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MoD Press Briefing on the AJAX programme – Part 2

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15 Dec 21. The MoD held a press briefing following the release of the Minister’s Statement (See: BATTLESPACE ALERT Vol.23 ISSUE 62, 15 December 2021, UK Defence Ministerial oral statement on the AJAX programme – Part 1)

The Press briefing was hosted by Air Commodore Wendy Rothery, Head of Strategic Communications at UK Ministry of Defence.

 

The panel included

Lieutenant General Sir Christopher Tickell KBE DCGS

David Marsh SRO for Armoured Cavalry Vehicles

David King MoD Director of Health, Safety and Environmental Protection.

 

Overall Message

 

The overall message from the Panel was that the current issues of noise and vibration in Ajax can be addressed to continue the programme although nobody would give a firm In Service Date until a full assessment of the problems has been made and whether they are addressable through engineering changes or a full change in vehicle specification.

The briefing focused on the noise and vibration automotive challenges for Ajax  being addressed at Millbrook and made no mention of any of the reported turret issues in the failure to gain a second round on target. The Editor asked that question which was not given to the Panel.

The general message mirrored that given by the Minister was that, ‘Ajax is an important capability and a vital step-change in the way the British Army will operate on the future battlefield. It will provide Ground Mounted Reconnaissance, allowing the Army to understand the battlefield in all weathers, 24 hours a day. Part of our £41bn investment in Army equipment and support over the next 10 years, this modernisation is critical to address future threats.’

The MOD accepts all of those relating specifically to armoured vehicle procurements, the regulation of safety for land equipment and the broader approach to safety in Defence.

Key points from the Review.

  1. General Dynamics UK is responsible for the design and build of the Ajax vehicles. The vehicles they delivered for use in the trials had levels of noise and vibration that were higher than usually expected in tracked vehicles and have been proven to be above the statutory limit. This exposed our personnel to potential harm. This exposure was not prevented by the MOD due to a series of failures to act when concerns were raised by expert advisers and by soldiers operating the vehicles.
  2. An MOD Safety Notice in December 2018 that said design upgrades were required to reduce vibration. This was not acted upon.
  3. MOD safety cases and safety management used GDUK calculations that were not independently assured, despite experts at the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory advising that the calculations should not be relied upon.
  4. A report from the Defence Safety Authority in May 2020 identifying some of these issues and entitled “Serious Safety Concerns on Ajax” that was retracted and not pursued, either by the DSA or by the project team in DE&S.
  5. Multiple warnings from Dstl and from the Armoured Trials and Development Unit that were running the trials were not actioned, even when the ATDU Commanding Officer questioned the approach as having the potential to expose soldiers to a known hazard which he stated was not a defendable position.
  6. There is an urgent need for Health & Safety issues to become a more integral part in the planning and management of major defence programmes. This issue was now being addressed not only at DE&S but also in the Army and MoD.
  7. The Ajax Health and Safety report makes for very difficult reading. It lays bare a deep malaise which is cultural and results in systemic failures across DE&S, the MoD and Army.
  8. There is a need to encourage all those involved in procurement programmes to speak up, to identify problems and make clear where those responsible are failing. A culture in which individuals may be discouraged from elevating problems through the chain of command, only solutions, may be admirable in other circumstances but rarely in procurement.
  9. A need to support Army, MoD and DE&S Staff by resolving underlying cultural issues that risk making it harder to deliver the capabilities needed by our Armed Forces.
  10. A senior legal figure is being commissioned to look more deeply at Ajax and not just health and safety; to examine the cultural and process flaws that it has highlighted.
  11. General Dynamics UK is responsible for delivering a safe and effective vehicle, it is clear from the report that the customs and practices of the Army, DE&S, Defence Digital and wider MOD resulted in a culture that prevented issues being addressed at an earlier point. The MoD is committed to ensuring that measures are put in place to deliver what are very complex programmes in a way that minimises the risk to MoD personnel while delivering the capability needed by the Armed Forces.
  12. If the review uncovers evidence of gross misconduct, those concerned will be held to account but the primary purpose though is to ensure that we address significant cultural failings.
  13. A culture exists of not treating safety as equally important as cost and time in the acquisition process.
  14. From a cultural perspective, the Army did not believe it was potentially causing harm to people, especially from vibration, as it was tacitly expected that soldiers can and should endure such issues.
  15. The Millbrook trials to baseline the vehicle’s characteristics have completed and conclusions are expected shortly.
  16. General Dynamics have been developing its own theories and trialling design modifications to address vibration. The analysis will be received in the New Year, following which it will be deemed if appropriate undertake thorough testing of GDUK’s proposed modifications to satisfy ourselves on their efficacy.
  17. Part of the analysis is also looking at the performance of the headset used in Ajax. While the noise profile on Ajax is noticeably different from other armoured vehicles, following tests on in-service headsets we took in November a precautionary measure to limit temporarily the amount of time personnel operate using them in other AFVs.
  18. Acoustic testing of in-service headsets is now underway at test facilities in the UK and overseas. The MoD is also testing other headsets to establish if they will meet the requirements and provide additional attenuation. Once this analysis is complete, the MoD expects to be able to relax the temporary restrictions or implement appropriate mitigations. In the meantime, we remain able to maintain our operational commitments.
  19. The work on Ajax has also highlighted the significant number of personnel across Defence whose exposure to noise results in short or long-term restrictions to their military duties. The MOD Permanent Secretary wis to look further at this issue to ensure we are doing all we can to prevent avoidable hearing loss in our people. DE&S has contacted the 310 personnel identified as having worked on Ajax. 238 have returned to duty, 40 declined to be assessed for hearing but, of the remainder, I am pleased to report that the vast majority have returned to duty with no health impact. As of 9 December, 17 individuals remain under specialist outpatient care for their hearing, some of whom are again expected to return to duty with no health impact.11 individuals have had long term restrictions on noise exposure recommended, potentially requiring a limitation in their military duties. 7 of these had pre-existing hearing issues prior to working on Ajax. 4 did not. In addition, 4 individuals who worked on Ajax have been discharged on health grounds, in some cases for reasons wholly unrelated to hearing loss. While we cannot yet establish a definitive causal link, it is possible that Ajax may have contributed to the current hearing loss in a small number of individuals. It remains the case that no individuals have had long term restrictions or been discharged as a result of vibration. However, assessment for both hand-transmitted and whole-body vibration take time and require a specialist assessment and these continue.
  20. An MOD Safety Notice in December 2018 that said design upgrades were required to reduce vibration; this was not acted upon.
  21. MOD safety cases and safety management used GDUK calculations that were not independently assured, despite experts at the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory advising that the calculations should not be relied upon.
  22. There were missed opportunities to listen to soldiers from ATDU. BATTLESPACE understands that ATDU asked for 12 changes in Capability Drop 1 and none were addressed by GDUK.
  23. Avoiding the concurrent running of the demonstration and manufacture stages in future projects. This recommendation needs to be considered carefully to ensure the MoD captures the safety imperatives while not preventing sensible spiral development or for example the parallel construction of classes of warship.

Overall, the report made 20 recommendations.

Other issues covered in the press conference included:

  1. In Service Date (ISD). The original ISD was 2025 timeframe. This will now be reassessed in terms of the reality of the fixes required and the other issues of the Future Solider programme. Next year will see a sequence of performance events laid out.
  2. What if there is no solution? The MoD is positive that the current issues of noise and vibration in Ajax can be addressed to continue the programme. A full assessment of the problems has been made and whether they are addressable through engineering changes or a full change in vehicle specification.
  3. GDUK’s financial liability. The Minster’s Statement was that, “General Dynamics UK is responsible for the design and build of the Ajax vehicles. We have a robust firm price contract for the delivery of 589 vehicles at a cost of £5.5bn. We are ensuring we protect our commercial position under the contract and will not accept a vehicle that is not fit for purpose. It remains impossible to share with this House 100% confidence that this programme will succeed or, if it does, the timing of achieving Full Operating Capability.”
  4. Will slippage cause a Capability Gap? The MoD is a looking at a number of mitigating solutions including extending the life of CVR(T) and Warrior.
  5. A redesign of the Army Opportunity Model including more oversight of the equipment portfolio.
  6. Improvements in recent SRO appointments to ensure focus on delivering Programmes.
  7. An improved approach to safety culture in DE&S, the Army and MoD. ‘Near Miss’ reporting is improving.
  8. Learn the lessons from the Ajax programme and to continue to support DE&S and GDUK in delivering Ajax.
  9. To look after the soldiers affected by the excess noise and vibration issues.
  10. Accepting that the MoD, DES&S and the Army has considerable challenges to deliver a 21st Century capable Army from the legacy fleet of 20th Century vehicles. There is a need to work through the current uncomfortable hiatus
  11. There will be an acceptable risk in some areas.
  12. Allow Capability Drops to take into account new technology.

The Minister’s Statement and the Press Briefing cleared the air over Ajax and stopped any rumours of an outright cancellation of the project. However, clearly there is a long way to go until the MoD, DE&S, the Army and GDUK produce a vehicle which meets all the requirements for an advanced 21st Century C4ISR Recce vehicle for the British Army which meets all the performance and safety specifications required to allow a reasonable In Service Date. It was more akin to a ‘Holding Statement,’ rather than a firm commitment that ‘all the issues can be resolved within a reasonable timeframe’ – there is no Plan ‘B.’