives and ensuring merchant shipping is protected from the illegal Houthi attacks. I am confident that HMS Richmond will carry on her impressive work.”
HMS Diamond will now undergo a period of maintenance and resupply as HMS Richmond takes over her important mission. HMS Richmond, which left Plymouth at the beginning of January, has a crew of 200 sailors and Royal Marines and a Sea Ceptor missile system, capable of protecting shipping spread out across an area the size of Greater Manchester – some 500 square miles of ocean.
HMS Richmond is also armed with a range of medium guns, machine-guns, small arms, torpedoes, a Royal Marines boarding team, and a Wildcat helicopter which can search vast areas on patrols for hostile threats on the water – and destroy them if necessary with Martlet anti-ship missiles.
HMS Diamond Commander Peter Evans said
The situation in the region is fraught, and ships in the force are firing on a daily basis – we hand over the baton with our best wishes to the fantastic team in Richmond who we know will do a great job.
Having deployed at just five days’ notice we’re used to quickly switching aim, and now our focus is on a short maintenance and ammunition re-supply period before we get back to our mission in the Red Sea.
HMS Diamond has sailed nearly 20,000 nautical miles on patrols since leaving Portsmouth at the end of November – almost enough to carry her around the globe – while her Wildcat helicopter has flown more than 53 hours of sorties over the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden making its crew the busiest in the Royal Navy. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
05 Feb 24. Strikes Against Iran-backed Militias Had ‘Good Effects,’ Pentagon Spokesman Says. U.S. strikes against militias affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Feb. 2, “had good effects,” said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder at a news conference today.
President Joe Biden ordered the strikes in response to the Jan. 28 militia strike that killed three U.S. service members and wounded more than 40 others at Tower 22 base in Jordan. The American forces are in the region as part of the defeat-ISIS effort.
U.S. military forces conducted strikes Feb. 2 on seven facilities in Iraq and Syria and hit more than 85 targets. The facilities that were hit include command and control operation centers, intelligence centers, rockets, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicle storage and logistics, and ammunition supply chain facilities, Ryder said.
“Although we continue to evaluate, we currently assess that we had good effects and the strikes destroyed or functionally damaged more than 80 targets at the seven facilities,” the general said. “The number of casualties is still being assessed.”
Ryder emphasized that the strikes are the start of U.S. response. “There will be additional actions taken to hold the IRGC and affiliated militias accountable for their attacks on U.S. and coalition forces,” he said.
He reiterated that the United States does not seek conflict in the Middle East, “but attacks on American forces will not be tolerated, and we will continue to take all necessary actions to defend the United States.”
The Feb. 2 attacks are separate and distinct from the multinational actions taken Feb. 3, Ryder said. On Saturday, U.S. forces along with forces from the United Kingdom, Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand hit targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
“These strikes were intended to further disrupt and degrade Houthi capabilities to conduct their attacks against U.S. and international vessels, lawfully transiting the Red Sea,” Ryder said.
Coalition forces targeted 13 locations striking 36 Houthi targets. These included buried weapons storage facilities, missile systems and launchers, air defense systems and radars. These are capabilities the Houthis use to attack international merchant and naval vessels in the region, Ryder said.
“This collective action sends a clear message to the Houthis that they will continue to bear further consequences if they do not end their illegal attacks,” Ryder said.
U.S. forces have also taken unilateral self-defense actions to destroy Houthi missile launchers loaded to the fire, and unmanned surface vessels prepared for employment, Ryder said. These weapons posed an imminent threat to merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region.
“Again, the U.S. does not want escalation, and the strikes are directly in response to the actions by the Iranian-backed Houthis. However, we will not hesitate to defend lives and the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways,” the general said.
The international coalition will continue efforts in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Ryder said. The Houthis “live in the same physical plane that we do,” he said. “And they have a finite amount of capability. The question is: How much of that capability they want to sacrifice to a doomed cause? Because we’ll continue to diminish and disrupt that capability in the sake of working with international allies and partners to ensure that mariners can safely transit.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
05 Feb 24. Iran Warns U.S. Against Targeting ‘Cargo Ships’ Suspected as Spy Bases Following New Strikes on Yemen’s Houthis. Iran has issued a stark warning to the United States against targeting two cargo ships, the Behshad and Saviz, which have long been under suspicion as forward observation posts for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These ships, linked to a U.S.-sanctioned Tehran-based company, are believed to be engaged in activities that support Houthi rebels, including potential arms smuggling and intelligence gathering.
Previously, the Saviz was pinpointed by Saudi Arabia in 2017 as an IRGC maritime base, emphasizing its military rather than commercial role. Adding to the controversy, the Iranian army released a video on Sunday labeling these vessels as “floating armories,” meant to assist Iran’s counter piracy operations. This characterization came alongside observations from the Open-source Intelligence (OSINT) group Aurora Intel, which has kept tabs on the Behshad’s stationary position in the Red Sea, who found that the ships where regularly shadowed my Iranian Navy vessels. The behavior has raised suspicions about its true purpose, with Aurora Intel questioning the frequent small boat traffic to and from the Behshad, suggesting it is “moving people, not cargo,” according to a report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
The Behshad’s recent activation of its AIS transponder and its movement toward the Gulf of Aden have coincided with a surge in Houthi attacks in the region. This shift, as reported by the maritime intelligence service MariTrace, sparks debate regarding the ship’s level of involvement in these incidents. Security experts are increasingly convinced that these vessels are not just passively observing but are actively assisting Houthi rebels with targeting information. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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