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02 Mar 22. Versatile Storm EW Modules Deliver Advanced, Platform-agnostic ElW Capabilities. BAE Systems launched its versatile Storm EW™ Modules designed to provide customized, state-of-the-art offensive and defense electronic warfare (EW) mission systems BAE Systems launched its versatile Storm EW™ Modules designed to provide customized, state-of-the-art offensive and defense electronic warfare (EW) mission systems for combat platforms for the broader U.S. and allied fleets. Storm EW Modules use a proven common core architecture to accelerate the delivery of software-based EW capabilities, providing warfighters with situational awareness, survivability, and electromagnetic capabilities needed for today’s complex missions. Storm EW Modules are high-performance EW building blocks that leverage mature technology from today’s most advanced EW systems. The scalable design of Storm EW Modules provides a trusted hardware baseline that can be customized and integrated into multiple airborne platforms, including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and guided missiles.
“Our warfighters need a revolutionary approach to EW to maintain electromagnetic spectrum superiority and freedom of maneuverability in signal-dense environments,” said Dr. Jerry Wohletz, vice president and general manager of Electronic Combat Solutions at BAE Systems. “Storm EW Modules provide the technical dominance and rapid software reprogramming to counter quickly evolving threats.”
Using BAE Systems’ optimized design, production, and sustainment processes to deliver mature EW capabilities to warfighters faster, Storm EW Modules will reduce engineering and lifecycle costs for U.S. and allied forces. By leveraging foundational hardware derived from advanced, combat-proven technology, BAE Systems is helping the U.S. Department of Defense capitalize on key investments in design, production capacity, and a global support network to more rapidly drive critical mission capabilities to warfighters.
Storm EW Modules deliver on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) vision for a scalable and adaptable EW solution that permits third-party software and programming that is also exportable and affordable. BAE Systems worked closely with its partners and the DoD to create a common architecture with shared components and configurable blocks that address a broad set of requirements, streamline the build process, and lower lifecycle costs.
BAE Systems has a deep understanding of the electromagnetic threat environment, strong digital engineering and agile software development skills, state-of-the-art manufacturing, and a global support network to accelerate the delivery of modern EW systems to the field.
Work on Storm EW Modules is conducted at BAE Systems’ facilities in Burlington, Mass.; Manchester, N.H.; Merrimack, N.H.; Nashua, N.H.; Wayne, N.J.; and Austin, Texas. (Source: ASD Network)
03 Mar 22. DOD Working to Improve Cybersecurity for Its Industrial Base. The Defense Department’s industrial base is huge, encompassing some 220,000 companies. With criminals and nefarious state actors intent on stealing intellectual property or taking down networks, cybersecurity is a huge concern for the department, the companies and national security. As a result, the department is bolstering defense industrial base cybersecurity by sharing threat information, offering easy-to-implement ways the industrial base can shore up its own cyber defenses, and looking for ways to make further improvements as the threat continues to evolve, according to a DOD panel that spoke during a recent town hall.
“I think we’ve thwarted a good number of attacks by our intelligence sharing and your sharing of information about things going on in your network,” said David McKeown, DOD’s chief information security officer and deputy chief information officer for cybersecurity.
In addition to intelligence sharing, the department requires industrial base companies to achieve Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, which sets the minimum cybersecurity requirements for companies, he said, noting that the department has been working to streamline those requirements to make it easier for companies to comply.
He also said the department wants companies to review the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s publication “Guide to Securing WiMAX Wireless Communications.”
A third requirement, he said, is that if there’s a major cybersecurity breech, it must be reported within 72 hours to the DOD Cyber Crime Center. The center’s hotline is 410-981-0104 or 877-838-2174, and the website is https://dibnet.dod.mil.
“We would love to see you go beyond those requirements,” McKeown said.
An excellent place to start is by visiting https://dibnet.dod.mil, which is DOD’s gateway for defense contractor reporting and voluntary participation in DOD’s Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program, he said.
On that site, companies can report a cyber incident, as well as become a DOD voluntary public-private cybersecurity partner, he said. The site also has points of contact for anyone having questions or needing additional information.
DOD Partnerships
The defense industrial base is one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors, identified in the presidential policy directive “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience”, said Kristi Hunt in the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy.
That document spells out the policy for how the federal government will work to build trust with those sectors, how those sectors will work with other sectors, and how the whole effort for public-private partnership will advance national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure functioning and resilient critical infrastructure, she said.
Hunt said her agency works closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, sharing mitigation strategies, threat indicators, critical incidents and best practices.
Kristina Walter, chief of defense industrial base cyber defense at the National Security Agency, said, “NSA has great insight into foreign actors targeting DOD Information on DOD networks, national security system as well as defense industrial base networks.”
However, the NSA must rely on industry partners to mitigate cybersecurity threats, she said.
“You are experts in your networks. We understand what foreign actors are doing, and when we work together, we can understand more rapidly what’s happening and address the issue,” she said.
The NSA, in partnership with the FBI, has set up a collaboration channel to get out as much information before an incident occurs, she said. More information can be found at https://www.nsa.gov/About/Cybersecurity-Collaboration-Center/.
Krystal Covey, director of DOD’s Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment, said the Defense Cybercrime Center hosts cybersecurity conferences and performs malware analysis, publishes cyber threat analyses, and shares actionable cybersecurity incidents.
Covey said that although only cleared defense contractors are covered by Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32, Part 236, there is work within the department to incorporate other companies into this program. (Source: US DoD)
03 Mar 22. Belarus-Ukraine: European governments and NGOs will be increasingly exposed to Minsk-backed cyber activity amid Ukraine’s mounting humanitarian crisis. On 1 March, industry reports claimed that an alleged state-backed spear phishing campaign is currently targeting European government employees providing support to Ukrainian refugees. The attackers are believed to be using “possibly compromised” email accounts linked to Ukrainian armed forces personnel to launch these cyber attacks. While it is unclear which state-linked actor is responsible for this campaign, an analysis of the infection chain indicates that Belarusian hacking group UNC1151 (also tracked as Ghostwriter) may be responsible. These attacks are indicative of the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine’s (CERT-UA) 25 February warning that UNC1151 is compromising Ukrainian armed forces’ accounts to target their contact books (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 1800hrs GMT 25-02-2022). While this malicious activity is currently only targeting European government personnel, there is a heightened risk of other organisations providing support to refugees, such as NGOs, becoming increasingly targeted by this activity as more Ukrainians continue to flee into neighbouring countries in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Mar 22. US: Latest cyber security bill to gain bipartisan support in Congress but unlikely to lower the threat posed to US businesses in the short term. On 2 March, the US Senate approved the new “Strengthening American Cybersecurity Act”. This bill seeks to improve the federal government’s cyber security robustness by requiring the operators of the country’s 16 critical infrastructure sectors to report any cyber attacks to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours. This is Washington’s latest initiative to strengthen the US’ cyber security since several federal agencies introduced the rollout of a 100-day plan to improve its water systems’ cyber defence (see Sibylline Cyber Daily Analytical Update – 28 January 2022). While the House of Representatives and President Joe Biden are still required to approve the bill before it can be put into legislation, the growing cyber threats linked to issues such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict will heighten the likelihood of it gaining bipartisan support. However, with the bill’s approval and implementation progress unlikely to be completed in the coming six months, critical infrastructure operators will remain notable targets for malicious cyber activity in meantime. Such attacks could result in short-term disruption to essential services, such as energy. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Mar 22. In late January, Concurrent Technologies unveiled its new 3U VPX Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) plug-in card. A company press release announcing the news says the product is “designed in alignment with the SOSA (Sensor Open Systems Architecture) Technical Standard, PR A11/61d-RCR”. The card is for systems which need resilient PNT information when GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) signals may be jammed. The press release stated that the card is free of restrictions under US International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Concurrent Technologies has collaborated with Racelogic in the card’s design. “In periods of GNSS denial or jamming, accurate PNT data continues to be provided by utilising signals from a built-in inertial measurement unit and sophisticated Kalman filtering techniques,” the press release continued. Julian Thomas, managing director of Racelogic said in the press release that “we have provided Concurrent Technologies with a solution that enables their 3U VPX plug-in card to provide PNT information during long periods of GNSS denial to fit the needs of the defence community”. (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. Radio Reconnaissance Technologies has launched its THiEF-V2 body-worn radio direction-finding system. The company’s official literature says this weighs under one kilogram (two pounds). This body-worn equipment is designed to be used by dismounted troops. That said, its small size means it can also be used for mounted applications. For example, it could equip light vehicles thus providing a mobile COMINT capability. Covering High Frequency (HF – three to 30MHz) to Ultra High Frequency (UHF – 300MHz to three gigahertz) the company says THiEF-V2 provides up to 14 hours’ operation. The product uses an Android-based operating system. Emitter location information is presented on a Google Maps-style display. The literature continues that the product can be programmed for single channel, search or scan tasks. It has a choice of direction-finding or homing modes. All emitter information is automatically and continuously recorded and stored on a 32-gigabit micro secure digital memory card. Nick Hoben, Radio Reconnaissance Technologies’ president, told Armada that “to the best of our knowledge, THiEF is the smallest RDF (Radio Direction Finding) system on the market that can provide Lines of Bearing (LOBs) on frequencies from the higher HF through lower UHF bands.” Multiple THiEF-V2 systems can be networked “to provide lines-of-bearings to multiple emitters simultaneously or geo-location data on a single emitter.” (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. Staying in the US, in early February, thedrive.com reported that the US Army had tested a new counter-cyberattack system onboard the General Dynamics M1A2 main battle tank. The report revealed that the testing took place during an exercise at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona in September 2021. An M1A2 was outfitted with Peraton’s MIL-STD-1553 serial databus defender. This protects the tank’s databus against cyber attacks which could spread to its subsystems. The report said the equipment was tested using simulated cyberattacks and that it acquitted itself well. Operational tests of the serial bus defender are expected to commence soon. (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. The US Navy’s Naval Postgraduate School announced in mid-February that it had completed a foundational study on the convergence of cyber and electronic warfare. Held at the classified level, the study identified “a roadmap to meet the technological and acquisitional challenges inherent in ensuring American dominance across the future Electromagnetic Spectrum.” It is expected the study will influence future US Navy acquisitions in these domains over the coming five years and beyond. The study also flagged potential doctrinal and resource gaps, with recommendations on how these could be addressed. Participants in the study included military and civilian practitioners and academics. (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. The Russian government refused demands from its Israeli counterpart in early February to stop jamming Global Navigation Satellite Signals (GNSSs). The Israeli government accused Russia of performing GNSS spoofing reportedly affecting civilian air traffic using Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport. This is believed to have been caused by electronic warfare systems the Russian armed forces deployed to protect its presence at Khmeimim airbase on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Israel’s demands were rejected by the Russian government. The latter said that GNSS jamming systems were deployed at Khmeimim to protect its deployment. The spoofing may have been performed by Russian Army KRET R-330Z Zhitel jammers. These cover wavebands of 1.1GHz to 1.6GHz encompassing those used by GNSS satellites. Spoofing is almost certainly performed to prevent UAVs dependent on GNSS navigation flying over or near the base. The spoofing may also be used to degrade the ability of GNSS-guided ordnance to target the facility.Epirus debuted its new Leonidas electronic attack pod via a press release in mid-February. The company claims this product is a “first-to-market, solid-state, multiple shot high-power microwave system”. It continued that the pod complements the firm’s existing ground-based electronic attack systems. These provide 360-degree protection against incoming RF threats. Such threats include UAVs which may be carrying explosives. The pod allows similar protection to be deployed in a mobile capacity either unilaterally, or alongside other systems. Epirus said the pod can be ready for use in minutes and equip a small UAV. Leonidas can provide either continuous jamming or be activated when a threat appears, the latter mode helping conserve battery life. (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. Rohde & Schwarz announced via a press release on 14th February the launch of its new ADD557SR direction-finding and monitoring antenna. The company says this product covers a bandwidth of 20 megahertz to six gigahertz for vertical and horizontal polarisations. The press release continued that the ADD557SR “incorporates a separate antenna output that can be used independently of direction-finding in both polarisations over a wide frequency range.” It said that “this helps focus on certain signals in the spectrum or suppresses unwanted emissions.” The antenna can be employed for static and mobile applications on land, at sea and in the air. Moreover, the ADD557SR can determine the bearings of multiple emissions on the same frequency. “It can detect signals in the spectrum that other emissions have concealed and spot signals undetectable to other direction finders.” (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. Rafael Advanced Defence Systems announced via Twitter in February the completion of the development of its SkyShield electronic attack system. The social media announcement said that SkyShield was now undergoing flight tests “for an undisclosed customer”. The company’s official literature says the system is available in two configurations. The first uses two wing-mounted pods each weighing 770 pounds/lb (350 kilograms/kg). The second uses a single ventral fuselage pod weighing 1,540lb (700kg). The literature says that SkyShield can detect and jam threats across wavebands of one gigahertz to 18GHz. (Source: Armada)
03 Mar 22. D-TA Systems has launched its MFEL-5000 Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) collection system. The company’s product brochure says this can be deployed on surface vessels, uninhabited vehicles and on land. Latter applications could see the MFEL-5000 deployed to coastal locations to gather ELINT in littoral areas, for example. The MFEL-5000 family includes three variants: The MFEL-5000 GSN is intended for ground or surface deployment. It uses either omnidirectional or spinning direction-finding antennas. Covering a waveband of 500 megahertz/MHz to 18 gigahertz/GHz, this can be optionally increased to 40GHz. An instantaneous bandwidth of 500MHz is available which can be expanded to one gigahertz. The MFEL-5000 USV equips uninhabited surface vehicles. It uses between four and eight receivers and covers wavebands of two gigahertz to 18GHz, with 500MHz of instantaneous bandwidth. Finally, the MFEL-5000 AUV can equip Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Although it covers a 500MHz to 18GHz waveband, this can be extended to 40GHz. Like the MFEL-5000 UAV it has 500MHz of instantaneous bandwidth. (Source: Armada)
02 Mar 22. Rah, Rah, Rash Putin? Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24th February, Armada will provide continually updated coverage of Russian electronic warfare efforts as the conflict unfolds.
Author’s Note – This report is compiled from reliable and reputable sources inside and outside Ukraine. In some cases, we cannot reveal our sources of information to ensure they remain safe. Due to operational and tactical sensitivities, this article will not provide any information on Ukranian electronic warfare activities.
On 24th February, Russia invaded Ukraine. As of the time of writing (week beginning 28th February) hostilities are continuing between Russian and Ukrainian forces. To date, the invasion has involved elements of Russia’s army, navy and air force. This article focuses on Russian Army Electronic Warfare (EW) efforts at operational and tactical levels so far.
As Armada reported in early January, the Russian Army appeared to have seven manoeuvre formations deployed ready for the invasion. An US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report named these as the 20th and 150th Motorised Rifle Brigades from the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA). These were joined by the 3rd and 144th Motorised Rifle Divisions from the 20th CAA. Finally, the 4th Tank Division and 2nd Motorised Rifle Regiment from the 41st CAA were also deployed.
The Russian Army and Electronic Warfare
Russian Army EW doctrine focuses on detecting and attacking radio transmissions in frequencies of three megahertz/MHz to six gigahertz/GHz. The doctrine additionally stresses electronically attacking hostile airborne radars. The latter are targeted by jammers covering frequency bands of one gigahertz up to 18GHz. Jamming airborne radars is an important part of Russian EW doctrine. Military aircraft use X-band radars (8.5GHz to 10.68GHz) to detect targets in the air, on the ground and at sea. These radars provide fire control for air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. Russian Army logic is to protect deployments and targets on the ground by jamming airborne radars to deprive military aircraft of fire control information.
Beyond airborne radars, Russian Army EW doctrine prioritises detecting and jamming enemy military radios. Military radios use High Frequency (HF: three megahertz to 300MHz), and Very/Ultra High Frequency (V/UHF: 30MHz to three gigahertz) signals for Command and Control (C2). Russian Army EW strives to attack hostile military radio networks to deprive the enemy of C2 and situational awareness. The desired result is for enemy C2 to become badly coordinated, if not impossible.
If enemy radio networks are attacked, hostile unit commanders cannot share their situation with higher echelons. Headquarters are thus deprived of a reliable, real-time picture of the battle. Attacking these networks has a secondary but equally important benefit. It makes it difficult for commanders to distribute orders to subordinate units based on the prevailing situation. To summarise, land EW should prevent enemy commanders from accurately reading the battle and responding accordingly.
Like all land forces, the Russian Army uses its EW systems to detect and intercept hostile radio transmissions so they can be exploited for intelligence. Every land forces unit from an infantry squad upwards uses radios. Almost any vehicle supporting the manoeuvre from, from main battle tanks to surface-to-air missile units, need radios as do deployed headquarters. Detect and locate these radio transmissions and you can detect and locate the units, vehicles and headquarters making them. This information can provide real time details of where hostile units are located. It is easy to see how useful this is from a targeting point of view.
It may also be possible to decrypt the opposing force’s radio traffic although this will invariably have measures in place to stop eavesdropping. These measures are known in EW jargon as COMSEC/TRANSEC (Communications/Transmission Security). If they can be cracked it maybe possible to exploit this radio traffic for intelligence. This could yield important information on hostile intentions, troop movements and the enemy’s situation. Army EW is a compromise. On one hand, there is an imperative to attack hostile radio communications to deprive the enemy of C2 and situational awareness. On the other, there maybe an imperative to leave radio communications untouched to let hostile networks be exploited for intelligence.
Given the frequencies that Russian Army EW capabilities cover, they can potentially be used to attack civilian radio transmissions. The military are not the only users of HF and V/UHF radio. Cellphone networks, broadcasting, satellite communications, first responder radio and air traffic control all rely on V/UHF radio. GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) navigation and timing signals use UHF transmissions of 1.1GHz to 1.6GHz.
Whereas military radio and GNSS signals are protected using COMSEC/TRANSEC techniques, this is not always the case with civilian radio traffic. As such, it may be targeted deliberately by Russian Army EW. This may prevent cellphone networks or civilian GNSS signals being used by the military. This may also be done as part of a wider information warfare strategy. For example, enemy media outlets may find their radio or television broadcasting jammed to demoralise the population. Likewise, HF radio may be jammed. Amateur radio enthusiasts, known as ‘radio hams’, use high frequency radio for their hobby. They may find their communications come under attack both as a side effect of HF jamming and to prevent amateur radio assisting the military.
The Russian Army’s EW Order of Battle
The Russian Army deploys its EW assets at operational and tactical levels. Operational level EW units are organised into EW brigades. These are deployed with the CAAs equipping each of Russia’s military districts. They provide EW at the theatre level. In practice the brigade performs electronic warfare over a large swathe of the theatre of operations. It appears that Russian Army EW brigades are tasked with attacking hostile airborne radar. They also jam cellphone networks and HF radio communications.
Each Russian Army’s manoeuvre unit has an attendant EW Company. The motorised rifle regiments, brigades and divisions and tank brigades fight the tactical battle. These EW companies provide electronic warfare support at the tactical level. This is primarily to help the manoeuvre unit meet its tactical objective. Russian Army EW companies deploy large quantities of systems covering disparate wavebands.
Some of the systems used by the Russian Army’s EW brigades and companies are vehicle-mounted. Others like the RP-377U/UV are housed in backpacks. Apart from the RP-377U/UV systems, it is thought that Russian Army EW systems can only be used when stationary. This could mean they cannot advance alongside the manoeuvre force. On the other hand, they could provide an umbrella of EW coverage over large parts of the theatre (EW Brigade) or the brigade, division or regiment (EW Company).
Confusingly, Russian order-of-battle information lumps some of these systems together as a single ‘complex’. For example, the Borisoglebsk-2 HF/VHF COMINT/COMJAM system has five distinct components. These are the R-330KPK C2 system, the R-378B, R-330B, R-934B and R-325U. The number of these latter four systems in an EW Company can be scaled up or down according to tactical exigencies. Our table above includes a Borisoglebsk-2 system at full strength with a single C2 system and two each of the COMINT/COMJAM systems. The graphic below illustrates the approximate COMINT and COMJAM coverage that six of the Borisoglebsk-2’s jammers could cover.
For example, each jammer could cover a surface area of approximately 907 square kilometres (350 square miles). As we have illustrated in our graphic above, six Borisoglebsk-2 jammers could potentially detect and jam ground-based radios across a 5,442 square kilometre (2,101 square mile) area. However, we should stress that this is by no means an exact figure. Also, military radios and other emitters like ground-based military radars will protected waveforms to mitigate this.
Nonetheless, Armada has learned that the R-330B and R-934B components may have some potential jamming frequency-hopping VHF radios performing up to 300 hops-per-second. The R-378B and R-325U are thought capable of jamming frequency-hopping HF transmissions at up to 30 hops-per-second. The R-330KPK C2 system can handle up to 30 jamming tasks simultaneously.
Detection and jamming ranges expand at the operational level when using Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) based EW systems like the RB-341V Leer-3. The Orlan-10 UAVs equipping the system have a maximum altitude of 16,404ft (5,000m). This lets them cover an area of 266,582 square kilometres (102,928 square miles).
The Story So Far
Armada assesses that the Russian Army has deployed at least five EW companies and four EW brigades to support its invasion of Ukraine. Definitive information on the effectiveness of these units is hard to find. Nonetheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. On 25th February, CNBC quoted an unnamed US defence official who said “we do not believe that the Russians have employed the full scope of their electronic warfare capabilities, and it is not clear exactly why.”
This succinct summary underlines some surprising aspects of the conflict’s EW dimension to date. At first blush, it seems that the civilian world has not suffered as much as had been feared by Russian Army EW. There does not appear to have been any sustained efforts to deny Ukraine writ large access to the radio spectrum. Media satellite transmissions from Ukraine to the outside world appear to continue uninterrupted. Cellphone video footage sent from Ukraine indicates that local telecommunications networks have largely continued as before. Several Armada sources in Ukraine said their cellphone coverage has remained mostly unaffected. The Russian Army’s primary system targeting cellphone networks is the RB-341V Leer-3. Regardless of whether it has been used sporadically or in a sustained fashion, it seems to have had little effect so far. It is possible that Russian Army COMINT cadres want to leave cellphone coverage unjammed to exploit cellphone traffic. That said, given how effective cellphones are in helping organise armed resistance it is hard to see why the army has left cellphone coverage alone. Perhaps Russian communications jamming technology is not as effective as previously thought?
It is noteworthy that pictures circulated on social media on 28th February showed what appeared to be civilian V/UHF handheld radios. These were said to have been captured from Russian troops. There was some speculation that these radios were manufactured in the People’s Republic of China. It is a safe bet that the radios are not state-of-the-art telecommunications technology. As such, they should be very easy to jam.
The use by Russian forward units of such basic technology raises some interesting questions, not least about the health of Russian Army tactical communications. These questions will be dealt with in later articles. From an EW perspective, it may illustrate lacklustre Russian jamming performance. Such rudimentary radios should be easy enough to jam. Anecdotal evidence from Russia’s previous intervention in Ukraine from 2014 revealed that electromagnetic fratricide was rife. Russian V/UHF jamming regularly shut down the radio communications of Russian troops in range of the jammer. Surely troops using these radios would find them all but useless if V/UHF jamming was supporting their manoeuvre? Russian doctrine stresses EW as an integral part of land warfare. There is an apocryphal adage that summarises Russian Army doctrine; “attrit a third, jam a third and the rest will collapse.” This use of civilian V/UHF communications seems to suggest that either V/UHF jamming is not being used, is being used sporadically or is underperforming.
There has been speculation that the Russian Army is husbanding its EW capabilities for use later in the conflict. That is possible but seems counter-intuitive. Would the manoeuvre force not want to use the full panoply of its EW capabilities during the initial invasion, arguably the riskiest part of the operation? This is when depriving Russia’s adversaries of radio communications networks and airborne radar would be an absolute priority. Does this mean that Russian Army EW systems and personnel are struggling? It may betray army commanders having little confidence in their EW abilities and thus being loath to rely on them. Likewise, are these EW systems unreliable or suffering poor levels of maintenance which degrades their efficacy?
Some people on social media suspected that the loss of coverage of Ukrainian territory on aviation tracking websites like flightradar24 was the result of Russian GNSS jamming. This seems unlikely. Ukrainian civilian aircraft rapidly cleared from Ukrainian skies as the invasion unfolded. Civilian and military aircraft use transponders to share information with air traffic controllers. Transponders share details of the aircraft’s identity and flight characteristics. This can be supplemented with information from the aircraft’s GNSS systems.
However, it seems that GNSS signals over Ukraine were not jammed en masse. Transponder information from other aircraft flying near Ukraine’s borders was unaffected. Large-scale, theatre-level GNSS jamming would have almost certainly spread beyond Ukraine’s borders. What appears to have happened is that Ukrainian and Russian military aircraft flying over Ukraine kept their transponders switched off. This is standard wartime procedure. If you detect a transponder’s transmissions you can determine an aircraft’s location. This risks the aircraft being found and engaged by fighters or surface-to-air weapons.
Russia does have form jamming GNSS transmissions. This has been noted during the country’s deployment to Syria. As this month’s Spectrum SitRep article notes, the Israeli government recently complained to its Russian counterpart about GNSS jamming emanating from Syria. This was affecting civilian air traffic over Israel.
Conclusions
So far, the Russian Army’s electronic warfare acumen seems a shadow of its former self. As Armada reported in December 2019, it acquitted itself well during Russia’s first invasion. Russian Army EW continued to cause problems for the Ukrainian military in the following years. The stubborn resistance of the Ukrainian Army and population in general indicates it is less effective this time around. Russian Army EW equipment maybe under-performing and may not have the confidence of army commanders. This can only be good news for Ukraine as it fights tenaciously to repulse Russia’s invasion. (Source: Armada)
01 Mar 22. Leidos nabs $11.5bn Defense Enclave Services contract. Under the contract, the company will lead an effort to streamline the Pentagon’s vast network infrastructure of non-service-specific agencies. The Defense Information Systems Agency has awarded Leidos a potential $11.5bn contract for Defense Enclave Services, an effort to streamline the Pentagon’s network infrastructure of non-service-specific agencies, the Defense Department announced Monday. Under the indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract, the company will lead the Fourth Estate Network Optimization initiative — a process that will consolidate systems, personnel, functions, among other program elements. The Fourth Estate networks include 81 global sites, approximately 20,000 users and an estimated 40,000 end points, not including the number of people working remotely during the pandemic.
“The objective of the DES contract is to provide integrated, standardized, and cost-effective IT services; while improving security, network availability, and reliability for the 22 defense agencies and field activities within DoD’s Fourth Estate,” according to the original Feb. 28 DoD contract announcement. “DES will establish the modern infrastructure foundation and united frame of thought needed to deliver cohesive combat support capabilities to the warfighter.”
Defense Enclave Services, part of DoD’s Digital Modernization Strategy, will consolidate everything digital operations from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to agencies like the Defense Logistics Agency and Missile Defense Agency, Breaking Defense previously reported.
The contract has a potential 10-year period of performance with a base ordering period through Feb. 27, 2026, according to the contract announcement. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
01 Mar 22. DSIT Solutions Launches WhitePointer, a State-of-the-Art Acoustic Underwater Communication System Enabling Comprehensive Underwater Acoustic Communication between Multiple Platforms. This advanced communication system is a result of DSIT’s new technological development that offers reliable underwater networked communication between various entities at different distances from each other.
DSIT Solutions is proud to launch WhitePointer, a state-of-the-art underwater acoustic communication system that enables simultaneous communication between multiple surface and underwater platforms. The system is based on the company’s advanced underwater technology that allows networked communication between various users.
The WhitePointer system complies with NATO Standards and enables reliable voice and data communication between surface ships, submarines, and other underwater users including divers and drones such as Swimmer’s Delivery Vehicles (SDVs), Diver Propulsion Vehicles (DPVs), Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). The system supports underwater acoustic networked communication with multiple users and can be fully integrated with any onboard communication system.
The solution – which implements multiple types of modulations for data transmission – includes a synthesized, high-power transceiver with preset frequencies. This allows the Operator to rapidly switch channels without risking errors.
Regarding the launch of WhitePointer, DSIT’s VP Business Development and Marketing,
Mr. Hanan Marom, remarked, “We are proud to launch this innovative acoustic underwater communication system that enables cyber safety and protected underwater networked communication between multiple surface and underwater platforms on the same network, via both voice and data transmissions. The WhitePointer system is an advanced communication suite that supports covert operational missions of multiple maritime vessels as well as tactical missions and search & rescue missions.”
About DSIT Solutions
A subsidiary of RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., DSIT Solutions Ltd. has, for the last three decades, developed and implemented comprehensive defense and protection solutions against various underwater threats, focusing on six main types of solutions: Underwater Coastal Terrain Dominance systems, Underwater Security systems, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) systems, Sonar systems for Submersible Platforms, Acoustic Analysis & Trainer systems, and underwater communication. Based on DSIT Solutions’ wide range of capabilities, experience and innovative technology, the company’s underwater systems and technologies have been successfully deployed by many sophisticated customers worldwide for naval defense, HLS, and energy security applications.
24 Feb 22. Ukraine pelted with cyberattacks ahead of Russian assault. Ukrainian websites were paralyzed by denial of service cyberattacks ahead of Russia’s overnight offensive, with analysts discovering data-corrupting malware coursing through the country’s computers shortly thereafter. The sites for Ukraine’s defense, foreign affairs and interior ministries, among others, were knocked offline Feb. 23, according to the government, as Russian forces moved in. Explosions were reported around the country — including near the capital, Kyiv. Distributed denial of service attacks flood a site with traffic, rendering them useless. Ukrainian agencies and banks were previously hit with a denial of service cyberattack Feb. 15, while Russia continued massing troops and materiel along its border. Websites were crippled in January, as well. While experts urged caution in attributing blame in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the White House National Security Council claimed to have evidence linking them to a Russian intelligence agency.
“The U.S. has technical information linking Russian GRU to this week’s distributed denial of service attacks in Ukraine,” the council said in a Feb. 18 tweet. “Known GRU infrastructure has been noted transmitting high volumes of communications to Ukraine-based IP addresses and associated banking-related domains.”
And just hours after the DDoS attacks, cybersecurity firm ESET separately warned of a hostile data-wiping software “installed on hundreds of machines” in Ukraine. Dubbed Hermetic Wiper, the malware was able to corrupt data on users’ computers, according to ESET researchers. The company went on to note that metadata in the software suggests the attack may have been in preparation for almost two months.
Cyberattacks preceding an offensive in Ukraine have long been predicted, though exactly who is to blame for the latest onslaught was not immediately clear. A request for comment made Thursday morning to U.S. Cyber Command was not immediately answered.
Moscow has used cyber and disinformation campaigns to project its force in the past, including in Ukraine in 2015, according to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
Greg Austin, a senior fellow for cyber, space and future conflict at the Institute for Strategic Studies, on Thursday said Russia “has launched many cyberattacks on Ukraine.” But, he added, “even as the Ukraine crisis escalates further, Russia is unlikely to unleash the full power of its cyber sabotage operations.”
Ukraine has sought closer ties to NATO’s cyber center of excellence in Estonia, which could provide much-needed expertise and resources. But the country’s formal membership was denied last year.
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is staffed and financed by the U.S., the U.K., Canada, South Korea, Germany, Japan and many others.
CISA on Feb. 18 said the cyber operations observed abroad demonstrate how quickly foreign governments and other actors can spring into action and potentially target U.S. infrastructure and other interests.
“We need to be prepared for the potential of foreign influence operations to negatively impact various aspects of our critical infrastructure with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine geopolitical tensions,” the agency’s director, Jen Easterly, said in a statement at the time.
Easterly in a Thursday morning tweet said there were “no specific threats to the US” at the moment.
28 Feb 22. Zyter Collaborates with Qualcomm to Provide Applications and Dashboard for 5G Private Networks. Production-Ready Applications Include Autonomous Mobile Robots, LiDAR-Based Analytics and AI-Based Cameras.
Zyter, Inc., a leading digital health and IoT-enablement platform, announced today that it has collaborated with Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. to support the demonstration of 5G private networks by providing network management services, a user interface/dashboard, and three initial production-ready applications that include autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), LiDAR-based analytics and AI-based cameras.
5G private networks offer significant advantages over today’s public 5G and Wi-Fi networks. To fully support digital transformation efforts, modern businesses and organizations need a higher-bandwidth, lower-latency network that can potentially support thousands of devices and data intensive applications. Advanced network management capabilities, such as allocating bandwidth to different devices or customizing security protocols are also necessary. Current Wi-Fi and 5G public networks offer limited flexibility in these areas. Qualcomm Technologies, Zyter and other ecosystem members are solving these challenges through the demonstration of 5G private networks powered by Qualcomm® FSM 5G RAN Platforms.
In addition to providing network management and a consolidated dashboard to display application and device data, Zyter is also making three production-ready applications available that include:
- Autonomous Mobile Robots (AMRs) –Equipped with sensors and cameras, AMRs use AI and machine learning to autonomously move goods inside a defined space such as a factory or warehouse.
- LiDAR-Based Analytics – Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) cameras can be used to detect the movement of people and goods in a defined space, which is rendered on a 3D map viewed on Zyter’s dashboard.
- AI-Based Cameras – This application supports 4K video streams originating from eight cameras provided by Qualcomm Technologies’ device ecosystem members as well as data analysis.
“Applications like LiDAR-based analytics require high bandwidth, low latency networks that can potentially support thousands of devices, render images in 3D, or enable autonomous mobile robots to react in milliseconds,” said Sanjay Govil, founder and CEO of Zyter, Inc. “The combination of Qualcomm Technologies’ platforms for 5G private networks with Zyter’s leading-edge applications offer a world of new possibilities for organizations that want more performance, ownership and control.”
Zyter is one of the system integrators supporting the introduction of the Qualcomm® Private Networks RAN Automation solution. Zyter 5G applications are available for demonstration on the Qualcomm® Smart Campus in San Diego.
For more information, please visit www.zyter.com/IoT
About Zyter, Inc.
Zyter delivers a wide range of Internet of Things (IoT) solutions spanning buildings, stadiums, campuses, and even cities. The Zyter SmartSpaces platform supports solutions for multiple markets including healthcare, education, logistics, retail, travel, and construction. By integrating and consolidating data from IoT devices and applications, organizations can gain new insights to improve efficiencies while providing end-users with an engaging digital experience. In 2021, Zyter won more than 37 global awards for its IoT products including Best Technology and Company Innovation of the Year. Founded in 2017, the privately-held company is based in Rockville, Md. For more information, please visit www.Zyter.com/IoT.
28 Feb 22. DOD Officials Discuss Advancements in Joint All-Domain Command, Control. Joint All-Domain Command and Control, aka JADC2, is a system being developed that aims to connect any sensor to any shooter in any domain across the joint force, enabled by artificial intelligence for combined effects. Defense Department officials discussed that system at the National Defense Industrial Association webinar panel on “Enabling the Joint Warfighter: JADC2,” Feb. 24, 2022. Although not officially titled JADC2, work on JADC2-like concepts has been going on for more than two decades, said Anthony Smith, director, command and control, communications infrastructure and chief information officer. After 9/11, the department, with the services, created an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system linked by satellite communications, ground relays and data dissemination nodes that was good at targeting terrorists, he said. However, that system didn’t handle jamming, spoofing and other things that would be expected in a fight with a peer adversary, he said. Also, each service had its own system which did not communicate well with other services, requiring postproduction modifications and a series of relays and translation utilities to integrate the disparate capabilities.
“The near term for JADC2, I think, is going to be building stopgap fixes,” he said.
For the long term, there will need to be software-defined systems and an open system architecture.
Hardware-based systems are just too hard to fix and too hard to modify, he noted, as it takes five to 10 years to replace, particularly in aircraft.
“The long-term effort is coming up with new joint software-defined radio systems and programs so that we will all have the ability to quickly change the stuff on the fly. And, as our enemy develops new ways of jamming and detecting and finding and fixing our forces, we can quickly change on the fly and add fixes,” he said.
Zero-trust is also important to the JADC2 system, he said, meaning it must not trust information coming in unless it is verified that it’s not adversarial in origin.
Another important piece of JADC2 is that it must be able to communicate with allies and partners, he said.
Michael Zatman, principal director, fully networked command, control and communications for the office of the secretary of defense for research and engineering, said the service networks are currently not all equal in efficiency and effectiveness and the joint network is only as strong as the weakest component.
Therefore, synchronization of effort across the services is important, he said.
Having said that, Zatman noted that the services are doing some creative and useful work in the JADC2 realm.
The JADC2 system must also be resilient in the face of a highly contested battlefield that includes enemy electronic warfare, cyber and kinetic attacks, Zatman said.
“In the future, we’re also looking at autonomous systems taking on our adversaries’ autonomous systems. So, who’s going to win that battle? Well, it’s partly about who comes to the better answer in terms of information processing and decision support,” Zatman said. (Source: US DoD)
28 Feb 22. USAF uses Kessel Run application during Cope North 22 exercise. C2IMERA is developed by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Detachment 12 called Kessel Run. The US Air Force (USAF) has used a Kessel Run application during a multinational humanitarian exercise called Cope North 22. According to a USAF statement, the military branch used a Command and Control Incident Management Emergency Response Application (C2IMERA). The application uses a common operating picture and dashboarding capabilities as communication tools to consolidate information for leaders offering C2 capabilities and improving situational awareness. It is developed by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Detachment 12, commonly known as Kessel Run. During the exercise, the airmen used the application to track assets such as aircraft, as well as individual personnel’s medical status and movement. This provided the leadership with real-time updates on aircraft, personnel, fuels, and communications status among others.
36th Operations Support Squadron non-commissioned officer in charge of airfield operations Staff Sergeant Rebekah Kowalczyk said: “For airfield management, we used it for aircraft accountability, arrivals and departures, tail-number tracking, we also used it for the common operating picture.
“Before we had this, we had Excel documents, PowerPoints, and Word documents that we would use on the share-drive. We also are able to use it on the airfield for real-time updates, rather than having to come into the office with the updated information.”
Last year, Kessel Run’s C2IMERA was used to support evacuation operations in Afghanistan.
The Cope North 22 exercise involved USAF, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft conducting aerial refuelling, close air support, and counter-air operations.
Earlier this month, the USAF announced that it will phase out the Multi-Domain Warfare Officer (13O) career field. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
27 Feb 22. Lockheed and Microsoft partner up on new 5G tech for military. In an exclusive interview, Lockheed’s head of 5G programs described a first demonstration in December, in which Lockheed and Microsoft connected commercial 5G with military datalinks such as Link 16 for simulated missions. Lockheed Martin and software giant Microsoft are joining forces to develop 5G technologies for the military, Lockheed’s head of 5G programs said in an exclusive interview with Breaking Defense. Although the two companies announced the agreement tonight, Lockheed and Microsoft have already collaborated on their first demonstration, which took place at Lockheed Martin Space’s 5G test range in Colorado last December.
“We essentially simulated four different air platforms doing ISR missions and close air support, to support a simulated special operations force on the ground that was pursuing a high value target,” said Dan Rice, Lockheed’s vice president for 5G.MIL, the term Lockheed uses to describe its 5G efforts.
During the laboratory tests, the companies were able to link three hybrid base stations — basically, transportable 5G base stations that can also connect to military networks — to Microsoft’s 5G core and to military datalinks such as NATO’s Link 16 and other advanced tactical links.
The companies also used Microsoft’s Azure Arc, a suite of management tools for cloud environments, to move applications from the enterprise level to the tactical level, to be used by dismounted troops on the ground, Rice said
“The real intent here was to start to expand and show the value of these hybrid connected networks to bridge the gaps that we see today in DoD communication,” he said.
Lockheed CEO Jim Taiclet has personally made 5G integration one of the company’s top priorities since taking its reins in 2020.
During a Feb. 10 investors conference, Taiclet said 5G.MIL could “[put] Lockheed Martin … in the pole position” for joint all domain operations — the US military concept that calls for linking all of the services’ sensors and shooters together so that they can exchange data across currently stovepiped systems.
Lockheed’s vision for 5G.MIL involves taking commercial 5G technologies, figuring out how to integrate them with existing military networks, and layering on protections to make them more resilient and secure, Rice said.
“Existing and emerging DoD communication systems are going to be around for a long time to come, and we can augment and support those existing systems with the capabilities of 5G and next-gen technology,” Rice said. “We don’t view this as ending with 5G, but starting to integrate the commercial telecommunication capabilities, where commercial industry has invested hundreds of billions of dollars to create resilient, high performance, mobile telecommunications.”
Aside from Microsoft, Lockheed has also signed partnership deals with a number of commercial communications companies, including a November 2021 agreement with Verizon and a March 2021 partnership with satellite startup Omnispace. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
28 Feb 22. Pentagon doubles down on 5G spectrum-sharing strategies. The US Department of Defense (DoD) research and engineering (R&E) directorate is doubling down on research and development efforts, exploring spectrum-sharing strategies designed to expand mobile 5G communications capabilities across the US armed forces. 5G spectrum-sharing initiatives will be one of several key areas of investment and development designed to further expedite integration of 5G communications, said Amanda Toman, acting principal director for 5G with the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD R&E). “Understanding that spectrum is going to be a valuable resource into the future … [and] understanding how things can coexist in that spectrum-constrained environment is going to be a huge focus of the [5G] initiative,” she said during an event sponsored by the Potomac Officers Club. (Source: Janes)
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Spectra Group Plc
Spectra Group (UK) Ltd, internationally renowned award-winning information security and communications specialist with a proven record of accomplishment.
Spectra is a dynamic, agile and security-accredited organisation that offers secure Hosted and Managed Solutions and Cyber Advisory Services with a track record of delivering on time, to spec and on budget.
With over 15 years of experience in delivering solutions for governments around the globe, elite militaries and private enterprises of all sizes, Spectra’s platinum and gold-level partnerships with third-party vendors ensure the supply of best value leading-edge technology.
Spectra was awarded the prestigious Queen’s Award for Enterprise (Innovation) in 2019 for SlingShot.
In November 2017, Spectra Group (UK) Ltd announced its listing as a Top 100 Government SME Supplier by the UK Crown Commercial Services.
Spectra’s CEO, Simon Davies, was awarded 2017 Businessman of the Year by Battlespace magazine.
Founded in 2002, the Company is based in Hereford, UK and holds ISO 9001:2015, ISO 27001:2013 and Cyber Essentials Plus accreditation.
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