Sponsored by Spectra Group
————————————————————————
30 Nov 23. DOD Chemical, Biological Defense Program Adapts to Emerging Threats as it Marks 30-Year Anniversary. As the Defense Department marks the 30th anniversary of its chemical and biological defense program, the field’s professionals continue to adapt to the future threat environment.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Ian Watson said that threat landscape has evolved significantly since the creation of the Pentagon’s program responsible for arming the joint force against chemical and biological risks in the wake of the Gulf War.
Technological advances have enabled near peer competitors to potentially engineer a broad range of agents at a speed and scale unlike decades before, he said. And those threats are now less detectable.
“The capabilities across high-performance computing, , material science and near peer competition far exceed anything that we were dealing with ,” Watson said.
“We are dealing with very sophisticated capabilities that we are concerned about,” he said. “And we’re talking about if there’s ever a conflict with one of those near peer competitions, unlike in Desert Storm, it will bring the entirety of the joint force into, and possibly susceptible to, chemical or biological attack. So, we have to protect everyone.”
Congress created the DOD wide chemical and biological defense program in November 1993, after a government report noted U.S. forces were not sufficiently prepared to address Iraq’s chemical and biological warfare capabilities.
Prior to the creation of the program under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services were each responsible for developing their own chemical and biological defense capabilities.
Watson said other studies also noted a lack of interoperability among U.S. forces in responding to chemical and biological threats.
Those deficiencies spanned “nearly every aspect of chem bio defense across our detection, individual protection, collective protection and decontamination and medical programs,” he said.
“Not only were the services showing up with a lack of interoperability between them, but they also had differing levels of protection, different levels of standards and different types of equipment,” he said.
That combination resulted in severe deficiencies in the ability of U.S. forces to continue to fight through a chemical or biological attack.
The fallout could have changed the course of the war.
Senior defense officials at the time noted the debilitating psychological impact the use of biological and chemical weapons would have had on U.S. forces.
“One of my biggest concerns from the outset was the psychological impact of the initial use of chemical weapons on the troops.… if it stops them dead in their tracks and scares them to death,” Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., who, as Commander of U.S. Central Command, oversaw the U.S. and coalition effort during the Gulf War, said in his 1991 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Marine Gen. Walter E. Boomer, who led the Marine Corps’ efforts during the war, remarked that chemical warfare was an “overriding concern” along with the potential for being outnumbered during the Gulf War.
“This just occupied most of my waking moments,” he said in an interview with PBS Frontline.
Congress’ mandate was to unify the disparate chemical and biological defense programs under the services into a single program that would manage and integrate that defense across the DOD.
The newly created defense wide program was charged with developing chemical and biological defense capabilities for the entire joint force. This includes detection and early warning of threats as well as providing U.S. forces with the tools to counter them on the battlefield, such as personal protective gear, decontamination equipment, and medical countermeasures.
Today the program oversees the chemical biological defense across the full continuum from initial research and experimentation through the delivery of new capabilities to the joint force.
In addition to arming the joint force against chemical agents and weaponized pathogens, the program has also overseen the DOD response to naturally occurring contagions including the development of mRNA technology used in the rapid development of vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The program also developed therapeutics used to treat Ebola. One of those treatments, Remdesivir, also became the first FDA-approved therapeutic for COVID-19.
Throughout its history, the Pentagon program has adapted to a constantly changing threat landscape.
The chemical and biological risks posed by non-state actors during the War on Terror, for example, were different than those posed by Iraq during the Gulf War.
Today, as DOD postures against near-peer competition it now must contend with a new era of chemical and biological threats.
The new era is marked by new capabilities that enable adversaries to engineer new agents rather than rely solely on those found in nature. This capability impacts the DOD’s ability not only to detect emerging threats to U.S. forces but also its ability to attribute and defend against those threats.
New technology has also enabled potential adversaries to engineer chemical and biological threats at previously unmatched speed and scale.
Watson said the new threat profile is unlike anything that the U.S. has had to contend with in the past, especially as the program aligned itself with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which prioritizes challenges posed by near-peer competitors such as Russia and China along with the threats posed by North Korea, Iran and violent extremist organizations.
To position the department to contend with the changing biothreat environment, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III ordered the first of its kind Biodefense Posture Review, which was published earlier this year. Deborah Rosenblum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, who helped oversee the BPR, noted it “outlines significant reforms and lays the foundation for a resilient total force that deters the use of bioweapons, rapidly responds to natural outbreaks, and minimizes the global risk of laboratory accidents.”
To achieve that resilient total force, the DOD has doubled down on early warning and detection efforts to rapidly detect chemical and biological threats and develop medical countermeasures and changes to protective posture for U.S. forces at speed and scale.
“Building different types of sensor arrays, identifying different modalities the joint force on the battlefield and understand what they’re being subjected to is crucial because time will matter more in the future,” Watson said.
He said innovation is critical in responding to the evolving threat and fielding effective early warning detection capabilities and countermeasures that enable the warfighter to operate in a contested environment.
Watson said the chemical biological defense workforce is focused on iterative development of technology to respond to threats.
And that technology extends far beyond gas masks and protective equipment. The program is experimenting, for example, with using the services’ wearable technologies to provide early warning of exposure to biological threats. These can alert warfighters to possible sickness days before symptoms appear.
Watson said the program’s approach is geared toward solutions that integrate automated sensors, creating a common operating picture of the threat and unencumbering the warfighter while still mitigating risks posed by emerging agents.
He said the department has recognized the imperative of ensuring that the warfighter is protected under the new paradigm and recognized chemical and biological defense as a key enabler to the overall integrated deterrence strategy.
“A lot of work has gone into not what we were, but what we’re going to be for the next 20 years,” Watson said. “Against the threat profile … and against the near peer threat, there is zero room for error for making sure that this program is entirely effective and efficient.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
29 Nov 23. Now it’s official: The Eurofighter EK (Electronic Combat) is coming. Following the recent parliamentary approval by the German budget committee, Airbus will equip 15 German Eurofighters for electronic combat – and equip them with a transmitter location and self-protection system from Saab, as well as “AARGM” anti-radar missiles from the American company Northrop Grumman. The Eurofighter EK is to be NATO-certified by 2030 and will then replace the Tornado in the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) role.
“Electronic warfare and reconnaissance are an important NATO requirement: current conflicts and the present security situation show how important the two capabilities are,” says Airbus Defence and Space CEO Michael Schöllhorn. “In this respect, the German government’s decision to include such an important capability as electronic warfare in the Eurofighter capability portfolio is an important measure. EK will add this important capability to the already broad operational spectrum of the Eurofighter while strengthening European sovereignty and autonomy.”
With the parliamentary approval by the Budget Committee, the Eurofighter is now officially set as the successor to the Tornado ECR (Electronic Combat/Reconnaissance). Airbus is now looking forward to the official order to integrate the selected technical solutions into the Eurofighter. The corresponding contract between Eurofighter GmbH, as prime contractor, and NETMA (NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency) is expected to be signed before the end of the year.
With Saab’s transmitter location system and the Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) from Northrop Grumman, the Eurofighter EK will be able to detect, localise and disable anti-aircraft radars. In addition, the Saab solution has jammers that improve the Eurofighter’s self-protection. The Eurofighter EK also has technologies on board that were developed by small and medium-sized enterprises and a start-up. These include an AI solution that makes it possible to analyse radar data on-board and quickly determine precise self-protection measures.
Airbus is currently working with the BAAINBw procurement office, the German Air Force and the Bundeswehr Aviation Office on a detailed schedule for the implementation of the selected EK solutions in 15 Eurofighters.
24 Nov 23. Making Waves. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year could have a profound impact on the tactical communications domain.
What the world is seeing in Ukraine is a semblance of a peer-on-peer conflict. Granted, Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). She remains reliant on Soviet-era and Russian materiel supplied before relations deteriorated in the wake of Russia’s first invasion of the Crimea in 2014. However, prior to the latest invasion, Ukraine began receiving advanced communications equipment. These supplies increased in size and scope following Russia’s invasion on 24 February. Most media attention has focused on supplies of kinetic weaponry. Lockheed Martin’s M-142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, better known as HIMARS, has emerged as a star of the conflict. Likewise, the Raytheon/Lockheed Martin FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank guided missiles is engaging Russian armour.
Less discussed are supplies of Western communications equipment, and the effect these maybe having on the fortunes of the Ukrainian armed forces. Following the 2014 invasion, the United States began supplying L3Harris RF-7800V Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System transceivers to Ukraine. Better known as SINCGARS, these radios are now considered somewhat legacy systems by NATO members. Debuting in the 1990s, SINCGARS radios are still widely used across NATO. In fact, alliance members like the US are ensuring their new transceivers are compatible with the SINGARS waveform. For Ukraine SINCGARS has emerged, albeit quietly, as another star of the war. Armada has been told by sources in the Ukrainian theatre of operations that the SINCGARS waveform has resisted jamming by Russian Army Electronic Warfare (EW) systems.
SINCGARS’ impressive resilience has not been lost on the US armed forces. In 2017 the US Army’s Programme Executive Office for Command and Control embarked upon a SINCGARS upgrade. Among other adornments, this is rolling out AES-256 standard encryption into the force’s SINCGARS radios. AES-256, of which the United States’ National Security Agency is the custodian, is used for the carriage of US Top Secret traffic. Open sources say that AES-256 encryption is considered unbreakable by today’s available computing power.
Shortcomings
While the war in Ukraine has showcased the enviable vigour of SINCGARS, it has also highlighted glaring deficiencies. Nowhere has this been arguably more visible than in the current condition of Russian Army tactical communications. The early stages of the war illustrated what seemed to be a series of Russian communications failings. Army voice traffic was heard on clear high frequency (three to 30 megahertz) channels, eavesdropped upon by radio amateurs in and around the theatre of operations. Traffic often betrayed tales of woe suffered by Russian troops and their commanders as the war gathered pace.
The situation has seemed little better at the tactical edge. The conflict was still relatively young when pictures began cropping up on social media of Russian infantry relying on cheap Chinese civilian handheld ‘walkie-talkie’ style radios. These radios are very easy to intercept and are highly susceptible to jamming. Further revelations followed in August. A report by the London-based Royal United Services Institute thinktank entitled Silicon Lifelines exposed the quantities of Western and third-party electronics in Russian radios. Some of these components were legitimately acquired by Russia before sanctions started to bite following the 2014 invasion. Other components are not subject to export restrictions. some may have been acquired nefariously through false pretences by Russia’s intelligence services. Furthermore, intermediary countries may have supplied uncontrolled and controlled components to Russia’s electronics industry. Some suppliers in Hong Kong were highlighted in the report as acting in this fashion.
revelations of the Ukraine war was the extent to which Russian dismounted infantry rely on civilian standard communications like these Baofeng ‘walkie-talkie’ style radios. (Twitter/LostWeapons)
The report raises many questions. Why are Russian manufacturers not building these components themselves? Do they not have the wherewithal to do so economically at the volumes required by defence electronics manufacturers? Is it simply easier and more economical for Russia’s defence industry to acquire third party electronics even if done so illegally? Have Russian manufacturers stockpiled third party components for use in their defence electronics. If so, how long might these stockpiles last?
Consequences
The lessons of Ukraine’s bitter war will be digested in staff colleges, procurement brain-stormings and policy focus groups for years to come. What are the potential effects on the tactical communications landscape beyond the Ukrainian? A caveat should be added that we are but part way through what is likely to be a long conflict. Nonetheless some initial observations can be made.
Perhaps almost too obvious to state, but the centrality of robust, encrypted communications is central. The extent to which SINCGARS has acquitted itself is nothing short of breath-taking. That a waveform fielded over three decades ago remains strong against the best that the Russian Army’s EW units can throw at it is impressive. If Ukraine’s tenacious enemy cannot break this ‘hipster’ waveform, how will it fair against state-of-the-art waveforms the US and her allies will field in current and forthcoming radios? Hopefully, the experience of SINCGARS in Ukraine augers well for initiatives like TrellisWare’s TSM networking waveform. For all intents and purposes, TSM will superseded SINCGARS in the coming years. TSM can carry both US Sensitive but Unclassified and Secret and Below traffic, the latter using NSA Type-1 encryption. TSM will primarily be fielded at the company level and below. Provided there are no major advances in the acumen of Russian electronic warriors, tomorrow’s waveforms should be resilient if the experience of SINCGARS is a guide. Nonetheless, this is no excuse for complacency. Just because Russian Army EW has struggled against a legacy waveform, it does not mean US and allied militaries should be complacent about communications robustness. This should encourage tactical communications engineers to push the outside of the envelope yet further to ensure their hardware and software is simply beyond the nefarious reach of potential enemies.
Another lesson concerns internal and external interoperability. It seems that large numbers of Russian Army radios cannot work with each other. The army was in the middle of a major overhaul of its tactical communications when the war in Ukraine expanded in February. It was thus in an unhappy place. The majority of its manoeuvre units were using legacy, and probably obsolete, transceivers. Elite airborne and naval infantry units had received the newer kit. This should not in itself have been a problem provided both legacy and new radios share common, robust waveforms allowing them to communicate with one another. The reality on the ground seems quite the opposite and this has hampered Russian Army command and control.
Ironically, NATO and allied nations find themselves in a similar position to their Russian rival. France, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom are all modernising their land forces tactical communications. By necessity, this will see legacy radios being phased out as new ones are introduced. This means that disparate systems will have to work alongside each other. Are these, and other nations, confident their armies can use new and old radios on the battlefield seamlessly and securely? If they are not, they should be remedying this situation with alacrity.
Interoperability extends beyond individual armies. If the unthinkable happens and NATO’s armies are forced to fight Russia, can they do so in a coordinated manner? Coordination is contingent on robust, flexible communications allowing NATO’s manoeuvre forces to talk and share data with one another. The ESSOR (European Software Defined Radio) waveform provides a common high-data rate, radio agnostic waveform. ESSOR is equipping the armies of Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland and Portugal. The waveform will enter service in the coming years allowing traffic to be moved between manoeuvre forces. NATO’s Coalition Wideband Networking Waveform (COALWNW) was to have performed a similar role. However, COALWNW now appears moribund, if not stillborn. Worryingly, the alliance does not appear to have anything to replace it. Going to war without a multilateral wideband waveform designed for coalition networking should be an unthinkable prospect. Should NATO look towards adopting ESSOR or something similar? Brussels can no longer postpone this decision and must take action now before the strategic environment worsens.
The final lesson relates to budgets and programmes. The digestion of the lessons from Ukraine will crystalise into demands for new materiel and upgrades of existing systems. Funds for these acquisitions cannot be appropriated at the expense of military communications programmes. Tactical radios lack the glamour of main battle tanks, uninhabited aerial vehicles and self-propelled artillery, for example. Voters and politicians alike may balk at the significant costs of tools that simply allow soldiers to talk to each other and share information. The Russian Army’s experience shows that bad communications translate into bad situational awareness. This leads to bad coordination and ultimately bad decisions. It is incumbent on policymakers and personnel to stay the course and ensure their communications are not paired back to pay for heavy metal as both are essential. (Source: Armada)
27 Nov 23. 4GD to utilise ChatGPT in its robotic targetry to train soldiers. Close combat training technology specialists, 4GD, have been awarded a contract by the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) to integrate the ChatGPT language model into its robotic targets (SimStriker). This will allow soldiers to have dynamic conversations with the target. 4GD will work with its partners NIAXO, a software solutions company, to create varied and realistic military training scenarios.
SimStriker, which started development in 2020, represents a new generation of intelligent training adversary. It has added a layer of tactical performance analysis to the 4GD SmartFacility, which is currently in service with the British Army’s 16 Air Assault Brigade in Colchester. In 2022, the facility was used for more than 1,200 hours by the Air Assault Brigade, the Essex Police and the MOD police.
Currently, the target is fitted with “hit-zone” sensors capable of accurately recording the precision and fire rate of soldiers. High-tech instruments inside the body can also pick up movement, light and sound enabling the target to vocally respond, raise the alarm, shoot back with non-lethal ammunition and drop on its base when engaged.
This latest development of SimStriker, using OpenAI’s ChatGPT system, will enable the operator to configure, or select preconfigured scenarios. The training personnel will be able to verbally interact with the SimStriker in a fluid manner; literally having a synthetic conversation with the equipment. Further to this, 4GD will integrate this behavioural dynamic with simulated social media feeds, and other environmental stimuli. The benefit of this will be that the training scenario will be both physically immersive, and also cognitively dynamic.
James Crowley, 4GD Business Development Director, said:
“We are excited about the latest stage in the development of SimStriker. This contract award from DASA is proof that, in conjunction with our industry partners, 4GD continues to adapt our solutions to achieve the best training outcomes. 4GD’s flagship SmartFacility was designed to bring realism to military training simulations and utilising AI adds another dimension of reality to urban warfare scenarios.”
About 4GD
4GD specialise in bringing the most cutting-edge technologies to the defence market, in order to reduce the distance between operational reality and training. We use technology to drive operator performance by increasing levels of realism, providing scalable complexity and delivering targeted improvements, all whilst making the systems more intuitive for the user. We already have capability optimising performance in elite units in both the USA & UK.
27 Nov 23. South Korea: Ongoing exploitation of software supply chain elevates infection risks to organisations. In a joint advisory release on 23 November, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that the North Korean threat group, ‘Lazarus’, is exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in software supply-chain attacks. The zero-day exploits the South Korean software company Dream Security’s MagicLine4NX, used for secure logins by organisations. The attack compromised a media outlet’s website, executing malicious scripts against users using the MagicLine4NX software based within a specific IP address range. Lazarus then exploited the software vulnerability to move laterally within the network and obtain unauthorised access to sensitive data to then exfiltrate to actor-controlled command-and-control (C2) servers. North Korean threat actors consistently conduct supply chain attacks, abusing software vulnerabilities to obtain access to secure systems for cryptocurrency theft or cyber espionage. As Lazarus continues to exploit software vulnerabilities to target software vendors’ downstream users, there remains a heightened infection risk to South Korean entities in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Nov 23. Hadean and Faculty AI join forces to create next-generation AI capabilities for defence. Spatial computing company, Hadean, and AI solutions provider, Faculty AI, have agreed to team up and accelerate the advancement of AI integrations for defence, security, and national or international governance. The collaboration marks a significant milestone in harnessing the power of live and synthetic data to propel innovation and support the global customer base with new offerings.
The agreement aims to leverage world-leading expertise in developing AI-driven solutions, and AI-powered spatial computing technology to exploit synergies and develop tailored capabilities. As Open AI’s first implementation partner, Faculty AI will bring experience in helping organisations across industries deliver AI solutions, while Hadean will contribute a track record in enabling defence organisations, including the UK Ministry of Defence and the British Army, to orchestrate systems and technologies at scale.
The partnership will combine Faculty’s experience of developing and deploying AI models onto UAVs and other edge devices with the Hadean Platform to leverage on a large-scale synthetic environment that can simulate immersive and complex scenarios and aid the development of novel AI models, capitalising on synthetic data generated across different sources, and addressing challenges associated with limited real-world data for training, and test and evaluation of systems and technologies.
It will enable the rapid validation of algorithms and allow the delivery of fit-for-purpose prototype technologies, at the speed of relevance, for addressing critical challenges including subject identification, tracking object movement, and exploring autonomous swarming development, deployment and operations.
Hadean Chief Executive Officer, Craig Beddis, said: “The fusion of Hadean’s proven spatial computing platform with Faculty AI’s expertise and AI capabilities represents our joint commitment as technologists to bring the best and brightest minds together and consistently deliver value to our customers. As our business continues to scale internationally, our work with Faculty AI will further elevate the development of purpose-driven solutions and keep Hadean at the edge of the AI development lifecycle.”
Head of Defence at Faculty, Andrew Van Der Lem, said: “AI is an epoch-defining technology – and it is now set to revolutionise productivity and decision making in National Security and Defence. From autonomous systems to processing electronic signals, AI will help the UK operate quicker and more intelligently than our adversaries. This partnership between two industry leaders will offer new services to public and private sector clients, whilst fundamentally rethinking how AI can impact operations.”
Reflecting a wider movement of collaboration between disruptive SMEs with trusted domain-specific knowledge, the team-up will aim to influence the future landscape of AI-driven technology and foster innovation that goes beyond the conventional boundaries of defence and national security.
About Faculty
Faculty, headquartered in London, transforms organisational performance through safe, impactful and human-led AI. We have over 10 years experience helping customers reap AI’s benefits whilst managing the risks. Founded in 2014 with a training programme to help academics become data scientists, we now provide over 300 global customers with software, bespoke AI consultancy, and an award winning Fellowship programme. Our expert team includes leaders from across government, academia and global tech brands. We have raised over £40m from investors including The Apax Digital Fund, LocalGlobe, GMG Ventures LP, and Jaan Tallinn, one of Skype’s founding engineers.
About Hadean
Hadean is a UK-based spatial computing company modernising the military simulation ecosystem for training, strategy and readiness. Our technology provides the AI-powered spatial compute infrastructure that bridges allies, domains, systems, and technologies to deliver a common operating picture for multi-domain training, decision support, test and evaluation, and wargaming. Our customers and partners include BAE Systems, the UK Ministry of Defence, the British Army, Microsoft, and Cervus. For more information please visit: https://defence.hadean.com/
27 Nov 23. Australian ransomware ban is ‘inevitable’ but won’t become reality for at least 2 years. The government has revealed that a ban on ransomware payments will happen, but it won’t for at least two years as more groundwork needs to be laid. The notion of banning ransomware payments altogether became a keen topic of discussion in the aftermath of the Latitude Financial cyber attack back in March, with leaders of industry asking whether an outright ban was the right solution during a consultation for the 2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy (ACSS) earlier in the year.
Speaking with ABC Radio National’s Patricia Karvelas, Minister for Home Affairs and Cyber Security Clare O’Neil said she does support a ban on ransomware payments as they feed cyber criminals, but she added that now is “clearly not the right time,” as more had to be done prior.
“The payment of ransoms at the moment is effectively businesses around the world funnelling ms and ms and hundreds of ms, probably bns of dollars into criminal gangs who reinvest that money back in their capability,” said Minister O’Neil.
“So every time a ransom is paid, we are feeding the cyber crime problem. Now, we are in a situation in our country where it is clearly not the right time at this moment to ban ransoms, and that’s because we haven’t done the hard work.
“We don’t have, for example, a Federal Police force that’s properly resourced and properly equipped to deal with this problem, and we solve part of that problem in the strategy.
“We don’t have a proper system of support for companies that are undergoing cyber attack, and we solve that problem in the strategy.”
Despite the former cyber security coordinator Darren Goldie calling it a mistake not to ban ransomware payments as part of the ACSS, Minister O’Neil said that the first stage or horizon of the strategy is about developing an understanding of the current state of national cyber security, before revisiting the idea of banning ransomware payments, a move she said is unavoidable.
“My plan for the country on ransoms is that we undertake what is the first two years of this strategy, and then we revisit where we are then and contemplate what I think is inevitable for countries around the world, and that is one day a ban on making ransomware payments.
“We just can’t feed cyber crime like this.”
The pros and cons of an outright ban on ransomware payments have been discussed at large throughout the year.
As Minister O’Neil has said a number of times, paying a ransomware payment only fuels a cyber crime syndicate, allowing it to reinvest the funds and become a stronger force. Organisations that pay ransom also paint a target on their heads as groups willing to pay, making them attractive to threat actors for repeated attacks.
Paying a ransom as a method of recovering or decrypting data is also not a guarantee, as businesses are negotiating with criminals who may provide false proof that data is deleted or just not hold their end of the bargain. That being said, even these criminal organisations have reputations to uphold, and if they are known for double-crossing victims once ransom is paid, they won’t be paid in the future.
On the other hand, a ransomware payment ban could have dire consequences. For example, if a healthcare institution has its infrastructure attacked, resulting in encrypted systems, power outages or other major hindrances, not having a quick solution could have a fatal outcome, with hospitals then unable to access vital patient information or unable to run crucial life-saving machinery.
27 Nov 23. Thales – Elettronica joint company SIGEN aboard the Horizon frigates for the modernization of the Electronic Warfare system. Following the signing of the contract between OCCAR and Naviris (a Fincantieri and Naval Group joint venture) for the Mid-Life Upgrade of the four Horizon-class units in service with the Italian and French navies, a sub-contract was signed in August 2023 between SIGEN (a consortium between Elettronica and Thales) and Naviris for the modernization of the Electronic Warfare (EW) system. This contract represents a continuation of what has already been successfully initiated in the Horizon and FREMM programs and consolidates the collaborative relationship between the two companies for the supply of cutting-edge EW systems capable of successfully confronting current and future operational needs, with very balanced contributions from both companies. In detail, the EW system integrates into the new Naval Units the excellence developed by both companies in their respective national naval programs. The full digital Radar Electronic Support Measures (RESM) component developed and qualified for the FDI (Frégate de Défense et d’Intervention) program for the French Navy will be integrated with ELT Group’s Radar Electronic Counter Measures component developed and qualified for the PPA (Patrol Multipurpose Offshore Units) for the Italian Navy. The Communication Electronic Support Measures and Electronic Warfare Management Unit subsystems, on the other hand, will be national variants, provided by each company for its own Navy.
27 Nov 23. HENSOLDT develops jamming system to protect naval vessels together with Israeli partner RAFAEL. “Kalaetron Attack” and “Digital Shark” neutralize radar-guided threats. Sensor solution provider HENSOLDT is further developing its “Kalaetron Attack” jamming system for use on board naval vessels. The fully digital system has proven to be very effective in neutralizing air defence radars in several test campaigns. Now HENSOLDT is using the knowledge gained from land and airborne tests to develop a capability for the electronic protection of naval vessels. To this end, HENSOLDT has entered into a cooperation with RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems Ltd, Haifa/Israel. Together, the partners initially want to offer an electronic countermeasures (ECM) system for naval vessels in Germany, which is based on the Digital Shark ECM system and a decoy system (C-GEM) from RAFAEL.
“Radar-guided weapons pose a major threat to naval vessels at sea as well as on land and in the air,” says Roland Castor, Head of Airborne Electronic Warfare at HENSOLDT. “We are using the knowledge we have gained from the development of Kalaetron Attack to offer the German Navy a solution to close the capability gap in the self-protection of its ships.”
The Kalaetron Attack jamming system is part of HENSOLDT’s fully digital ‘Kalaetron’ product family, which is used in various forms in self-protection and signal intelligence systems by the German Armed Forces. In addition to cognitive elements of artificial intelligence, the core components are a fully digitized, broadband sensor and an electronically controllable jammer. This enables a broad spectrum of threats to be detected quickly and countered with pinpoint accuracy.
————————————————————————-
Spectra Group (UK) Ltd
Spectra Group (UK) Ltd, internationally renowned award-winning information security and communications specialist with a proven record of accomplishment.
Spectra is a dynamic, agile and security-accredited organisation that offers secure Hosted and Managed Solutions and Cyber Advisory Services with a track record of delivering on time, to spec and on budget.
With over 15 years of experience in delivering solutions for governments around the globe, elite militaries and private enterprises of all sizes, Spectra’s platinum and gold-level partnerships with third-party vendors ensure the supply of best value leading-edge technology.
Spectra was awarded the prestigious Queen’s Award for Enterprise (Innovation) in 2019 for SlingShot.
In November 2017, Spectra Group (UK) Ltd announced its listing as a Top 100 Government SME Supplier by the UK Crown Commercial Services.
Spectra’s CEO, Simon Davies, was awarded 2017 Businessman of the Year by Battlespace magazine.
Founded in 2002, the Company is based in Hereford, UK and holds ISO 9001:2015, ISO 27001:2013 and Cyber Essentials Plus accreditation.
————————————————————————-