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Military And Security Developments
Dec 22.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continues to intensify its operations in Gaza, indicating an expansion south of Wadi Gaza through Bureij.
• Israel-Lebanon border hostilities continue to escalate, with large barrages of rockets targeting northern Israel and the IDF striking deeper into Lebanon.
• A diluted UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution will likely pass without a US veto; it will likely focus on the provision of aid to Gaza amid slow progress in ceasefire negotiations.
• IDF operations and clashes in Gaza continue at a previously observed increased pace. In northern Gaza, the IDF began transitioning from clearing to holding operations in Beit Hanoun and north-western Gaza City. It has reportedly established operational control of Shujaiya, highlighting its continued efforts to consolidate territorial control. On 22 December, the IDF also ordered civilians to evacuate Bureij in central Gaza, indicating the likely southwards expansion of its operations in the coming days. IDF operations have continued to draw Gaza-based militants’ resources and focus, with the majority of rocket fire targeting IDF locations in Gaza and the surrounding Gaza envelope. Nevertheless, on 21 December, a multi-rocket barrage triggered alerts in Central and Tel Aviv districts; alerts in Herzliya underscored the use of higher capacity and longer-range rockets. The pattern of fire remains consistent with our analysis of lower time windows for launches and more concerted efforts to clear weapon caches before they are discovered by IDF ground forces.
• Clashes along on the Israel-Lebanon border continue to escalate. Over the past 24 hours, there was a notable uptick in the frequency and size of rocket barrages fired towards Israel, with a salvo of 20 rockets fired in the early hours of 22 December. The IDF has continued to intensify air and artillery strikes against Lebanese Hizballah infrastructure and positions in Lebanon, reportedly conducting airstrikes up to 12 miles (20km) from the Israel-Lebanon border. This points to the elevated physical security and bystander risks deeper within Lebanese territory.
• The Shin Bet’s statistics highlight increased settler violence in the West Bank since the start of the war. During an interview on 21 December, an Israeli security official discussed internal figures on settler violence; they claimed the Shin Bet documented 201 attacks by settlers between 7 October and 3 December. These represent a 54% increase in settler attacks compared to pre-war levels. Of these attacks, nine incidents involved attacks against IDF soldiers. According to the official, the first month of the war experienced the biggest uptick; cases have since continued to decline. These figures highlight the continued elevated ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, as well as the heightened physical security risks.
• Nothing significant to report in the Red Sea
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• While a UNSC resolution calling for increased aid deliveries will likely pass in the coming hours, progress in ceasefire negotiations remains slow. On 22 December, the UNSC will almost certainly vote on a resolution proposed by the UAE calling for increased humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza; the US will likely abstain while allowing the resolution to pass. Over the past week, negotiations to soften the resolution’s wording from calling for a ceasefire to improving the delivery of aid into Gaza have been driven by efforts to avoid a US veto. Concurrently, negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue, though significant tensions remain, with Hamas representatives reportedly stating that an unconditional ceasefire should be implemented in Gaza before discussions on hostage releases can begin.
• International shipping companies continue to restrict the movement of their assets through the Red Sea, exacerbating supply chain disruption and increasing prices. On 21 December, Hapag-Lloyd and Orient Overseas Container Line announced plans to continue re-routing vessels away from the Red Sea amid elevated threats posed by the Yemen-based Houthis. Given the significant disruption to international shipping lanes and rising insurance costs, the average price of shipping a container from China to the Mediterranean has increased by approximately 40% since 1 December. Earlier on 22 December, Maersk announced that it would impose additional surcharges on containers re-routed from Asia to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) from 1 January 2024. It is likely that additional shipping companies will soon follow suit, increasing the likelihood of further supply chain disruption and rising costs for consumers in the coming months (see Sibylline Special Report – Red Sea Supply Chains 21 December 2023).
FORECAST
Continued sticking points in ceasefire negotiations will likely delay an agreement being reached, with operations in Gaza continuing at pace. Hamas reportedly continues to insist on the cessation of IDF operations and hostilities in Gaza in return for negotiations over hostage releases. Given this stance, ceasefire negotiators are unlikely to reach an agreement in the coming days. However, US pressure on both sides to achieve a ceasefire and to reduce IDF operations in Gaza before 1 January 2024 will continue to sustain the possibility of a last-minute agreement. As the negotiations continue, the IDF is likely to continue intensifying its operations in Gaza so as to achieve key strategic aims before being ordered to stop in the event of a ceasefire. In the coming days, the IDF is likely to continue its ground expansion towards central Gaza south of the Wadi Gaza mark, further elevating security risks and mobility disruption in the area. Despite the likely adoption of the UNSC resolution to improve humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza, continued combat operations and disruption to cross-border movement is highly likely to sustain critical food, water and energy insecurity throughout Gaza.
A moderate de-escalation in hostilities in the Red Sea is likely, though sporadic Houthi attacks against commercial and military vessels remain a realistic possibility. Following the formation of the international maritime task force, there has been a decrease in the frequency of Houthi drone and missile attacks against commercial vessels, despite threats by the group to continue targeting international shipping lanes. While this trend likely reflects the reduced traffic in the Red Sea, increasing international participation in the taskforce will likely continue to deter attacks and hijacking attempts. As the Houthis have broadly achieved their goals of disrupting shipping lanes and fixing the attention of the international community, the frequency of attacks against ships will likely remain low in the coming days. Nevertheless, as the Israel-Hamas war continues and elevated regional tensions persist, shipping firms will continue to face elevated risks of attack in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, disrupting supply chain continuity and driving elevated insurance costs.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
• The ongoing IDF ground operation expands further into southern Gaza
*Lebanon: Economic recovery unlikely in short term despite announcement of EU financial package. On 22 December, the EU announced that it would allocate 205.5 m Euros (USD 225 m) to support economic stability and recovery in Lebanon. The new financial package will aid the government in covering some essential imports, salaries, and other expenditures. However, it will likely not be enough to support a material economic recovery in the short term. The EU also added in its statement that it would provide further technical support to enhance border management and to upgrade water and electricity infrastructure, in addition to strengthening education programs and the electoral process, though no timeline was given. The EU gave further incentives for Lebanon to implement regulatory and policy reforms recommended by the IMF, promising to help implement fiscal policy and public finance management measures to increase resources once the IMF program is in place. However, an ongoing political deadlock is likely to continue to challenge the implementation of such measures, impeding a sustainable socio-economic recovery.
Dec 21.
*Yemen-US: Houthis threaten to attack US battleships, driving risk of military escalation in Red Sea, Iraq and Syria. On 21 December, the leader of Yemen’s Houthis, Abdel-Malek Al-Houthi, warned they would strike US battleships and interests in the region if the militant group was targeted by Washington DC. The warning comes two days after the US Secretary of Defense announced the formation of a US-led multinational maritime taskforce to respond to the Houthi attacks on commercial vessels traversing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Houthi targeting of US commercial and military vessels will render further military escalation a realistic possibility in the southern regions of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 December 2023). It is also likely that other Iranian proxies will seek to escalate attacks on US assets in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility the Houthis will target other coalition members in the region (such as Bahrain) or neighbouring countries offering logistic support to the navies.
Dec 20.
• The IDF continues to intensify operations in Gaza in an effort to consolidate territorial gains amid intensifying ceasefire talks. On 19 December, the IDF announced it took control of Jabalia and proceeded to perform ‘fire belt’ airstrikes, intense strikes performed in very close proximity to one another primarily designed to destroy underground infrastructure. In Shujaiya, the IDF also reportedly demolished 56 buildings linked to militant activity in a co-ordinated explosion. Intensified strikes and efforts to destroy militant infrastructure likely reflect increasing efforts to secure operational goals and consolidate territorial gains before agreeing to pause military operations under a ceasefire agreement. As such, intensified operations are likely to continue over to coming days, particularly in northern Gaza, further elevating security risks.
• Tit-for-tat clashes between Israel and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants moderately increased over the past 24 hours, underscoring cross-border security threats. The IDF has increased the frequency and intensity of strikes on Hizballah positions and infrastructure in southern Lebanon, also launching pre-emptive strikes on 19-20 December. On 19 December, Lebanon-based Hamas militants also fired a multi-rocket barrage at an IDF position in Kiryat Shmona (Northern district), highlighting Hizballah’s increasing tolerance of pro-Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, launching cross-border attacks as tensions grow. This will likely elevate threats to Israeli population centres in northern Israel, particularly those close to the border and IDF positions. Similarly, IDF retaliatory strikes are likely to elevate security and bystander risks in southern Lebanon, given the risks of misidentification.
• Armed clashes and elevated tensions between the Israeli security forces and Palestinians continue on a trend, gradually escalating throughout the West Bank. On 20 December, IDF soldiers prevented a car-ramming attempt in Kiryat Arba (Hebron governorate), while armed clashes involving the deployment of IEDs in Azzun (Qalqilya governorate) on 19 December continued for the second day. Increased armed clashes and attacks on Israeli security forces in the West Bank are likely to continue elevating security and bystander risks in the area over the coming days. These are likely to drive tensions and the risk of mobility disruption following attacks.
• An alleged IDF airstrike in Syria’s Damascus International Airport (DAM) on 20 December reflects heightened tensions, though significant escalation remains unlikely. Following the strike, sporadic cross-border rocket launches into Israel’s Golan Heights from Syria are likely in the coming 48 hours.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Ceasefire negotiations continue, with a realistic possibility that parties will agree on a longer-term multi-day ceasefire. Over the past 24 hours, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad representatives have travelled to Egypt for mediated negotiations, increasing the likelihood of a tentative agreement being reached over the coming days. Reports indicate that such an agreement would likely include provisions for a week-long ceasefire in exchange for the release of at least 40 hostages, including women, children and male non-combatants. Though significant sticking points remain, amid ongoing US pressure on Israel to negotiate and implement a ceasefire agreement by 31 December, there is a realistic possibility of a tentative agreement or framework being agreed over the coming days.
• Additional telecommunications blackouts in Gaza will further limit humanitarian aid distribution, and disrupt communication with on-the-ground staff. On 20 December, Gaza’s largest telecommunications firm, Paltel, announced the complete interruption of all telecom and internet services. While the outage was likely triggered by damage to critical infrastructure, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will intentionally establish a communications blackout preceding an escalation in operations, which remains possible ahead of the launch of any ceasefire agreement. Disruption to communication with on-the-ground staff in Gaza will further exacerbate logistical issues with delivering and distributing aid amid critical food, water and energy insecurity.
FORECAST
IDF operations are likely to intensify over the coming days, likely forcing Hamas and associated militants to focus operations within Gaza, reducing the frequency of cross-border rocket barrages. Intensified airstrikes are likely to limit Gaza-based militants’ operational window. Together with increased IDF ground activity, Gaza-based militants will likely be forced to focus their resources on repelling ground advances, subsequently reducing strikes against Israeli population centres. However, sporadic barrages of rocket fire towards central and southern Israel remain a realistic possibility due to possible militant efforts to exhaust weapons caches before the IDF’s arrival. This risk will continue to sustain incidental threats to bystanders across Israel in the coming days.
The intensification of airstrikes and communication disruption in Gaza is likely to challenge aid deliveries, worsen socioeconomic conditions and drive risks to NGO staff. Limited communication services in Gaza are likely to disrupt the ability of NGOs to co-ordinate aid supply deliveries efficiently. Furthermore, intensifying strikes in Gaza, particularly in southern Gaza, are likely to further disrupt road access and mobility of aid trucks, causing additional delays to aid deliveries. These are likely to continue worsening the socio-economic health environment in Gaza, elevating security and criminal risks for NGO staff delivering or responsible for aid distribution.
- Elevated tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border are likely to persist, elevating the risk of gradual escalation on the Israel-Syria border. Israel is likely to gradually increase its strikes against Hizballah targets in Syria in order to limit escalation in Lebanon and further limit weapon procurement and Hizballah activities in Syria. These operations are likely to elevate the risk of sporadic cross-border rocket fire from Syria into Israel, particularly the Golan Heights area. However, significant escalation with Syria-based militants currently remains unlikely.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
• The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave
*Egypt-Ethiopia: Food, water security concerns will drive domestic grievances after dam talks’ failure. On 20 December, the Egyptian Ministry of Water and Irrigation announced that the latest round of talks over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) had failed given disagreements over the dam’s filling-in timeline. Continued disputes over how quickly Ethiopia will fill in the GERD will sustain significant water security concerns in Egypt, exacerbating uncertainty within the agricultural sector. Despite Egypt’s development of desalination infrastructure and water storage in Lake Nasser, a rapid filling-in of the GERD would likely result in significant water shortages, undermining food security and socio-economic health. As such, Egypt will likely intensify its diplomatic efforts to resolve any disagreements over the GERD filling-in timeline; it will possibly seek international mediation from China, Russia and/or the US. Should a diplomatic deadlock continue, there is a realistic possibility of persistent water insecurity further undermining the Egyptian economy’s stability, driving risks of domestic unrest through 2024.
*Iraq: Low voter turnout during provincial elections will likely prompt challenges to results. Earlier on 20 December, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced the preliminary provincial election results. A relatively low turnout rate (around 41%) was likely partially driven by boycott calls from the influential Shia cleric and politician Muqatda al-Sadr. Iran-backed Shia parties, including Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and Hadi Amiri’s We Build Coalition, made substantial gains in Shia-majority governorates. The Taqadum Alliance, led by Mohammed al-Halbousi, Iraq’s former parliamentary speaker, secured the majority of votes in Baghdad governorate, representing a shift from broad Shia dominance since 2003. While the vote passed with no major security incidents, there is a realistic possibility that several political factions will challenge the results given the low turnout, elevating the threat of protests in the coming weeks. It is also highly likely that hard negotiations will take place between Halbousi and Maliki for a provincial coalition in Baghdad, driving local tensions.
Dec 19.
• IDF made further progress in its clearing operations in northern Gaza, taking control of Hamas command and control centres in Beit Hanoun. In northern Gaza, IDF forces reached Gaza City’s central Palestine Square, where Hamas previously released hostages. In Khan Yunis, the IDF reportedly captured intelligence material and destroyed a drone lab. In Rafah, the IDF assassinated a businessman operating as a Hamas financier involved in money laundering and transfers of ms of Israeli shekels to finance Hamas’ military wing.
• Retaliatory IDF and Hizballah strikes continue against respective military positions and infrastructure in southern Lebanon and northern Israel continue on trend. On 18 December, Hizballah launched a salvo of rockets targeting Kiryat Shmona (Northern district) in retaliation for earlier IDF airstrikes near a funeral procession for a Hizballah fighter, resulting in a short-term electricity outage. Additionally, on 18 December, Hizballah claimed it struck two Iron Dome launch pads, though the IDF rejected this claim.
• The IDF continues its heightened frequency of operations in the West Bank, increasingly targeting terrorism funding and illegal vehicles. Overnight between 18-19 December, the IDF impounded 40 vehicles during operations in Surif (Hebron governorate). Additionally, on 18 December, Palestinian militants used IEDs against IDF soldiers during armed clashes in Azzun (Qalqilya governorate). Increased IDF operations are likely to continue driving tensions in the West Bank over the coming days, elevating risks of armed clashes and targeting of IDF positions.
• On 18 December, rockets fired from Syria into Israel fell in open land in the Golan Heights; the IDF responded with artillery fire towards the source in Syria. IDF tanks also subsequently struck a Syrian army position. The cross-border rocket launches from Syria were likely in response to an IDF airstrike on Hizballah positions in Syrian territory on 17 December. The rockets and the IDF response remain within trend and unlikely to signal a significant escalation between Israel and forces within Syria.
• The US announced the formation of a maritime task force named ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ to safeguard shipping routes in the Red Sea area. The multinational maritime task force will initially include Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, Spain, the UK and the US. Some parties will conduct joint patrols while others will support the task force with intelligence operations. Furthermore, according to reports citing an anonymous US defence official, several countries will be contributing to the task force on the condition of non-disclosure of their involvement; these are likely Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This likely reflects Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s tense relations with the Houthi and interest in avoiding escalation of attacks targeting their territory and/or vessels. In response to the US announcement, the Houthis reaffirmed their threats, saying the new task force will not deter them from continuing attacks on vessels, with the Houthis having attacked two commercial vessels, the Panama-flagged MSC Clara and the Cayman Islands-flagged Swan Atlantic on 18 December.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas continue to progress slowly, though negotiations remain highly fragile. Reports indicate that Hamas will release up to 50 hostages if the IDF first commits to a multi-day ceasefire. Additionally, Hamas representatives have reportedly requested that the IDF withdraw operations behind pre-determined lines within Gaza and are unwilling to negotiate on which hostages are released from Gaza. Amid rising domestic pressure to secure hostage releases and international pressure to pause operations in Gaza, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will make concessions to Hamas, particularly on the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli detention facilities. However, Israel is unlikely to agree to an unconditional ceasefire before reaching an agreement on hostage releases and is highly unlikely to withdraw forces from locations within Gaza, sustaining risks of negotiations stalling over the coming days.
• IDF operations in Gaza continue to undermine access to key medical facilities, sustaining significant public health concerns. On 18 December, the World Health Organisation announced that following IDF clearing operations in Beit Lahiya, the Kamal Adwan Hospital is non-operational. Less than a third of health centres in Gaza remain operational, with the WHO reporting that only one facility remains open in northern Gaza, given significant damages to facilities and lack of medical supplies. Deteriorating humanitarian conditions throughout Gaza, compounded by water and energy insecurity, will increase the risk of communicable disease outbreaks over the coming weeks, particularly during periods of elevated rainfall.
• Resumption of birthright trips underscores improving travel risk environment in central and southern Israel, though elevated physical risks persist. On 19 December, Birthright Israel announced that it would resume operating trips to Israel on 5 January, citing reduced concerns over rocket attacks on civilian population centres. Similarly, on 18 December, the Home Front Command announced the easing of conflict-related restrictions on in-person gatherings and designated Ashkelon (Southern district) as a ‘green’ area, permitting a return to in-person schooling and work. These decisions underscore the stabilising stable travel risk environment in Israel as the frequency and intensity of rocket fire from Gaza-based militants continue to decrease. Although continued IDF clearing operations will likely continue drawing militant resources away from targeting civilian population centres in central and southern Israel, sporadic instances of rocket fire will sustain physical security and bystander risks therein.
• There is a realistic possibility of the United Nations Security Council adopting a ceasefire resolution over the coming hours, though this is unlikely to alter IDF operations in Gaza. On 19 December, the UNSC will vote on a resolution proposed by the UAE calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. While the US will likely veto a resolution calling for an immediate and indefinite ceasefire, there is a realistic possibility of the US allowing a resolution calling for the temporary suspension of hostilities to pass. Although a UNSC resolution is unlikely to substantially alter IDF operations in Gaza over the coming days, rising international pressure on Israel to moderate operations in Gaza, particularly from the US, will increase the likelihood of ceasefire negotiations progressing over the coming days.
FORECAST
Given rising domestic and international pressure to adopt a ceasefire, there is a realistic possibility of negotiations resulting in a tentative agreement over the coming days. Such an agreement will likely entail a multi-day pause in IDF operations in exchange for the release of approximately 50 Israeli hostages, likely including male hostages for the first time. Although negotiations will be highly sensitive to spoiler violence in Gaza, an imminent Hamas delegation visit to Egypt will likely facilitate progress towards an agreement over the coming days. The agreement will almost certainly include provisions for Palestinian prisoner releases, and there is a realistic possibility of Israeli negotiators agreeing to release Palestinian prisoners convicted of killing Israelis in sole-perpetrator attacks and/or political figures to expedite hostage releases. Releases of Palestinian prisoners are highly likely to trigger demonstrations in the West Bank, particularly in proximity to the Ofer Prison (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). In response to demonstrations, Israeli security forces will likely use heavy-handed dispersal techniques, triggering localised clashes and driving ethno-religious tensions therein.
Iran-backed Houthis are likely to continue attacking vessels though with reduced frequency. Houthi threats and attacks have garnered significant international attention and caused the diversion of shipping operations, disrupting global trade as well as Israeli trade specifically. They are likely to continue targeting ships in the Red Sea area, however, to mitigate risks of major escalation while maintaining the threat of attacks these will likely take place at a reduced frequency. The Houthis Red Sea campaign will likely remain primarily one of harassment, although this will depend on the international task force response. A response greater than missile interception, such as the targeting of the source of fire or attacking warehouses or Houthi positions is likely to further elevate attack risks and Houthi escalation. Such a response by the international task force remains a realistic possibility. However, it is more likely that the international task force actions and response to Houthi attacks will follow a pattern of gradual escalation and warning signals, to prevent a quick escalation and will remain dynamic in response to Houthi actions. While security risks in the Red Sea area will remain elevated in the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility that the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the coming weeks will help reduce tensions and Houthi attacks, in a pattern consistent with the last ceasefire period.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
• The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave
*Egypt: Economic conditions are unlikely to improve in short term following El-Sisi’s election victory. Earlier on 19 December, the Electoral Commission announced that President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi won a third term with 89.6% of the vote. While El-Sisi’s victory was widely anticipated, the result remains highly contentious. Economic conditions across Egypt are poor, while a key opposition candidate was forced to withdraw from the campaign due to alleged harassment. Additionally, human rights activists claim government workers were forced to vote for El-Sisi, whose government has now secured six more years in power through its victory. The government is highly likely to devalue the Egyptian Pound (EGP) further against the USD in the coming months so as to secure further tranches of IMF financial support. In the short term, such a move will increase import costs, increasing challenges for local businesses and driving inflation further. This will impact poorer households more acutely, exacerbating the cost-of-living crisis and raising the threat of domestic unrest through 2024.
*US-Yemen: Military escalation is likely in Red Sea, Gulf of Aden due to Operation Prosperity Guardian. On 19 December, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational security initiative to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. According to Austin’s official statement, the initiative will address the increasing threats posed by the Yemen-based Houthis, who are currently targeting commercial ships traversing the Bab Al Mandab Strait. The multinational maritime task force will initially include Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, Spain, the UK and the US. The operation will lead to an increase in military activity in the waters to the south of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in the coming weeks, driving the risk of further escalation. The Houthis will likely continue to pose a threat to commercial vessels crossing the strait. Notably, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not part of the coalition. This most likely reflects an attempt by both countries to mitigate any setbacks to their recent détente with Iran, the main sponsor of the Houthis.
Dec 18.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shot and killed three Israeli hostages during operations in Shujaiya, underscoring the intense clashes taking place amid ongoing clearing operations in northern Gaza.
• Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly resumed with Qatari mediation; there is a realistic possibility of a tentative agreement being reached in the coming days.
• Continued Houthi attacks against ships in the Bab al-Mandab Strait have prompted several international shipping firms to suspend operations in the Red Sea, elevating risks to global supply chain continuity.
• Over the past 72 hours, the IDF has intensified its operations in Gaza, deploying more troops to Khan Yunis in southern Gaza. Additionally, IDF soldiers accidentally shot and killed three Israeli hostages in Shujaiya on 15 December, underlining the significant threat of misidentification in Gaza. On 17 December, the IDF revealed that it uncovered one of the largest tunnels to date, wide enough to drive a car through. The tunnel is located close to the Erez crossing and is connected to Jabalia. In Beit Lahiya in northern Gaza, the IDF announced it had cleared the Kamal Adwan Hospital, arresting 90 militants in the area. The IDF also expanded its operations in Khan Yunis to the east of the city. Additionally, rockets fired from Gaza on 15 December triggered sirens in Jerusalem for the first time since 30 October. No damage was reported. Overall, the rate of rocket fire from Gaza towards Israel over the past 72 hours has remained low.
• Tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border remain elevated; there has been an uptick in drone incursions and attacks over the past 72 hours. Tit-for-tat clashes between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah and/or affiliated militants continued on trend over the weekend, gradually escalating. On 16 December, Hizballah killed one IDF soldier and injured two others in a drone attack against an IDF position near Margaliot (Northern district). The IDF also conducted a strike deeper than usual into Lebanese territory. Also on 16 December, the IDF reportedly struck Hizballah targets in Houmine el-Tahta (Nabatieh governorate), located around 15.8 miles (25.4km) north of the Israel-Lebanon border. Escalation, security and bystander risks across southern Lebanon and northern Israel remain elevated.
• IDF forces have continued to bolster their operations in the West Bank, driving tensions and armed clashes. On 17-18 December, Palestinian militants were recorded clashing with IDF troops in Nour Shams (Tulkarm governate) and in Aqabah, Fara and Tubas (all Tubas governorate) with small arms and IEDs. Overall, the use of IEDs against IDF troops during armed clashes in the West Bank over the past 72 hours increased and expanded outside the usual hotspot locations. This is consistent with our previous assessment that IDF operations in Jenin would likely push Palestinian militants concentrated in the city into other governorates in the West Bank (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update 13 December 2023).
• Over the past 72 hours, increased tensions in the West Bank resulted in several attacks against civilians and the Israeli security forces. On 18 December, assailants opened fire on passing cars near Rawabi (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). On 17 December, an off-duty IDF reservist sustained moderate injuries following a sole-perpetrator knife attack at a petrol station near the Rantis checkpoint (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate); the perpetrator was later detained.
• On 17 December, the IDF reportedly killed two Lebanese Hizballah militants during strikes against military infrastructure and positions hosting Hizballah in Rif Dimashq governorate (Syria). The strike underlines the increasing risk of conflict spilling over into Syria as the IDF seeks out Hizballah assets assessed to be a direct threat to Israel, elevating security and bystander risks.
• Elevated Houthi activity continues to exacerbate operational threats for international shipping lanes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. At approximately 0900hrs (local time) on 18 December, the Swan Atlantic, a Cayman Islands-flagged oil and chemical tanker, was targeted by rocket fire as it passed the port of Mocha (Yemen). The rockets, which were fired from Houthi-controlled territory, did not strike the vessel, which was then assisted by the USS Carney. Additionally, on 16 December the US Navy shot down 14 drones linked to Houthi activity during operations in the Red Sea. Egypt and the UK also claim their navies have downed drones operating in the area. Elevated Houthi activity is highly likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining significantly elevated threats to global shipping lanes and operations close to Yemen.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have reportedly resumed, though will remain highly vulnerable to spoiler violence and deadlocks. On 15 December, the head of the Israeli intelligence service (Mossad) David Barnea met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Al-Thani to discuss potential ceasefire negotiations. This development comes as the Israeli government faces significantly elevated domestic pressure to secure hostage releases through diplomatic means after IDF personnel shot and killed three hostages in Gaza. Negotiations will almost certainly centre on Israel pausing operations in Gaza, as well as the release of Palestinian prisoners in the West Bank in exchange for the release of hostages (possibly including male hostages for the first time). Negotiations will be highly sensitive to spoiler violence by Gaza-based militants and will depend on Hamas’ capacity to commit credibly to locating and safely delivering hostages (who have been dispersed among multiple militant groups throughout Gaza).
• Despite the opening of the Kerem Shalom goods crossing, disruption to telecommunications services has sustained challenges to aid distribution in Gaza. On 15 December, the Kerem Shalom goods crossing opened to allow aid to enter Gaza directly. In the past 24 hours, approximately 80 trucks passed through the crossing while 120 passed through the Rafah crossing. However, damage to telecommunications infrastructure has resulted in an internet and telecommunications blackout throughout Gaza since 14 December. Although coverage was partially restored by 18 December, continued clashes between the IDF and Gaza-based militants will sustain the risk of further critical damage to infrastructure. Further blackouts will limit communication with on-the-ground staff and are highly likely to restrict the delivery and distribution of aid, sustaining humanitarian concerns over critical food, water and energy insecurity throughout Gaza.
• Cyber attacks conducted by an Israeli-linked hacking group disabled petrol station operations across Iran, increasing the likelihood of retaliatory attacks in the coming days. On 18 December, ‘Predatory Sparrow’, a hacking group with alleged links to Israel, launched a cyber attack against payment systems at Iranian petrol stations, disabling approximately 70% of such systems nationwide. While the attack is unlikely to undermine fuel access and energy security significantly in the coming days, Iranian-linked cyber threat actors will almost certainly attempt to conduct retaliatory attacks against targets in Israel and/or those linked to the Israeli government in the coming days. Escalating cyber hostilities will elevate the risk of attacks, breaches and hacks to firms with operations in Israel, particularly those linked to the public sector. However, attacks are unlikely to impact operations significantly for extended periods.
• Amid the significantly elevated threat posed by the Yemen-based Houthis, numerous international shipping firms have paused operations in the Red Sea, increasing threats to supply chain continuity. Since 15 December, six international shipping firms, including Maersk, Hapag-Llyod and the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), have announced temporary and/or partial suspensions of shipping services through the Red Sea. Earlier on 18 December, British Petroleum (BP) also announced that it would suspend all transits through the Red Sea, triggering a spike in natural gas prices in European markets. The re-routing of vessels via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) will significantly increase journey times for goods travelling from East Asia to Europe, increasing the likelihood of supply chain disruption and rising costs for carriers and consumers in the coming weeks.
FORECAST
While there is a realistic possibility that negotiators will reach a tentative ceasefire agreement in the coming days, intensifying clashes in southern Gaza will sustain critical physical security threats. In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that an agreement with a similar structure to the previous Israel-Hamas ceasefire will be reached, to include a suspension of military operations tied to the staggered release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners. Given the significant domestic pressure facing the Israeli government to secure hostage releases, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will make substantial concessions with regard to West Bank prisoner releases, including Palestinian political figures. As negotiations progress, the IDF will likely continue intensifying its operations in Gaza to consolidate territorial gains before pausing operations. As ground units advance into Khan Yunis, there is a realistic possibility of Hamas and allied militant groups diverting resources away from combat operations to defend key military strongholds in and around the city. In the coming days, escalating clashes will increase spillover risks in Rafah, elevating the threats to bystanders and the likelihood of disruption impacting aid deliveries arriving through the Rafah border crossing.
Increased Hizballah drone activity along the Israel-Lebanon border has underscored the sustained threat of escalation. There is a realistic possibility that the uptick in drone activity reflects a rise in the reconnaissance of IDF movements and positions as Hizballah attempts to identify the most valuable strike locations. While both sides appear reluctant to escalate the conflict significantly, this ostensible intelligence gathering likely reflects preparations for such an escalation. The continued rise in casualties on both sides points to an increased risk of an intensification in IDF-Hizballah tit-for-tat clashes, sustaining the risk of escalation in the coming weeks, though there is a limited possibility that the resumption of negotiations between Israel and Hamas will drive a reduction in military operations. Retaliatory clashes will maintain elevated security and bystander risks in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, particularly near military infrastructure. Increased hostilities between Israel and Hizballah will likely also increase security and bystander risks in Syria.
The suspension of Red Sea operations by major shipping companies is likely to increase European import and export costs. These are likely to exacerbate supply chain risks and delays due to the longer route that ships bypassing the Red Sea need to take. Furthermore, reduced shipping traffic in the Suez Canal will elevate socio-economic risks for Egypt due to the reduction in revenue from managing the canal. These are likely to elevate regional tensions further and to increase calls for an international maritime task force to secure shipping routes and to respond to Houthi attacks. As part of this task force, the US and its allies will likely first engage in a rhetorical campaign to discourage Houthi attacks, before considering strikes against Houthi positions. However, if the frequency and severity of Houthi attacks remain elevated, the risk of strikes against targets in Yemen will increase, raising the risk of escalation by other Iranian proxies.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by Lebanese Hizballah and/or Hamas against Israeli/Jewish targets outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes in Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting Lebanese Hizballah and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation from Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel strikes Hamas leadership within Lebanon
• The ongoing IDF ground operation into Gaza expands beyond the northern area of the enclave.
*Yemen-global: Halted Red Sea operations following Houthi attacks will disrupt global trade. On 15 December, the Danish shipping company Moller-Maersk and the German transport company Hapag-Lloyd announced that they are halting their operations in the Red Sea. Similarly, both the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and CMA CGM announced on 16 December that they are stopping their operations in the Red Sea. Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL) made a similar announcement on 17 December. These developments come amid an increase in Iran-backed Houthi attacks targeting ships traversing the Red Sea. As a result, various shipping companies are opting to conduct longer journeys through the Cape of Good Hope. Halted operations in the Red Sea will elevate socio-economic pressures in Egypt due to reduced shipping traffic traversing the Suez Canal. The longer route will also likely raise the costs of goods imported from East Asia to Europe and particularly Israel. The situation will likely further elevate regional tensions, while also increasing the prospects of joint international maritime operations established to deal with the Houthi threat, exacerbating security risks in the Red Sea area.
*Iran: Israel-linked campaign targeting gas stations points to cyber threat facing Iranian infrastructure. Earlier on 18 December, the Israel-linked hacktivist group ‘Gonjeshke Darande’ claimed responsibility for a disruptive cyber attack targeting Iranian gas stations. The attack allegedly disabled most gas pumps throughout Iran. Iranian officials have acknowledged the disruption, though they have not yet explained the cause. Gonjeshke Darande announced that the attack was in response to increased Iran-linked hacktivist activity targeting Israeli entities amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Since the outbreak of the war, there has been an uptick in Palestine- and Iran-affiliated hacktivist groups targeting Israeli entities via disruptive operations. In response, pro-Israel actors have increased their targeting of Iranian sites; this will likely continue as the war persists. Politically motivated hacktivist campaigns have proliferated globally in the past few years, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and, more recently, the Israel-Hamas war; they underscore the increasingly complex threat landscape governments must now must navigate. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Dec 23. Israel launches more Gaza strikes as Netanyahu says Hamas must be destroyed.
Summary
• LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel’s military says it hits 100 targets including tunnel shafts in southern Gaza
• Israeli forces shell Gaza from air land and sea, residents say
• 10 Palestinians killed in two Israeli air strikes, medics at Nasser Hospital say
• IDF says 160 soldiers killed in Gaza since ground operations began on Oct. 20
Israeli shellfire slammed into central Gaza on Tuesday after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged no respite in attacks on Hamas, as residents of the coastal enclave mourned more dead in a war that has cost more than 20,000 Palestinian lives.
Israel is determined to pursue its goal of destroying Hamas despite global calls for a ceasefire in the 11-week-old war, amid concerns the conflict could spread with U.S. and Iran-aligned forces attacking each other elsewhere in the region.
Since Hamas made the deadliest Palestinian militant attack on Israel in the country’s 75-year history, Netanyahu has responded with an all-out assault on Hamas-ruled Gaza. On Tuesday, the Israeli military said 160 soldiers have so far been killed in Gaza since ground operations began on Oct 20.
“Seventy-five years of suffering, our rights taken, our country seized, and our people slaughtered. Our rights, as people, are justifiable. What can we do?” said Mariam al-Omsi, walking along an alleyway after an air strike in Shaboura camp, near the town of Rafah in southern Gaza.
At Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis, the largest medical facility in the southern Gaza Strip, medics said 10 Palestinians had been killed in two separate Israeli air strikes.
Khan Younis resident Salah Shaat said he had heard a huge explosion at sunset on Monday that destroyed a building.
“There were displaced people and residents inside the house, more than 20 people, children and women. We managed to rescue some children, but the rest were martyred,” he said.
In Jerusalem, Israel’s military said the air force carried out a strike against 100 Hamas targets, including tunnel shafts, to assist ground forces.
It said in a statement that in Shejaia, a suburb near Gaza City, troops backed by aircraft killed several fighters spotted trying to plant a bomb underneath a tank. More than 10 fighters were killed in separate incidents in Khan Younis.
Netanyahu, who visited Israeli troops in northern Gaza on Monday, told lawmakers from his Likud Party that the war was far from over and dismissed what he cast as media speculation his government might call a halt to the fighting.
‘WE ARE NOT STOPPING’
He said Israel would not succeed in freeing its remaining hostages held by Hamas without applying military pressure.
“We are not stopping. The war will continue until the end, until we finish it, no less,” Netanyahu.
In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on Monday, Netanyahu reiterated three prerequisites for peace: Hamas must be destroyed, Gaza must be demilitarised, and Palestinian society must be deradicalised.
Retaliating against Hamas’ Oct. 7 cross-border rampage in which it killed 1,200 people and took about 240 hostage, Israel has been under pressure from top ally the U.S. to shift to lower-intensity warfare and to reduce civilian deaths.
Nearly 20,700 Gazans have been killed, including 250 in the last 24 hours, according to authorities in Gaza.
Elsewhere in the region, U.S. forces have come under attack by Iran-backed militants in Iraq and Syria over Washington’s backing of Israel in its war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
In the latest tit-for-tat clash, the U.S. military carried out retaliatory air strikes on Monday in Iraq after a drone attack by Iran-aligned militants on a U.S. base in Erbil left one U.S. service member in critical condition and wounded two other U.S. personnel, officials said.
The air strikes killed “a number of Kataib Hezbollah militants” and destroyed multiple facilities used by the group, the U.S. military said.
IRAN-HAMAS TIES
Hezbollah has deep ties to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, another Palestinian faction backed by Iran.
The U.S. military has come under attack at least 100 times in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began in October, usually with a mix of rockets and one-way attack drones.
Washington has for weeks pressured Israel to take further steps to minimise civilian harm by designating safe areas and clearing humanitarian routes for people to escape. But the death toll keeps rising and Israeli operations have intensified.
Gemma Connell, a U.N. team leader deployed in Gaza, described what she called a “human chess board” in which thousands of people, displaced many times already, are on the run again and there is no guarantee a destination will be safe.
A spokesperson for the Israeli military said the army takes all feasible precautions to minimise harm to civilians, but that Palestinian militants use civilians as human shields – an accusation Hamas denies.
Since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, Israel has laid much of the narrow strip to waste. The vast majority of Gaza’s 2.3 m population have been driven from their homes, and the United Nations says humanitarian conditions are catastrophic.
The Gaza war has also stoked violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, another territory where Palestinians seek statehood. Medics said two Palestinian males, aged 17 and 31, were shot dead by Israeli troops near the West Bank city of Hebron on Tuesday. A military spokesperson said soldiers opened fire at Palestinians who threw rocks, cinder blocks and petrol bombs at them.
(Source: Reuters)
20 Dec 23. Mohammed al-Zouari, the Tunisian Engineer behind Hamas’ Attack Drones. Mohammed al-Zouari is credited with granting the military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the technological know-how to create their first viable attack drones.
His name is now emerging once again, due to the Palestinian Resistance having announced the usage of a drone named ‘Zouari’ as part of their offensive against Israel.
Background
Mohammed al-Zouari’s role in aiding Hamas’ armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, was not known publicly until his assassination in 2016.
Although the team of armed men that killed al-Zouari was never caught, his death is widely attributed to the work of the Israeli Mossad, who is accused of assassinating him on Tunisian soil.
Following his death, al-Zouari was transformed into an iconic figure throughout occupied Palestine and the Arab world, yet his story is little known in the West.
A Tunisian by birth, Mohammed al-Zouari was born in 1967 and grew up in a conservative Muslim household, completing a religious and formal education, before graduating from the ‘National School of Engineers’ in the city of Sfax.
Working in a number of Arab countries, al-Zouari achieved the status of a university professor, was the technical director at a mechanical engineering company, a pilot for Tunisian airlines, and even the head of the ‘Southern Aviation Model Club’ where he trained students on how to make drones with limited materials.
In his youth, al-Zouari joined the Ennahda Movement, through his role as an activist in the ‘Tunisian General Union of Students,’ resulting in persecution from the regime of then President Zin El Abidine Ben Ali.
Imprisonment
Mohammed al-Zouari was imprisoned and when released, allegedly lived between Sudan, Syria and Libya for around 20 years, before returning to his homeland after the Tunisian revolution of 2011 that deposed Ben Ali.
In an interview conducted with al-Zouari’s widow, who is a Syrian national, she revealed that her husband adopted the name ‘Murad’ and did not inform her of his real identity until roughly a year and a half into their marriage.
It was in Syria, allegedly sometime in 2006, that he officially joined the Qassam Brigades of Hamas and began working on drone projects for them.
Qassam Brigades
By the year 2008, al-Zouari and a specialized team working alongside him, managed to manufacture around 30 drones successfully.
Then, between 2012 and 2013, he spent some 9 months inside the Gaza Strip, during which he successfully manufactured the ‘Ababil’ drone. This drone was used during the 2014 war that was fought between Israel and Hamas, proving successful at carrying out operations in attempts to repel Israel’s invading forces.
Prior to his assassination in 2016, while he was in Tunisia, al-Zouari was also working on a unmanned submarine project.
Al-Aqsa Flood
Hamas revealed that 35 suicide-drones bearing the name ‘Zouari’ were used by the Qassam Brigades on October 7, paving the way for their fighters to penetrate crucial military positions belonging to the Israeli military.
The mention of Mohammed Zouari, by Hamas officials following the launch of operation ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ has drawn further intrigue into his story, which even came as a shock to many Palestinians following the announcement of his martyrdom in 2016 by the Qassam Brigades.
His identity was completely hidden until his assassination and the obituary released by the Hamas military wing, in the advent of al-Zouari’s passing, was the first of a foreign national known to be involved in such an intimate way in the ranks of the armed wing. (Source: UAS VISION/The Palestine Chronicle)
19 Dec 23. Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Virtual Conference on Red Sea Maritime Security. Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following readout:
During his trip to the Middle East, Secretary Austin convened a virtual ministerial with Ministers, Chiefs of Defense, and senior representatives from 43 countries, as well as the European Union and NATO, to discuss the increased threat to maritime security in the Red Sea. Secretary Austin reaffirmed U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways and outlined the ways Houthi attacks are destabilizing maritime security. Secretary Austin underscored that attacks had already impacted the global economy and would continue to threaten commercial shipping if the international community did not come together to address the issue collectively. Secretary Austin condemned Houthi attacks on international shipping and global commerce as unprecedented and unacceptable, noting the attacks threaten the free flow of commerce and endanger innocent mariners.
The Secretary and senior Department of Defense leadership, including the Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Kurilla, and the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Vice Admiral Cooper, briefed participants that the Houthis had conducted over 100 one-way uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and ballistic missile attacks, targeting 10 merchant vessels involving more than 35 different nations. They highlighted that the Houthis had taken the Merchant Vessel GALAXY LEADER and its 25-member international crew hostage on November 19; the crew remain unjustly detained in Yemen. Participants discussed how the attacks are a flagrant violation of international law, and the Houthis must cease their aggressive actions. Currently, 10-15% of global trade passes through the Red Sea, and international shipping companies are having to reroute through the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to the delivery of key goods and materials, including oil and gas.
To address this unprecedented series of attacks, the Secretary urged participants to join U.S.-led and other international initiatives and work with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) and the 39-member Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to restore security in the Red Sea to deter future Houthi aggression. Secretary Austin pointed to CMF’s Task Force 153—charged with international maritime security and capacity-building in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden—as an existing multi-lateral platform that could be leveraged to deter attacks under the CMF. He reiterated that the international community is faced with an unprecedented global challenge that demands collective action. The United States will continue to consult and work alongside allies and partners, who share the fundamental principle of freedom of navigation. (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Dec 23. Austin, Gallant Discuss Continuing Operations Against Hamas. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III discussed the goals and objectives of Israel’s campaign against the Hamas terror group in Gaza with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in Tel Aviv today.
The officials also talked about how to reduce harm to civilians in the battlespace and the need to ensure a sustained flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, Austin said at a news conference following the meeting. Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also participated in the high-level talks.
Today, @SecDef and I met with @IsraelPM, @yoavgallant, and Chief of the General Staff LTG Halevi in Tel Aviv to discuss Israel’s ongoing campaign to defeat Hamas and emphasize the strategic alliance between our two countries. pic.twitter.com/TcahzY3EdR — General CQ Brown, Jr. (@GenCQBrownJr) December 18, 2023
Austin has been in near-daily contact with Gallant since Hamas launched its terror attacks on Israel Oct. 7. That attack killed more than a thousand Jews living near the Gaza Strip with hundreds of hostages, including Americans, taken by the terror group.
“I know that Israel has been profoundly changed from where you were on Oct. 6,” Austin said. “I’m here with a clear message: America’s support for Israel’s security is unshakable.”
Hamas committed atrocities during its attack on Israel. It is a continuation of its professed goals: The killing of Jews and the elimination of the Jewish state. “No country should tolerate such a danger,” Austin said. “And Israel has every right to defend itself against a fanatical terrorist group whose stated purpose is to murder Jews and eradicate the Jewish state.”
The terrorists hide among the population of Gaza and seem determined “to doom both Israelis and Palestinians to an unending cycle of suffering and strife,” the secretary said. “Democracies are stronger and more secure when we uphold the law of war. And I’ve said, protecting Palestinian civilians in Gaza is both a moral duty and a strategic imperative.”
The United States will continue to stand up for Israel’s bedrock right to defend itself, he said. “And we will also continue to urge the protection of civilians during conflict and to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza,” Austin said. “That’s important, as Israel fights to dismantle the Hamas terror infrastructure in Gaza. And it will also be crucial for our work with our allies and partners after the fighting stops.”
Both Austin and Gallant looked beyond Hamas toward the group’s sponsor: Iran. “We’re working to ensure that this conflict does not escalate beyond Gaza,” Austin said. “But as we are driving to stabilize the region, Iran is raising tensions by continuing to support terrorist groups and malicious attacks by these Iranian proxies who threaten the region and risk a broader conflict. Of course, the United States does not seek war. And we urgently call on Iran to take steps to de-escalate.”
Productive meeting today with @yoavgallant to discuss Israel’s ongoing campaign to defeat Hamas, to include objectives, phasing, and protecting civilians. We also focused on Iran-backed threats across the region, and our shared commitment to countering this aggression. pic.twitter.com/HOCKiC5yFX — Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (@SecDef) December 18, 2023
Austin is also looking beyond the Israeli war on Hamas. “Now, we know that the past 72 days have been some of the most painful days in Israel’s history,” he said. “But it would compound this tragedy if all that was waiting for the Israeli people and your Palestinian neighbors is at the end of this awful war, was more insecurity, fury and despair.”
Israelis and Palestinians “deserve a horizon of hope,” Austin said. It is in the interests of both people to support the “two-state solution” living side by side in mutual security. “Now we know how hard that is, especially after Oct. 7,” Austin said. “But ongoing instability and insecurity only play into the hands of Hamas. So, we must think together about what lies beyond this terrible season of terror and war.”
But the war does continue, and the U.S. and Israeli leaders discussed the complexity of the combat. Austin stressed that the battlespace is incredibly difficult with very closed spaces and a dense population. “That makes it very, very difficult to conduct any military operation,” he said. “Above and beyond that, we see that Hamas routinely uses civilians as shields.”
The terror group also sites headquarters and logistical nodes near “protected sites” like hospitals, schools, mosques and churches. This adds to the complexity and “provides an additional burden for the forces prosecuting this fight,” Austin said. ” requires a very professional force. And that force has to learn each step of the way.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
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